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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

COUNTERING ‘PLASTIC ADDICTED SUBJECTS’:
POWER, ESSENTIALIZED IDENTITIES, AND EXPERTISE IN THAILAND
Thailand is considered one of the six most significant contributors to marine plastic
pollution in the world. This has led to widespread media attention and condemnation of
Thai people as “addicted to plastic,” with little attention paid to how such discourses
actually take shape. Drawing from semi-structured interviews with Thai regulatory
institutions, grassroots environmental organizations, plastic industry representatives, and
recyclers, I analyze the social, political, economic, and environmental processes that shape
Thailand’s plasticscapes. I propose a feminist political ecology of plastic waste which
attends to people’s lived experiences and perspectives, power relationships underlying
discourses that inform the issue, and Thai activisms. Following feminist ethnographic
scholarship on the importance of situated knowledges that challenge dominant forms of
expertise, I complicate current understandings by revealing that discourses across all
groups interviewed center Thai consumption, often drawing on environmental tropes of
Thainess, while decentering other potential sources of waste such as plastic waste imports.
Meanwhile, findings suggest that those in power are reticent to alleviate the plastic pileup
through measures that would challenge plastic production. Grassroots environmental
organizers calling for strengthened regulatory measures struggle to find a voice in largescale environmental improvement schemes. Therefore, I argue that proposed solutions
must incorporate grassroots voices.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION.

In June 2018, news of a plastic-induced death of a pilot whale on the coast of
Thailand made headlines around the world. Over 80 plastic items were found in the
whale’s stomach, bringing international attention to the massive volume of plastic waste
in the Gulf of Thailand. With little known about the origins and long-term impacts of
plastic waste, questions began to surface as to how this country, with its rich history of
traditional and sustainable practices, had transformed into a hub of plastic waste. News
articles often referenced Thailand’s status as the 6th largest contributor to marine plastic
pollution, further compounding attention on the country’s waste (Jambeck et al. 2015). In
this thesis, I reveal the plasticscape of Thailand. I utilize critical feminist and political
ecology scholarship to analyze how expert knowledges inform the plastic waste issue
while interrogating their limits and contradictions. In particular, I examine discourse that
relegates Thai people as “plastic addicted” and the plastic pileup as Thai-produced. In
doing so, I argue that while Thai consumption is often named as the cause of the plastic
pileup, dominant framings often overlook other major sources such as plastic waste
imports. In turn, I reveal how this mainstreamed discourse of “plastic addiction” limits our
understanding of the problem and restricts the proposed solutions to the waste.
This thesis delves into prevailing hegemonic discourses and environmental
narratives on the plastic waste issue and how they shape Thai residents’ experiences with
plastic waste. My theoretical framework draws upon feminist political ecology and critical
expertise scholars such as Li (2007), Yeh (2013), and Sen (2017) to understand how
discourse and environmental narratives shape Thai subjectivities (Chapter 2). I consider
feminist theory critiques of expertise such as Harding (1986) and Haraway (1988), and
draw from critical Thai studies scholars such as Baker & Phongpaichit (2005) and
Winichakul (1994), to better understand how the construction of Thainess frames notions
of “plastic addicted” Thai people and the solutions posed. This chapter is integral to
understanding how plastic waste shapes Thai subjects as well as how power is embedded
in the narratives about why Thailand is considered the 6th most significant country in
marine plastic waste pollution, and who decides and implements solutions.

1

Figure 1.1 Plastic bottles collected for recycling in Khlong Toei District, Bangkok.
Photo by author (2019).

To situate the particularities of respondents' lived experiences, worldviews, and
everyday activities within broader systems, patterns, and forces, as highlighted by other
feminist political ecology scholars, I engaged in feminist methods for an ethnographic
qualitative research analysis (Chapter 3). My qualitative research design included two
months of fieldwork in Bangkok conducting semi-structured interviews, discourse
analysis, narrative analysis, and participant observations. My research participants
included Bangkok's environmental regulatory institutions, the plastic industry, plastic
recyclers, grassroots environmental organizations, and residents living and working near
plastic waste sites.
These methods informed my development of Thailand’s plastic landscape or
plasticscape. I detail processes of power, as they play out in Thailand’s plastic production,
2

consumption, waste separation and management, and plastic waste imports (Chapter 4).
Through this analysis, I reveal how Thailand maintains highly uneven exposure to plastic
waste and access to proper waste management systems, exacerbated through waste imports,
creating a significant barrier to stemming waste into the ocean. In particular, the imbalance
of power in decision-making leads to struggles over funding, resources, information access,
and contradictory support and opposition to specific anti-waste strategies. I demonstrate
the contested nature of waste management solutions and power-laden conflicts over who
is informing the issue, making decisions, and proposing improvement schemes. I then turn
to examine how this plasticscape is shaped by discourse.
Powerful expert knowledges largely define the plastic problem and its solutions
(Chapter 5). Drawing on feminist studies and feminist political ecology scholarship to
locate and position knowledges, I interrogate expert knowledges originating from Western
and international academic and media institutions. These Western scientific studies and
rationales impose authoritative agreements and agendas in Thailand, while discourses of
blame centering “plastic addiction” saturate the media. I demonstrate how local elites
deploy discourses of expertise that inform the solutions, shaping environmental
improvement schemes such as the circular economy and the Roadmap for Plastic Waste
Management (2018-2030). Governmental and plastic industry actors shape alliances and
networks that primarily influence these top-down agendas and resolutions which, while
galvanizing new support and action, simultaneously dissuade focus on reducing plastic
production as a solution. As such, I argue that expertise continually emerges as a tool for
exercising power to shape the proposed solutions, resulting in a notable lack of attention to
plastic production and an aversion to plastic bans and taxes. As a result, many
environmental activists, waste collectors, and other grassroots actors fail to hear their
voices reflected in decision-making.
As grassroots environmental activists push back against the proposed
environmental improvement schemes, fundamental tensions are emerging in the strategic
networks and coalitions formed between waste actors in the government, plastic industry,
and environmental sphere (Chapter 6). These grassroots activists enact trash cleanups,
corporate accountability campaigns, reusable product designs, creative public
performances in plastic bag costumes, protests against waste imports outside of ASEAN
3

summits, and petitions targeted at governmental regulators. These environmentalists
reproduce and contest certain forms of prominent expertise, and work to form their own
expert knowledges. Meanwhile, I demonstrate how these concerted efforts to address the
plastic issue challenge notions of Thailand’s residents as “plastic addicted.”
Drawing on anti-essentialist feminist political ecology scholarship on
environmental subjects and critical Thai studies, this thesis then turns to further interrogate
international and domestic media discourses that consistently focus on Thai people who
are "addicted to plastic” (Chapter 7). This particular discourse is achieved in part through
its pairing with essentializing constructions of Thai people, and tropes about Thai
environmental behaviors and qualities. By focusing on the work of critical Thai studies
scholars such as Baker & Phongpaichit (2005), Winichakul (1994), and Harrison &
Jackson (2010), I uncover the construction of Thainess by way of nationalist state projects,
colonialism, and hegemonic Western discourses. I argue that interviewees across
government, industry, recycling, and activist spheres reproduce tropes to explain Thai
environmental behavior, plastic consumption patterns, and activisms. As a result, this
narrow focus on consumer behavior obfuscates attention to other sources of waste such as
plastic waste imports and toxins and chemicals released along the plastic commodity chain,
thereby silencing a diverse array of environmental narratives, activisms, and experiences.
I conclude by advocating for increased incorporation of grassroots voices and
solutions in Thailand’s environmental improvement schemes (Chapter 8). Through
integrating grassroots actors’ concerns, demands, and strategies, there is potential for
empowering a broad range of grassroots organizations, informal waste collectors (saleng),
and other waste actors who are not otherwise included in decision-making. Likewise, these
findings bring the potential for more socially just solutions to the plastic waste issue, as
well as an influx of creative anti-plastic waste solutions and a thriving anti-plastic waste
movement.
In sum, this thesis critiques current framings of the plastic waste issue. Through
this analysis, I demonstrate how hegemonic discourses of expertise are deployed for
various agendas, often constructing Thai ‘plastic addicted subjects’ as the source of
Thailand’s plastic waste, while overlooking other sources of waste. Instead, this thesis
challenges readers to consider the limitations of this framework and associated narratives
4

that presume to explain the plastic pileup and solutions deemed appropriate. As such, this
thesis reveals the various sources of waste, the diverse plasticscapes by which residents are
differentially affected by plastic waste, and the variegated responses and activisms taken
by Thai residents to counter this issue. Through illuminating situated knowledges, resident
experiences, and environmental subjectivities, this thesis promotes solutions that move
beyond a myopic framework of “plastic addiction,” moving toward greater inclusion of
grassroots voices and socially just agendas in decision making.

5

CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1

The History of Political Ecology, the Poststructural Turn, and the Emergence of
Feminist Political Ecology
This thesis provides a critical stance on plastic waste in Thailand. In particular, I

examine how expert knowledges inform and frame the issue and its solutions while
investigating their contradictions and limits. I utilize feminist political ecology scholarship
to interrogate environmental subjects, environmental narratives, and environmental
improvement schemes, while my approach draws attention to the ways that local grassroots
efforts both are subject to and counter these discourses of expertise. In doing so, I ask: what
hegemonic discourses and environmental narratives on the plastic waste issue prevail and
what solutions do they privilege; how do particular groups engage with, counter, and
reproduce these discourses and narratives; what subjectivities do these discourses and
environmental narratives produce; how do the responses and activisms enacted translate
onto subjectivities. To answer these questions, it is vital to draw on feminist critiques of
hegemonic and expert knowledges, political ecology scholarship on subjects and
environmental narratives, and feminist political ecology interrogations of environmental
improvement and development schemes in the global south. I incorporate these particular
literatures as they are necessary for understanding how plastic waste reworks Thai subjects
in terms of who they are and their responsibilities. However, I will first explain the history
of political ecology and the emergence of feminist political ecology.
Political ecology is a multidisciplinary field that works to examine the relationship
between politics and ecology. According to political ecology, environmental degradation
is largely determined by political power in terms of who has control and access to
environmental knowledge and resources, and the circumstances under which this control

6

Figure 2.1 Chao Phraya River, Bangkok. Photo by author (2019).

is wielded (Neumann, 2005). This scholarly endeavor emerged in the 1980s, primarily the
work of geographers and anthropologists (Neumann, 2005). Its roots are in cultural
ecology, a field formed in opposition to environmental determinism, concerned with
human adaptation to and impacts on natural landscapes (Haenn & Wilk 2006, Biersack &
Greenberg 2006, Robbins 2012, Neumann 2005).
Amidst growing interest in communities and their relationship with global
capitalism, anthropologists and geographers engaging cultural ecology began to consider
issues beyond cultural adaptation to the environment such as power, economic systems of
inequality, environmental history, and social constructions of nature (Haenn & Wilk,
2006). Meanwhile, the field transformed when Michael Watts critiqued cultural ecology
for its nature-society dualisms and portrayal of human behavior as rational adaptations to
environmental hazards (Neumann, 2005). Instead, Watts suggested that nature and society
are a dialectical process and pointed to the social, political, and economic structures that
dictate and constrain human interaction with the environment (Neumann, 2005). An
7

emerging political ecology recognized that environmental crisis and degradation should be
explained through the lens of social theory, specifically Marxist political economy related
to the power relations that shape structures of inequality and political processes.
In critique of political ecology’s overemphasis on material processes, the field then
experienced a poststructuralist turn. Escobar (2010) explains that poststructuralism
advocates a theory of social reality in which discursive representations are inseparable from
material reality. In other words, “poststructuralism treats language not as a reflection of
‘reality’ but as constitutive of it” (Escobar, 2010: 93). Likewise, an emergent poststructural
political ecology aimed to address differing conceptions of environmental problems and to
counter dominant and authoritative knowledge by recognizing reality as produced
discursively (Biersack & Greenberg 2006; Elmhirst 2011; Elmhirst 2015). In other words,
poststructuralism recognizes the structures of power as laid out by early political ecology
but counters the more rigid and essentialized aspects of structuralism through a
reexamination of how this power is located, operated, and contested. Liberation Ecologies
by Richard Peet and Michael Watts exemplifies this shift beyond a narrow focus on
structural Marxian political economy, advocating a discursive analysis applied to
ecological issues. Their book demonstrates the poststructural reconfiguration of political
ecology agendas to examine societal factors aside from class and critiques of prevailing
discourses on development (Peet and Watts, 2004). Additionally, Peet and Watts (2004)
stressed an attention to agency and social movements, and their situatedness within larger
structures and contexts. Poststructuralism therefore, transformed how political ecologists
both approached and understood environment and power.
Many political ecologists who draw upon poststructuralism contribute to feminist
political ecology, a subfield that both exemplifies this turn and emerged in the 1990s
through the work of gender and development studies (Elmhirst, 2015). This turn was the
result of not only feminist theoretical developments within academia but also the grounded
empirics researchers discovered in the field and the work of environmental, feminist
activists. For example, leading up to the turn, political ecologists were attending to issues
of power, especially as it related to class. According to Dianne Rocheleau’s situated
knowledge, around the late 1970s and early 80s, many researchers including herself were
entering the ‘field’ to investigate class, only to find that gender was the integral factor
8

shaping livelihoods, landscapes, and power relations in the global north and south
(Harcourt & Nelson, 2015). These encounters with intersectional identities in relation to
environments and livelihoods were, for Rocheleau, where feminist political ecology first
began.

2.2

Illuminating Situated and Expert Knowledges through Feminist Political Ecology
Feminist critiques of science and attention to situated knowledges were developed

by Donna Haraway and Sandra Harding, providing a foundation for feminist political
ecologists scholars. In her seminal piece, "The science question in feminism,” Harding
(1986) exposes the sexist roots of science, challenging its otherwise objective and
indisputable position while calling for a revised ‘science’ that relies on postmodern
sensibilities. In response to Harding’s critique, Haraway (1988) examines the difficulty of
recognizing and translating knowledges that exist between asymmetrical power relations
and different communities. Firstly, this difficulty results from the ways in which we are
trained to believe certain perspectives over others, which represent hegemonic discourses.
Paralleling the reputation of science, these are often presented as objective (a ‘god-trick’)
and therefore represent a ‘gaze from nowhere,’ where the source of this perspective is not
visible or knowable (Haraway, 1988). This vision of the world claims “…the power to see
and not be seen, to represent while escaping representation” (Haraway, 1988: 581).
In order to counter this phenomenon, Haraway and Harding assert all knowledge is
socially situated and comes from somewhere. Knowledge is a political project in which
power is asserted to benefit some over others. In addressing the plastic waste issue and
expert knowledges that arise, I utilize the concept of "situated knowledges," in which
rational knowledge claims are located, positioned, situated, and impartial, not universal
and objective (Haraway, 1988: 581). These embodied knowledges are subjective and
produced socially and relationally in communities, not by a single individual, where even
our own ability to locate and name our positions is inherently limited. In producing feminist
work, Haraway explains that we can speak only from a limited location and situated
knowledge, and that promoting a particular knowledge is a power move rather than a move
toward truth.

9

Feminist political ecology scholarship continues to rely on the foundational works
of Harding and Haraway, considering the power of discourse, expertise, and situated
knowledges. A major trend in feminist political ecology, which my research draws upon,
is to investigate so-called expert knowledge and the results it produces (Harcourt & Nelson,
2015). Expert knowledges largely relate to the idea of hegemony, a concept developed by
Antonio Gramsci that has influenced scholars across a broad range of disciplines. For some,
hegemony represents the rendering of enforcement and power as spontaneous or inevitable,
such as common constructions of ‘culture’ (Robbins, 2007). For others, more broadly,
“…hegemony refers to a pervasive, lived experience of power relations…” “… it is never
static or totalizing, but rather processual, unstable, and constantly fought over and
maintained on many sites and at different levels, requiring ongoing effort” (Yeh, 2013: 12).
To address expert knowledges and hegemonic discourses that go largely unquestioned,
feminist political ecology draws heavily from poststructural feminist theory, which
emphasizes issues of identity, situated knowledge, and power asymmetries (Rocheleau,
2008). Therefore, a large body of feminist political ecology scholarship interrogates issues
of environmental knowledges and the positionality of those who produce this knowledge.
These theoretical developments laid the groundwork for major trends in feminist
political ecology scholarship including research in the global south that analyzes the
diversity of perspectives and voices that contest and counter hegemonic narratives
(Harcourt & Nelson, 2015). Attention to situated knowledges that interrogate expert
knowledges from the margins decenters this hegemonic thought, exposing powerful beliefs
that underlie knowledge production on issues of environmental degradation. Tania Li
(2007) explains that expert knowledges and expertise through governmental rationality,
“constitutes the boundary between those who are positioned as trustees, with the capacity
to diagnose deficiencies in others, and those who are subject to expert direction” (p. 7). In
other words, certain groups maintain the power to define, measure, and narrate
environmental issues and to enforce particular activity as a result. However, expert
knowledges are not always utilized solely by the state. It is important to consider that in
addition to being harder to locate, expert knowledges represent:
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“…knowledge that has become authoritative because it is used and left
unchallenged by many actors, including those that are also engaged in
conflicts with the state. Accordingly, expertise should not be seen as that
which is connected only to the interests and practices of opposing actors,
but as something that is shared and used for political advantage by all
groups” (Forsyth, 2019a: 2).

While there is a clear need to interrogate expert knowledges, their status as expertise does
not necessarily invalidate them, nor does it mean that its wielder is in the right or wrong.
Struggles over who claims certain expertise pervade across international lines and
domestically between a variety of groups, serving as a powerful and political tool.
Likewise, situated knowledges from the margins are not inherently innocent and can be
moves toward power as well. Meanwhile, locating these knowledges and experiences of
the environment also calls for attention to the positionalities of those producing them,
influencing the work of feminist political ecologists including Sundberg (2017), Rocheleau
& Nirmal (2015), Nightingale (2003), and many others. These feminist political ecologists
credit the work of Harding and Haraway for their theoretical and methodological
contribution in the critique of hegemonic policies and institutional initiatives, while
attending to the positionalities of those who produce the situated knowledges that contest
them.
Political ecologist scholars have been successful in critiques of expert knowledges.
In The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics, Li
(2007) introduces her research on development schemes aimed at improving Indonesia,
taking a critical stance that does not offer a plan for improvement, but “… that seeks to
prize open expert knowledge and expose its limits” (p. 2). She asks questions about how
these programs of improvement are shaped by political-economic relations and the
exclusions that they necessitate, remaining critical of the programs and the expert
knowledges upon which they are based. Following feminist scholarship, Li (2007) suggests
that “…the claim to expertise in optimizing the lives of others is a claim to power, one that
merits careful scrutiny” (p. 5). In the case of Indonesia improvement schemes, expertise is
often achieved through rending political issues apolitical, framing them instead as
11

technical, and reinforcing boundaries that paint their expert positions as uniquely
positioning them to understand the solutions. Meanwhile, rather than relying on state
violence or direct control, these neoliberal and transnational development programs rely
on “… educating the desires and reforming the practices of their target population” in order
to shape their participation in these schemes (p. 16). Drawing on Marx, Gramsci, and
Foucault, Li (2007) demonstrates the complex multiplicities of power, a genealogy of
government interventions and their prescriptions/exclusions, and “analysis of what
happens when those interventions become entangled with the processes they would
regulate and improve” (p. 27). Her empirics shed light on the inconsistencies and distrust
in improvement schemes to actually improve lives through attention to environmental
narratives and subject formation.

2.3

Situating Environmental Narratives in Political Ecology
In order to understand issues of situated and expert knowledges, political ecology

scholars utilize discourse and narrative analysis. Discourse is a system of language,
representations and practices that produces conventional forms of knowledge and which
produces meanings, identities, and social relations (Cope & Kurtz, 2016). Meanwhile,
narrative analysis is useful for identifying the stories told by different actors, as well as the
ways in which people position themselves as protagonists, how people discuss a series of
events, and how social movements narrate their struggles (Cope & Kurtz, 2016). The study
of environmental narratives more specifically, has a long history in the origins of political
ecology. Environmental narratives are oft described as simplified stories in which ideas of
blame and responsibility are attributed (Hajer, 1995).
During the emergence of early political ecology, anthropologists Fairhead and
Leach investigated environmental narratives told about deforestation in Africa and found
that structures of power placed colonial visions above local ecological knowledge (Leach
& Mearns, 1996). In effect, the dominant narratives explaining the cause and effect of this
environmental degradation served the interests of colonial powers. Environmental
narratives are always imbued with political dimensions that necessitate deconstruction and
reframing of their discourses in order to understand why some are accepted over others.
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These narratives are utilized to push particular agendas by a wide range of actors, while
political ecologists are especially interested in interrogating those advocated by
international environment and development discourses (Robbins 2012). For example, in a
discussion on public-private partnerships for waste management in Asia, Tim Forsyth notes
a range of efforts by NGOs and political groups to maintain “specific narratives of
environmental concern,” that privilege the empowerment of particular actors over actually
addressing the environmental issue of waste (Forsyth, 2005: 432). Narratives are formed
within particular structures and seemingly unchallengeable civic epistemologies,
demonstrating how “…knowledge and political agencies of different actors are coproduced
in reductive ways” (Forsyth, 2019b: 593). Environmental narratives therefore exist within
power structures and relations, both shaping and shaped by actors. Environmental
narratives play an important role in understanding how particular subjectivities are
produced and why certain solutions are promoted over others in addressing environmental
issues.
I draw from a rich body of feminist political ecology scholarship that critiques
hegemonic international discourses and development and improvement schemes, largely
enacted in the global south. Drawing examples from Sundberg (1998), Truelove (2011),
Sen (2017), Li (2007), and Yeh (2013), these works form a foundation for my own
approach in addressing the plastic pileup in Thailand. For example, Sundberg (1998)
addresses environmental narratives shaped by conservationists in Guatemala that are often
presented as being factual and “true representations of reality” (p. 86). These expert
knowledges then place value on particular practices, leading different groups and social
movements to claim livelihoods or identities as a means of gaining access to and control
over land. Sundberg explains that conservationists working from global-level institutions
such as NGOs, are shaping environmental agendas outside of Guatemala and across the
world through generating particular discourses and practices. These discourses that explain
the causes of environmental degradation are imbued with power relations that privilege
particular ways of thinking while marginalizing and silencing others. Local people living
in areas where these NGOs exist then interact with these discourses, adopting them into
their own environmental narratives about their relationship to nature, thereby articulating
new identities. Sundberg calls us to ask how local environmental groups interact with these
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discourses and practices and how the political ecologies are then transformed through these
interactions.
Meanwhile, in response to the plastic pileup, the government of Thailand has
initiated a number of non-binding and unenforced anti-plastic bans and other efforts. Those
in power are reticent to alleviate the plastic pileup through measures that would challenge
plastic production, as international discourses largely serve their interests. Those
spearheading these initiatives such as the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
reference the expert knowledges of the plastic industry (largely situated within the publicprivate partnership or PPP) as the driving force shaping these responses to the plastic waste.
These industry and government organizations likewise draw on international and global
discourses on the circular economy. Following political ecology scholarship, I consider
how individuals make sense of events and narrate knowledges about plastic waste in
Thailand, as it is critical to understanding the environmental issue and why particular
solutions are promoted over others under global capitalism, with special attention paid to
circular economy discourses. I additionally interrogate Thai plasticscapes, which I develop
to describe the ways in which plastic moves throughout and shapes Thai landscapes.
Drawing on Swyngedouw’s (1999) use of the “waterscape,” which describes how water
interacts with people, culture, and power, I consider how plastic both shapes and is shaped
by nature and society in Thailand. Following this scholarly tradition, I develop the concept
of Thailand’s plastic landscape or plasticscape to represent the power-laden and hybrid
socio-natural landscape. Political and economic power is interrogated, as waste
management systems, cleanups, and plastic production reconfigure the lives of Thai
residents.
I examine particular forms of environmental processes and behavior and their
ability to produce subjectivities. In the wake of major media events in which megafauna
died by consuming plastic waste and shifts in attention to Thailand’s plastic waste issue
through the country’s ranking and media coverage, interviewees noted how Thailand and
they themselves ‘woke up’ to the issue of plastic. I will consider how interviewees tell
environmental narratives about the cause of the plastic pileup, their geographic proximity
to and interaction with plastic waste, and how this changed how they felt about their role,
responsibility, and subjectivity in dealing with plastic waste.
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2.4

The Making of Environmental Subjects through Feminist Political Ecology
Lessons learned from Sundberg (1998), Truelove (2011), Sen (2017), Li (2007),

and Yeh (2013) demonstrate the vital importance of scholarship that seeks to interrogate
the effects of global hegemonic discourses and environmental improvement and
development schemes on environmental subjects and narratives. Additionally, political
ecologists are increasingly attending to the issue of environmental subjects as a line of
inquiry. In critical scholarship, largely derived from Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser,
the term “subject” refers to the dual position of an actor who acts freely, as well as one who
is subjected to a higher authority (Robbins, 2007). This theorizing of the subject displaced
the idea of a fixed or locatable identity since, as it implies, our identities are shaped and
differentiated by particular social processes. Identity remains a contested subject, proving
politically useful in issues of social justice and bringing attention to the ways in which
experiences vary across axes of difference. However, it can also be seen as essentialist,
assigning particular qualities and attributes to categories of difference. As seen in
poststructural political ecology, particularly feminist political ecology thought, identity
categories are often deconstructed.
In political ecology, attention to subjects and the ways in which their subjectivities
and identities are constituted and produced by environmental issues was sparked by the
work of Arun Agrawal, in his influential book, Environmentality. Agrawal (2005) used this
concept to develop the term “environmental subjects,” or “those for whom the environment
constitutes a critical domain of thought and action” (p. 16). Examining environmental
subjects in particular involves “identities of people and social groups” and how these
“political identities and social struggles are shown to be linked to basic issues of livelihood
and environmental activity” (Robbins 2012: 22). While poststructural scholars consider
identity and subjects in relation to the structures and processes that shape them, they also
attend to how identities are shaped by discourse. Subjectivity as nested within
poststructuralism is seen as constructed through discourse and narratives.
Agrawal’s (2005) “environmental subject” has inspired a large body of political
ecology scholarship on environmental relations, environmental management schemes, and
environmental discourses and how they are translated onto subjectivities. As subjects are
increasingly integrated with global commodity markets, global waste trades, and large
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international NGOs and institutions, political ecologists concern themselves with “… how
local actors conversely confront expected identities by acting to secure their own social
ecologies or how the imposition of institutions leads to problematic new kinds of people”
(Robbins, 2012: 224). These social relations and processes create new types of people
through shaping beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. For example, Agrawal (2005) found that
while subjects ostensibly had control over their day-to-day conditions, they internalized
new priorities through discourses that were of value to or imposed by external authorities
(Robbins, 2012). Another particularly prominent study on environmental subjects is Paul
Robbins’ (2007) Lawn People. Through surveys and interviews, Robbins reveals that the
use of lawn chemicals on American lawns relates to how people view themselves as a good
community member and as participants in collective, positive action. Simultaneously, this
chemical use coincides with growth in American middle-class home ownership and a
growing chemical industry. Robbins asserts that “This structure of institutions and identity
is therefore convenient first for a state system that harnesses a stable and docile middle
class and second for an economic system that enrolls household landscape management
into global capitalist chemical markets” (Robbins, 2012: 229). Conclusively, these
“turfgrass tenders” are subjects situated in a structured political economy (Robbins, 2012:
229). The text interrogates the many forces that play a role in shaping lawn-owning
subjects, from economic structures to the grass itself, revealing and dissecting the
contradictions between people’s beliefs about the relative dangers of chemical use and their
actions in maintaining lawns.
Lawn People exposes how hegemony and powerful discourses play a role in
governing “…what people think and who they think they are” (Robbins, 2012: 219).
Although this particular study took place in the context of the U.S., studies on
environmental subjects are useful for comparative studies, looking at disparate and unified
communities through the lens of environmental narratives (Robbins, 2012). Geographic
location and scale also play a role in environmental subject formation, considering
globalization, transnational movements, international organizations, and nationality. Other
political ecologists aim to demonstrate subjectivities and practices that “…have been
produced at the intersection of neoliberal capitalism and sustainable development…” (Peet,
Robbins & Watts, 2011: 11). For example, Yeh (2013) investigates the effects of
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hegemonic Chinese development on Tibet’s landscape and the multiplicity of ways in
which Tibetan people interact with, counter, and reproduce related discourses. Yeh (2013)
interlinks state projects, economic marginalization, and subject formation, in relation to
environmental change. These scholarly works on environmental subjects and narratives are
concerned with issues of environmental improvement schemes, development projects, and
other environmental interventions.
As noted by political ecologists, the many activisms, day-to-day behaviors, and
responses within different ecologies influence “what [subjects] think about the
environment (their ideas), which in turn influences who they think they are (their
identities)” (Robbins 2012: 216). I consider Thai plasticscapes, plastic consumption, and
the variety of activisms enacted by grassroots actors, reflecting on how these responses
from trash cleanups to public advocacy efforts shape Thai subjects. Following Robbins
(2007), I consider how activities such as engagement in recycling, produces subjects with
identities “… as a good citizen is associated with a set of specific environmental activities”
and obedience to particular powers (Peet, Robbins, Watts, 2011: 33). I additionally
consider how these responses (actions, ideas, discourses, and identities) are embedded
within complex power geometries with respect to the plastic industry, Thai government,
and historical/cultural context. For example, as Thailand is increasingly integrated in the
global waste trade, material flows of plastic waste into the country reconfigure
subjectivities as well.
As I trace the ways in which plastic waste has shaped distinct environmental
subjects and identities in Thailand, I hope to demonstrate how these plastic subjectivities
interact with different preexisting subjectivities and axes of difference. Drawing on
Nightingale (2006, 2011), feminist poststructural theory is useful to “…outline antiessentialist framings of the political ecological subject” (Sundberg 2017: 6). Scholars such
as Sultana and Nightingale “…advance the concept of intersectionality by explicitly
considering how subject identity is constituted in and through material ecological relations”
(Sundberg 2017: 8). As such, I consider the impact of Thailand’s plasticscapes,
environmental degradation, and prolific plastic consumption on the constitution of
environmental subjects. These material ecological relations then interact with political
histories of nationalism and colonialism to reshape subjects. Through discourse analysis, I
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examine how plastic consumption, activism, and action interacts with axes of identity such
as class and nationality to shape subjectivity, as individuals affect and are affected by
perceptions of environmental behavior.
Just as material interaction with countering plastic waste forms subjectivities, these
subjectivities likewise interact with the identity construct Thainess. This identity is
considered a “single, unified, and regimented ‘Thai culture’ or ‘Thai nation’” that was
invoked in interviews throughout my fieldwork (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005: 229). The
creation of an essentialized Thai identity, homogenous nation, and bolstered Thai
nationalism is a project of the state, undergoing variegated iterations until its contemporary
application. For example, in the mid 1900s, this started at an early age in which school
children were encouraged to “buy Thai goods; love Thailand and love to be a Thai; live a
Thai life, speak Thai, and esteem Thai culture” (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005: 171).
Thainess is often placed in relation to Western logics in terms of particular anti-plastic
solutions and waste management infrastructure and development schemes. For example,
some anti-waste solutions such as reusable products are relegated as ‘Western’ and
incompatible with Thai culture. Tropes were consistently evoked as a means of describing
Thai people’s plastic consumption and relation to plastic waste. These tropes reflected
negative behaviors or qualities attributed to Thai culture, reflecting current dominant social
values and concerns. At times, interviews demonstrated negative tropes and narratives
about Thai identity in relation to plastic waste and development, in which Thainess was
equated with a lack of environmental care as compared to ‘developed’ and ‘Western’
countries. However, I do not frame these as a straightforward mimicking of Western views,
despite Thailand’s historic incorporation in colonial economies. Instead, following Yeh
(2003), I interrogate these subjectivities and discourses through attending to history,
cultural ideas, and experiences of relevant hegemonic waste management, plastic waste
discourses, and development projects. These discourses reveal the ways in which power is
experienced and shaped through relations, structures, and governmental schemes.
As such, I interrogate the historical and contemporary meanings of Thainess,
drawing on critical Thai scholarship including Baker & Phongpaichit (2005), Winichakul
(1994), and Harrison & Jackson (2010). I consider Thai studies scholars and the work of
poststructural anti-essentialism in political ecology such as Escobar (2010) in developing
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Thainess as a social construction and hegemonic knowledge, in which those deemed Thai
are attributed particular environmental characteristics and traits. These inform the various
invocations of Thainess in relation to the cause of the plastic waste pileup, the solutions to
the environmental issue, and the rational for particular consumption patterns. In doing so,
I interrogate power geometries 1 in which Thailand’s residents differentially experience
plastic waste and the reconfigurations of plastic subjectivities.

2.5

Countering and Contesting Expert Knowledges
The anti-plastic waste movement is made of strategically formed alliances and

networks. Through these coalitions, I interrogate the role of expert and situated knowledges
in terms of what groups value, advocate, and promote. In order to understand the role of
shared goals, differing strategies, and tensions between groups, I draw from feminist
scholarship on coalitions, including Taylor (2018), Keating (2018), and Lugones (2003).
In the case of anti-plastic waste activism in Thailand, a broad range of coalitional tensions
are clearly emerging. Coalitions are often considered effective for addressing
heterogeneous issues (Taylor, 2018). For some feminist scholars, coalitions are theorized
as places of everyday encounter in which we are forced to reckon with the complexities of
interacting oppressions tied to identity for the sake of achieving a particular goal (Keating,
2018). For others, coalitions are theorized as relationships between individuals or groups
that share a common or overlapping goal in which groups seek to address a common
interest, while others might involve people supporting one another’s forms of resistance in
everyday life, coined by María Lugones (2003) as “interdependently resistant” (Keating,
2018). The strengths and weaknesses of these particular ways of forging coalitions is likely
situational but helps to inform the coalitions shaping Thailand’s anti-plastic movement.
However, through these coalitions, I examine what goals, strategies, and knowledges are
valued in plastic waste discourse.
Thailand’s plastic waste issue gained attention both domestically and
internationally, in large part due to its ranking as the 6 th largest contributor to marine plastic
1 Discussed further in Chapter 4, the term “power geometry” was coined by feminist geographer Doreen Massey. The
concept explains the ways in which power differentials shape spatiality and mobility. This in turn reproduces societal
inequalities.
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pollution (Jambeck et al., 2015). This thesis will discuss international tensions in which
interviewees situated in government and industry positions in Thailand question the
expertise upon which the ranking and other knowledges are based. In doing so, I investigate
“…the way specific forms of ecological knowledge are selected and validated, the way
environmental problems are narrated and structured, and what assumptions and practices
become normal and internalized for people” (Peet, Robbins, Watts, 2011: 40). Expertise is
framed throughout the thesis in terms of political power, as I move to look at other scientific
studies, citizen science, and grassroots claims to expertise surrounding the plastic waste
issue.
Countering and contesting expert knowledges are vital in feminist political ecology
as they reveal the power dynamics behind supposedly unquestionable claims, revealing the
failure of particular truths to account for lived experiences. Meanwhile, illuminating
situated knowledges which contest this expertise provides a new way to maintain the
rigorous aspects of science while incorporating a broader range of questions,
interpretations, perspectives, and topics, especially with respect to inclusions of more
marginalized groups (Cope, 2002). These situated knowledges may lie in tension with one
another but highlighting these contradictions can make new types of struggle possible.
Through countering expert knowledges, socially minded individuals and groups can
strengthen their own claims of truth and contribute to environmentally just agendas.
Political ecologists also provide such critiques with the hope of inspiring more
socially just and inclusive solutions to otherwise short-sighted development and
improvement schemes. For example, Truelove (2011) inserts feminist political ecology
into her analysis of water inequality in Delhi to highlight voices that counter hegemonic
discourses and policies regarding water use. Truelove (2011) considers everyday practices
to examine the effects of water rights on embodied experience and subjectivities in
particular spaces and communities. The everyday in her analysis contrasts with “…the
ways that international discourses on water are converging to serve the narrow interest of
water companies, primarily supporting privatization” and “…a nearly uniform set of
proposed solutions for addressing highly diverse water problems…,” demonstrating how
inequalities can worsen even as water management improves (Truelove, 2011: 144). In
other words, a feminist political ecology lens is useful to disrupt hegemonic international
20

discourse promoting water privatization, as this does little to address the diverse local
problems surrounding water use in the city.
Similarly, Debarati Sen’s (2017) Everyday Sustainability demonstrates the
contradictions that arise in the institution of capitalistic environmental initiatives that
purport to improve women’s lives. Sen raises questions about how people engage with,
reproduce, or reject global discourses, and how this affects their inclusion or exclusion in
decision-making and other efforts (2017). In the case of the Fair-Trade organics, “women’s
collective ways of making meaning and translating… somehow never ﬁnd voice in these
large discourses of saving the poor based on notions of individual autonomy, homogenized
understandings of women and the reiﬁcation of the “modern” ﬁrst world as the agent of
change…” (Sen, 2017: 24). In this study, global discourses are superimposed onto an
individual's own understanding of an issue and negotiated to produce particular
knowledges. Additionally, this framework attends to how social differences operate in the
everyday and how they connect to larger economic, political, environmental, and social
systems.
Through investigating the plastic pileup in Thailand, this chapter draws upon a range
of theoretical contributions in the field of political ecology. In particular, poststructural
feminist political ecology is useful for attending to issues of power as it applies to material
and discursive contexts. Hegemonic expert knowledges and situated knowledges are
interrogated, especially useful for revealing asymmetrical power relations and the
coproduction of environmental degradation and inequality in the global south. I draw on
these knowledges to consider how environmental narratives can explain why particular
solutions and agendas are prioritized over others with respect to environmental issues. I
then examine how these discourses and environmental narratives are translated onto
subjectivities, forming ‘plastic addicted subjects.’ Finally, contesting and countering these
expert knowledges demonstrates how hegemonic global discourses and environmental
narratives lead to contradictions, exposing their limits and failure of particular initiatives
to account for lived experiences.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS AND DATA

3.1

Feminist Theory and Methodology
Feminist scholars advocate qualitative methodology as a means of forming a more

collaborative exchange, in which subjects and researchers are co-constitutive of the
research process (Wilkinson 1998; Cloke et al. 2004). Recognizing the situatedness of
research methods and power, I engage with more participatory methods of semi-structured
interviews and participant observation, while considering the power dynamics imbued in
the process of knowledge production. In this chapter, I first describe my feminist
methodology including the definition of my field site, my theoretical contributions through
the extended case method, my positionality as a researcher and Western, white woman in
Thailand, and the framing of this qualitative ethnographic research. I then outline my
methods of recruitment and data collection, as well as my methods of analysis: interviews,
participant observation, and discourse and narrative analysis.
While my research broadly explores the plastic waste issue in Thailand, defining
the boundaries of the ‘field’ in my fieldwork is ambiguous and fuzzy. The very act of
defining what constitutes the ‘field’ creates a false binary between the academic (away
from ‘home’) and those we study in the ‘field’ (Staeheli and Lawson, 1994). In reality,
such binaries are far messier and more contingent; as a Western, white, female researcher
conducting fieldwork on plastic waste in Thailand, I attempt to bring research ‘home’ by
recognizing the ways in which I am subject to the structures that shape my research area.
As stated by Burawoy (2000), “… global ethnographers cannot be outside the global
processes they study” in which a reevaluation of scale and the global meant releasing
fieldwork “…from being bound to a single place and time” (p. 4). I, too, am situated within
the global waste trade when consuming plastic in the U.S., and I contribute to the plastic
waste issue as a product of living in Thailand.
Meanwhile, feminist qualitative research in Geography recognizes power as
shaping both large-scale and ‘political’ as well as small scale and ‘personal’ (Delyser et
al., 2010). Defining the field must also consider a broad range of actions, areas, and
qualities across scale that affect a particular issue. As evidenced through this project,
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Thailand is shaped by broad systems, global waste trades, and international discourses,
affecting local responses and activisms. Meanwhile, those in Bangkok work, reside, and
shape policies outside of the city limits and are affected by plastic waste as it moves through
the environment, regardless of province and country borders. Additionally, participant’s
imaginations connect them to the global (Burawoy, 2000). Feminist methodology
necessitates attending to power at all stages of the research process, while calls for rigorous
self-reflection and attention to power dynamics during and after fieldwork “…allows
qualitative research to demonstrate the relevance of the single case (credibility) and to
move beyond it (transferability) with a degree of certainty (dependability and
confirmability)” (Baxter and Eyles, 1997). I consider the implications of my methods in
relation to the methodology of the extended case method.
Methodology is considered the link or relationship between theory and techniques
and data (Burawoy, 1991). In connecting theory and empirics, I am particularly inspired
by the extended case method, which aims to (re)construct existing theory, while grounding
itself in fieldwork and data. Drawing on participant observation, this methodology exposes
anomalies and unexpected contradictions, revealing the shortcomings of theory as grounds
for such reconstruction. Therefore, extended case method always starts with theory, moves
to the field, and then back to theory.
Theory underlies all aspects of the research process from the questions we ask to
the ways in which we interact in the field or produce knowledge. I draw from the extended
case method, acknowledging the theoretical underpinnings and structural relations that
shape Thailand’s plastic waste issue, while attending to the particularities of place. I seek
to explain why particular responses and strategies are implemented in Thailand,
considering local histories, while drawing on similar studies of large-scale environmental
improvements schemes and grassroots pushback in the global south. The extended case
method shapes this analysis, seeing social situations as shaped by external forces, varying
from place to place and changing over time. Finally, “Once one highlights systemic forces
and the way they create and sustain patterns of domination in the micro situation, the
application of social theory turns to building social movements” (Burawoy, 1991: 283).
Building and sustaining a successful movement to counter plastic waste must interrogate
these ‘macro’ structures of oppression and conflicts as they unfold in Thailand, as
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grassroots organizers more successfully attend to the concerns of those most affected by
the plastic waste issue. The extended case method follows feminist scholarship in its
reflexivity and considerations of theory in relation to a particular case study. I now turn to
reflect on my own positionality as a researcher and Western woman conducting research
in Thailand.

3.2

Positionality
Qualitative and ethnographic studies utilizing feminist methods often call for

reflexivity and attention to positionality, and an interrogation of the insider/outsider
tensions imbued in the research process (Staeheli and Lawson 1995; DeLyser 2001; Cope
2002; Nagar and Geiger 2007). Drawing on Rose (1997), I aim for self-reflexivity that
acknowledges its limits and the limits of those knowledges discussed in this thesis.
Meanwhile, power relations are complex and contradictory, while a reflexive
understanding of our positionality is not entirely in our control (Rose, 1997). My
positionality both shaped the research process and brought a level of ambiguity to the
interview process as I occupied different spaces and spoke with a broad range of people.
Attention to the power dynamics between myself and my interviewees likewise revealed
an ambiguity, as dualistic categories of ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite,’ or ‘powerful’ and
‘vulnerable’ fail to account for the ways in which even decision makers are subject to the
decisions of others (Smith, 2006). These self-defined positions additionally illuminate how
interviewees make sense of their own positionalities in relation to plastic waste decision
making as discussed later in this thesis.
In relation to my own positionality, I found that as a foreigner (farang) and a
student, I was sometimes seen as less threatening (Herod, 1999). My positionality
constantly shifted in relation to the position of those I spoke with, the comfortability or
discomfort I felt in certain spaces, and the relative level of trust or distrust interviewees
showed me.
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3.3

Qualitative Ethnography
This research is an ethnographic study that combines participant observation and

in-depth semi-structured interviews over the span of two months. Qualitative ethnographic
research aims to understand worldviews and ways of life through daily interaction with the
lived experiences of subjects (Cook, 2005). Therefore, while living in Bangkok, Thailand
in the summer of 2019, I conducted 31 interviews with 44 individuals, and engaged in
participant observation. While most literature on plastic waste in Thailand follows the
material flows of plastic and considers aspects of sustainability and waste management, I
build on feminist political ecology scholarship to examine perceptions and situated
knowledges surrounding the plastic waste issue. Through observation and participation, I
engaged with individuals situated in government, industry, activist, and recycling spheres.
I now detail the methods (semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and
discourse and narrative analysis) and the data collected from each.

3.4

Semi-Structured Interviews
My primary method of data collection was semi-structured interviews. What makes

semi-structured interviews unique as opposed to structured interviews is that they initiate
from a broad set of questions but remain fluid and open rather than prescribing to a rigid
script of questions. In particular, semi-structured interviews allow interviewees to construct
and provide their own situated accounts and interpretations of their experiences (Valentine,
2005). This method is useful in qualitative research, as it allows the interviewee to initiate
new points of interest. In order to conduct these interviews, it first involved respondent
recruitment and selection.
In a call for more rigorous qualitative research, Baxter and Eyles (1997) advocate
for researchers to be more explicit about methods and rationales in the research process,
including respondent selection. For this thesis, I contacted government regulators, plastic
industry members, grassroots activists, plastic waste recyclers, and others involved in
countering plastic waste in Thailand. My recruitment strategy reflects the complexity and
breadth of this topic as I focused my research on actors in the Bangkok metropolitan area,
and recruitment was largely focused on my qualitative in-depth interview method. The
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names of individuals and organizations contacted for my research were collected through
analysis of contemporary news articles in the international and Thai media, academic
literature, reports by relevant government and nongovernmental organizations, and public
social media pages. Initial contact was made through publicly available contact information
of identified individuals and organizations, along with a request for an interview. The
snowballing of interviewees led to a higher number of contacts as subjects suggested
additional organizations and individuals involved in addressing plastic waste.
The snowballing of these informants revealed not only relevant actors, but the
interconnections and relationships among them, illuminating whose expertise was valued
by that particular individual or organization. These informal and formal networks
provided insight into the critical relationships and partnerships that shape Thailand's
response to the plastic waste pileup. At times, these networks provided useful, in which a
particular gatekeeper might lead to trust and candidness in the interview process. In other
instances, these networks created challenges, minimizing my control over the interview
process.
Most interviews were audio recorded and transcribed however, at the request of a
couple of interviewees, I abstained from recording, relying solely on notetaking. I
conducted most interviews in English. I was aided by a Thai student interpreter for a small
portion of my interviews. However, the majority of my interviewees spoke exceptional
English (largely related to privileged backgrounds or occupations in positions of power)
and my experience living in Thailand for almost a year previous to the project accustomed
me to many cross-language and cross-cultural components.
I followed a standardized process in terms of requesting interviews, reaching out
with an email invitation to voluntarily participate in an interview. Based on my
observations, group interviews typically meant that the individual with the highest rank or
perceived expertise was the primary respondent, however, the dynamic of a group
interview sometimes led to a more comfortable and collaborative rapport. This matched
findings on group interviews and focus group research, in which group interactions shape
new insights and provide research data that might otherwise be inaccessible (Wilkinson,
1998).
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My respondents span a range of ages, ethnicities, genders, and other axes of
difference, while each respondent plays a role in Thailand’s response to the plastic waste.
Through snowballing, I was often referred to those in leadership positions as opposed to
lower-level organizers, thereby excluding voices and efforts that likewise contribute to
shaping anti-plastic social movements. Additionally, snowballing revealed hierarchies and
trends in involvement, with Westerners and upper-class Thai individuals often occupying
leadership positions in grassroots environmental organizations.
I spoke with government regulators including the Permanent Secretary of the
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE), a Senior Professional-Level
environmentalist and pollution expert in the MoNRE, waste import experts in the
Department of Industrial Works (DIW), and an executive in the Department of Marine and
Coastal Resources (DMCR). I additionally interviewed various high-ranking members
(e.g., senior vice presidents, permanent secretaries, chief financial officers, etc.) of the
plastic industry and industry-based organizations such as the Plastic Institute of Thailand,
Federation of Thai Industries (housed in the Ministry of Industry), Indorama Ventures,
PTTGC, Siam Cement Group (SCG) and other plastic-related organizations in the PPP.
Additionally, these individuals often occupy additional positions in international decisionmaking bodies such as the ASEAN Federation of Plastic Industries. These multiscalar
actors are likewise integrated in international decision-making and influence.
I interviewed a variety of environmental activists in nongovernmental
organizations, nonprofits, and university-based environmental programs, who occupied
varied leadership roles and/or volunteer-based activists. These included but were not
limited to Precious Plastic, Grin Green International, RecycleNow.Asia, Refill Station,
CHULA Zero Waste, EARTH-Thailand, Trash Hero Bangkok, and various independent
activists and organizers. Many of these individuals have garnered large social media
platforms or media presence in local and regional newspapers on plastic waste. Those
occupying positions in international NGOs likewise had strong networks and a voice in the
media, their expertise often centering on the negative environmental, social, and healthrelated effects of plastic waste on the megafauna and communities across Thailand. Finally,
I interviewed larger plastic recyclers and smaller, more grassroots-level recyclers such as
GEPP and Won. These groups had expertise on the feasibility of recycling particular items
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and related challenges in the recycling sphere. I was also able to interview waste pickers
(saleng). Most interviews occurred in public spaces and offices at the request of the
interviewee, however these locations were variable as well.

Figure 3.1 Waste collected in Khlong Toei District, Bangkok. Photo by Author (2019).

3.5

Participant Observation
The method of participant observation involves living or working within a

community and participating in and observing their daily lived experiences (Cook, 2005).
Access to and immersion within these particular spaces then illuminates what was learned
from interactions with people, practices, and events (Cook, 2005). Working with and
learning from activists, visiting refill stations, strolling along famously polluted khlongs
(canals), attending international plastic awareness events, participating in a waste cleanup
on the outskirts of Bangkok, shopping in the plastic-crazed night markets, and attending
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the 2019 Circular Living Symposium, participant observations allowed for a rich and
fruitful data collection. Each day, I walked by foot through plastic filled streets and waste
sites, moving through the city and experiencing the omnipresent spaces where plastic waste
accumulates. My own actions and consumption likewise became a statement that meant
something to my interviewees. Additionally, throughout my days, I documented my
experiences through photos and videos along with my field notes. Although these visual
references are not treated as data, they served as vital points of reference for my analysis.

3.6

Discourse and Narrative Analysis
I employ discourse analysis of media and transcribed interviews for this research.

Discourse analysis involves interrogating language and meaning in order to understand
how power is described, who holds that power, and the nature of these power dynamics. I
conducted discourse analysis on a range of media in order to examine widespread
communication and the centering of plastic waste on international agendas. In particular,
discourse analysis was useful for interrogating the ways in which the U.S. and other
Western countries set particular agendas around plastic waste and highly covered media
stories about Thailand’s plastic waste issue such as the 2018 death of a pilot whale on the
coast of Thailand. Meanwhile I utilized discourse analysis of Thailand’s domestic media
coverage of plastic waste, taking note of who was interviewed and who had a voice in
newspapers such as Khaosod English, Bangkok Post, and Coconuts Bangkok. This
revealed the power of Western discourse to configure and influence Thai discourse, as well
as informing my decisions for who to contact for interviews, as various groups were
identified as actors with power within waste management systems and plastic waste
forums.
With respect to my interviews, I conducted discourse and narrative analysis first
through analyzing the data through transcription and coding. I employed axial coding using
the qualitative data analysis computer software NVivo. I created about ten key categories
with a series of nested sub-codes to identify conceptual linkages and themes in the
interviews (Cope, 2010). For example, I coded for axes of difference, which included
nested codes related to Thainess, class, and Western identities. These codes likewise
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formed the basis for organizing interview quotes and mental mapping. My codes and
transcriptions are aided by detailed field notes that consider aspects not necessarily
captured by the audio recordings or transcriptions, such as the setting of the interview or
affective moments that transpired. In qualitative research, analysis of codes developed from
self-generated interviews then entails narrative and discourse analysis (Cope & Kurtz,
2016). I utilized these methods in order to investigate how discourses surrounding the
plastic waste issue operate to influence the actions of environmental organizations,
influence and inform policy preferences, and affect strategies taken by a broad range of
industry and governmental organizations. In the case of my interview data, discourse
analysis provided a lens for interrogating the ways in which power is perceived and
performed in government, industry, recycling, and environmentalist arenas, shaping waste
management systems, capitalist initiatives, environmental improvement schemes, and
subjects themselves. These discourses circulate between organizations and beyond the
borders of Thailand. I additionally employed narrative analysis, examining why particular
stories that explain the plastic pileup exist, and the power imbued in that particular
narrative. Discourse and narrative analysis illuminated particular power relations as they
relate to plastic waste claims in Thailand and revealed how power was defined.
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CHAPTER 4. THAILAND’S PLASTICSCAPES

4.1

Setting the Stage: Thailand’s Plastic Waste
Over the past century, plastic production and resulting plastic waste has dramatically

increased, especially due to the introduction of single-use plastics2 on the global scale.
Usages of plastic range from medical applications to food packaging and the material is
integrated in most major economic sectors. Single-use plastic waste can be disposed of or
recycled, however, much of the waste generated is mismanaged and leaks out of what
current landfill or other management systems exist. Nascent research is working to track
the amount of plastic waste that is increasingly omnipresent in our oceans, lands, and
bodies (Van Cauwenberghe & Janssen 2014; Jambeck et al. 2015). However, although
plastic waste represents a global-scale issue, it forms diverse plasticscapes,3 affecting
different localities in often uneven and unique ways.
In 2015, a team of interdisciplinary researchers led by Dr. Jenna Jambeck published
a Science article stating that between 4.8 to 12.7 million metric tons of plastic waste
annually enters the ocean from land-based sources (Jambeck et al., 2015). The study
utilized 2010 data on various countries’ waste generation rates, the composition of plastic
within the overall waste, and the level of effectiveness of waste management systems
including collection and processing. Representing eight scholars, the Jambeck Research
Group acts as experts in environmental and chemical engineering disciplines, positioned
in various Western universities (Jambeck et al., 2015). These researchers calculated the
amount of plastic debris entering marine environments from land-based sources, “…by

2 Plastic is a pliable, durable, lightweight, and inexpensive material made from synthetic polymers. Derived from
extractive sources such as petroleum, natural gas, and coal, compounds such as olefins are extracted to form the basis of
chemical polymers. Although there are also renewable sources of chemical compounds such as cassava or cornstarch
used to make bioplastic, most plastics are derived from chemical products called petrochemicals. Some of the main
plastics derived from petrochemicals and attended to in this research include Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET, PETE),
generally used to make plastic drinking bottles and synthetic fabrics, High Density Polyethylene (HDPE), used for
making milk bottles and plastic bags, Polypropylene (PP) regularly used for making hot plastic food bags, bowls, and
plates, Polystyrene (PS) for making foam boxes, plates, and bowls, and Low-Density-Polyethylene (LDPEs) which make
film packaging and plastic bags (CP Group, 2018).
3 Drawing Swyngedouw's (1999) use of the "waterscape" to describe the intricacies of the nature-society nexus in shaping
how water interacts with peoples, cultures, and power, I utilize the term plasticscapes to describe how plastic moves
through, shapes, and is shaped by landscapes in Thailand.
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linking worldwide data on solid waste, population density, and economic status…”
(Jambeck et al., 2015: 768)

Figure 4.1 Waste accumulated on the banks of Bang Krachao Beach, south of Bangkok.
Photo by author (2019).
The Jambeck et al. (2015) study additionally shocked the world by producing a ranking
of countries by their contributions to marine plastic pollution, revealing that the top
contributors were located in the Asia-Pacific region. The study found that the top six
countries include China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
Additionally, it predicted that plastic waste generated in these countries would dramatically
increase in the coming years if sizable efforts to stem the flow of plastic waste into the
ocean did not occur, creating an alarming outlook for environmental and human health. 4
4 Studies suggest that plastic waste especially impacts filter-feeding megafauna whose feeding strategies, prey and habitat
occur in microplastic hotspots (Germanov, Marshall, Bejder, Fossi, & Loneragan, 2018). As a result, plastic waste
threatens biodiversity-dependent economic sectors such as the fishing industry. Meanwhile, the increased presence of
microplastics in our bodies, toxins adhering to plastic surfaces, and the methods of plastic waste disposal such as open

32

Figure 4.2 Map of Thailand and Bangkok metropolitan area. Map by author (2020).

Thailand, situated in Southeast Asia, once maintained many traditional practices that
did not include use of plastic packaging. However, although they are still practiced, rain
catchment and food wrapped in banana leaves were largely displaced by profligate use of
plastic water bottles and plastic packaging. Now, Thailand ranks 6 th among the highest
contributors to marine plastic pollution out of 192 coastal countries (Jambeck et al., 2015).
While this transition may have registered for some earlier, news headlines of Thailand’s
plastic waste consumption and the impacts of marine waste on megafauna have brought
this environmental issue into the national consciousness on a new scale.
Western scientific rationales and studies have greatly informed the plastic waste
issue, infusing knowledges in the environmental sphere. The Jambeck et al. 2015 research
study eventually infused media coverage of plastic waste in Thailand, with widespread

burning could have lasting impacts on human health (Van Cauwenberghe & Janssen, 2014; Global Alliance for
Incinerator Alternatives, 2019).
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coverage of the country’s plastic waste issue and the country’s 6th ranking in marine plastic
waste appearing in newspapers across the world. This included domestic newspapers such
as Bangkok Post (2019) and The Nation Thailand (2018), Japanese newspapers such as
The Nikkei (2018) and The Japan Times (2019), American newspapers such as The New
York Times (2018) and The Washington Post (2019), as well as international news
organizations such as Reuters (2019) and many more. As the 20 th largest country in the
world, with a population of under 70 million people, the amount of plastic waste generated
and entering the ocean from Thailand shocked media outlets, activists, and academic
institutions. New publics learned that large sea turtles are washing up on Thailand’s coast
with plastic in their stomachs (Rujivanarom, 2019). About a hundred kilometers northeast
of Bangkok, plastic bags and other waste particles were found in the dung of wild elephants
in Khao Yai National Park, a UNESCO World Heritage site (Cross, 2018). Social media
has likewise changed how Thai people envision their country, as the visible omnipresence
of plastic waste is now seen as “near” and “close” to the people (Interview 10, 11).
As plastic moves through the environment and newly formed policies emerge, this
chapter attempts to track the rapidly evolving, variable, and changing nature of the plastic
waste issue. Additionally, this chapter summarizes a case study of the plastic lifecycle in
Thailand. Thailand continues to grapple with considerable media attention, and at times,
perhaps condemnation, by the international community. As this thesis will show,
international media attention and scientific studies such as the ranking create new spaces
of contestation and influence in shaping how the plastic waste issue is understood in
Thailand.

4.2

Thai Plastic Industry/The Origins of Plastic
Thailand’s plastic industry dates back to 1960, with the rise in the petrochemical

industry (Plastic Industry Club, 2009). As investment in the petrochemical industry and
domestically sourced raw materials increased, the government created the Petroleum
Authority of Thailand (PTT) in order to develop Thailand’s petrochemical and natural gas
industries (Tanthapanichakoon, 2019). The Thai plastic industry is now largely self-
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sustaining in its ability to produce ethylene, propylene, and other necessary plastic resins.
These petrochemicals are then processed to produce plastic.
The three main petrochemical companies currently include PTT Global Chemical
(PTTGC),5 SCG Chemicals (SCGGCH), and Integrated Refining and Petrochemical
Complex (IRPC) (Tanthapanichakoon, 2019). Plastic resins produced by these and other
groups primarily serve the domestic market, while the remaining supply is largely exported
to other countries in Asia such as China (Plastic Industry Club 2010; Tanthapanichakoon
2019). Thailand’s petrochemical sector, currently marketing itself as the plastic and
bioplastic hub of Asia, is the second largest in Southeast Asia and the sixteenth largest in
the world (Thailand Investment Review, 2017). The plastic industry likewise represents
7% of Thailand’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP),6 while the petrochemical industry
accounts for 5% of Thailand’s GDP (Tanthapanichakoon, 2019).
Thailand has about 5,000 factories engaged in the production of plastic, including
converters and fabricators, manufacturers, compounders, and petrochemical producers
(Plastic Industry Club 2010; Chong 2019). As such, plastic production has sweeping effects
on local employment, investment, and economic generation. According to one PTTGC
member, Thailand’s plastic industry is responsible for about 200,000 employees, in which
it economically supports about a million people (Marks, Miller, & Vassanadumrongdee,
2020).

4.3

Consumption
According to the Plastic Waste Management Plan 2017-2021, developed by the

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE), Thailand produced 2.33
million tons of domestic plastic waste in 2015 (Pollution Control Department, 2019).
Research in the following years suggests that Thailand’s domestic consumption continues
to represent the highest per capita consumer of plastic in Asia (Marks, Miller, &
Vassanadumrongdee 2020; Chong 2019). Typically, wealthier and ‘developed’ countries
such as the United States and Canada produce more per capita solid waste, consuming over

5 PTTGC has since become a publicly owned company as of 2001 (Tanthapanichakoon, 2019).
6 Marks, Miller, & Vassanadumrongdee, 2020.
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60% of industrial raw materials while comprising 22% of the world’s population (Baker et
al., 2004). For example, Jambeck et al. (2015) found that the U.S. generates 37,729,383
kg/day of plastic waste while Thailand only generates 3,734,630 kg/day of plastic waste,
comparable to countries such as South Africa (3,082,909 kg/day), France (3,302,562
kg/day), and the Netherlands (3,794,520 kg/day). Plastic waste generation rates are highly
variable based on manufacturing, economic status, population, and more.

Figure 4.3 Plastic waste accumulating at Bangkok’s popular Chatuchak Weekend Market
(JJ Market), frequented by Thai residents and foreign tourists. Photo by author (2019).
With the average Thai person consuming eight plastic bags a day, plastic is now
considered part of the cultural and social fabric of Thailand (Marks, Miller, &
Vassanadumrongdee, 2020). In comparison, the average person in Japan consumes about
1.23 per day, while the average American uses about 1 plastic bag per day (Beals 2019;
Earth Policy Institute 2014). Meanwhile, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration
(BMA) estimates that 600,000 plastic bags are used per day in the city of almost 9 million
36

residents (Hongsathavij, 2017a). On the country-wide scale, about 500 million plastic bags
used per day in Thailand (Saokaew, 2020). Additionally, in Thailand, tourists also play a
role in consumption, with 39 million tourists in 2019, surpassing half of Thailand’s official
population (Worrachaddejchai, 2019)

4.4

Post-Consumer Plastic: Where Does the Waste Go?
Thailand’s municipal solid waste includes that generated by residential households,

commercial sectors, fresh markets, and other major sources. Paper and plastic make up the
highest percentage of waste is after organic solid waste (Yukalang, Clarke, & Ross, 2017).
In 2015, newly generated municipal solid waste in Thailand totaled about 27 million tons,
a large portion of which (about 17%) is generated in Bangkok (Pollution Control
Department, 2016). With respect to plastic, current waste management systems struggle
under the burden of these high numbers. The recovery rate of plastic waste in Thailand
remains decidedly low, with most of it ending up in landfills or dumps (Wongthatsanekorn,
2009). In 2018, 7.15 million tons of solid waste were disposed inappropriately through
open burning, open dumps, illegal dumping in public areas, and dumping in waterways
(Pollution Control Department, 2019).
According to the former Permanent Secretary of the MoNRE, Dr. Wijarn Simachaya,7
Thailand likely mirrors the global estimation, showing that 80% of the plastic waste that
ends up in the sea comes from land-based sources (Ocean Conservancy, 2015). This waste
then travels through the city’s network of canals to the Chao Phraya River, which empties
into the Gulf of Thailand. This movement of waste, compounded with the many land-based
sources along the coastal provinces of Thailand and other major rivers, leads to massive
inputs of plastic waste into the ocean. With respect to coastal areas, the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environment tracks the 23 coastal provinces in the country, estimating 2.83
million tons of uncollected and improperly disposed waste, 12% of which (339,000

7 Dr. Wijarn was acting Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment when interviewed
for this research in the summer of 2019. He is now acting as the President of the nonprofit NGO, Thailand Environmental
Institution (TEI).
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tons/year) is plastic waste (Simachaya, 2017).8 Based on Thailand’s domestically collected
data, 15% of the mismanaged plastic waste, or 51,000 tons/year is then washed into the sea
(Simachaya, 2017). Much of this solid waste is plastic, including plastic bags, plastic
beverage bottles, food packaging, foam dishes and bowls, plastic straws, foam scraps, foam
meal boxes, plastic cups, and other miscellaneous plastic waste (Pollution Control
Department, 2019).
Power geometries continue to shape Thailand’s plastic waste issue, creating uneven
access to waste disposal systems and exposure to waste sites. Doreen Massey, a feminist
geographer, coined the term “power geometry” to explain how spatiality and mobility are
shaped by power differentials, while simultaneously reproducing these societal
inequalities. As such, power geometries are useful in considering the production of uneven
access to waste disposal in the city of Bangkok and unequal spatial distribution of cleanups.
Interviews revealed strong notions of spaces of belonging in relation to plastic waste. For
example, plastic waste does not ‘belong’ in places adjacent or in sight of wealthy
neighborhoods. Likewise, in the case of new technological waste collection efforts that
send saleng, or informal waste collectors to pick up waste in restaurants or offices, there is
a sense of ‘non-belonging’ about their entry into these urban spaces. Additionally, as one
interviewee noted, plastic waste is transported to rural, agricultural areas and farmland in
Thailand where these individuals do not produce very much plastic waste (Interview 7).
This follows a trend with well-documented patterns of environmental injustice and
ecological distribution conflicts in which communities least responsible for an
environmental damage bear the brunt of risks and exposure (Mohai, Pellow, Roberts 2009;
Martinez-Alier 2004). The material used in recycling facilities in these areas often comes
from outside province borders, such as waste imports that enter Thailand through Laem
Chabang Port in Chonburi, then spread to nearby provinces. In urban and densely populated
regions, the spatial privileging of wealthier geographic areas and actors follows preexisting
processes of spatial differentiation and uneven development, as evidenced through
respondent accounts.

8 This statistic, developed by the Department of Marine and Coastal Resources, is starkly different from the total amount
of mismanaged plastic waste named in the Jambeck et al., 2015 study, which calculated the 2010 level was 2,027,739
tons.
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4.5

Waste Separation and Disposal Mechanisms
With a lack of public awareness on waste separation, as well as prolific contamination

by food waste, Thailand’s municipal solid waste management faces barriers. These include
insufficient infrastructure, limited access to waste collection points and bins, disorganized
and poorly planned management and collection systems, flooding that carries waste out of
open dumps and landfills, a lack of communication between municipality and residents,
and a plethora of other challenges (Yukalang, Clarke & Ross, 2017). According to
interviews with representatives in the MoNRE, there are roughly two million tons of plastic
waste produced annually in Thailand, with only around 25% recovered through methods
such as recycling (Interview 1, 2).9
Thailand has a variety of municipal solid waste disposal and transfer sites, the majority
of which are public (Pollution Control Department, 2019). However, with no national-level
waste management agency, municipal governments differentially manage waste collection
and disposal through public structures or outsourced private companies (Interview 15).
According to the PCD, in 2018 Thailand operated 2,764 waste disposal sites, of which only
647 were properly managed through containment and control of external factors such as
flooding (Pollution Control Department, 2019). According to an interview with a pollution
control specialist in the MoNRE, Thailand’s current systems for waste management do not
compare to that of many countries in the global North (Interview 2). The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has strict regulations for designing solid waste
landfills. The EPA notes that landfills must be built in appropriate geological areas, must
be compacted and covered to reduce odor, must be accompanied with regular groundwater
testing, and must comply various measures to prevent leaching (EPA, 2016). However,
these standards are often considered looser or less strict in Thailand, and landfills
considered safe and of good standing do not necessarily need to be in compliance with the
same conditions as the U.S. (Interview 2). Therefore, the number of properly managed sites
9 This recycling rate appears to be extrapolated from larger estimates of general solid waste. According to the PCD, “27.8
million tons of solid waste produced in 2018, 2 million tons is municipal plastic waste. Around 500,000 tons of solid
waste can be used in recycling systems (most of it is plastic bottles) and the other 1.5 million tons is plastic waste, which
consists of 1.2 million tons of plastic bags, and the rest being other plastic garbage, such as glass, boxes, trays, bottles,
bottle with lids. In 2018, there was 7.15 million tons of solid waste that was disposed inappropriately, such as by open
dump or open burning in waste disposal sites, illegal dumping in public areas and throw away into water sources”
(Pollution Control Department, 2019).

39

could decrease against the standards of an outside organization such as the U.S. EPA
(Interview 2). Likewise, many interviewees both in environmental regulatory positions as
well as grassroots activists suggested that despite the PCD’s efforts to clarify distinctions,
what is often referred to in Thailand as a landfill, is in actuality, typically an open dump
(Interview 2, 6, 13). The difference is significant in terms of ability to properly manage
waste, prevent leakage, and the subsequent effects on the environment.

Figure 4.4 Hand-sorted recyclable waste collected in a low-income community in Huai
Khwang District, Bangkok, neighboring the famous Ladprao canal trash collection point.
Photo by author (2019).

Meanwhile, Thailand is able to recycle a fourth of all plastic waste, made possible
through waste collection, junk shops, recycling facilities, waste pickers, and a variety of
different municipal groups. Most recycling occurs in wealthier areas with substantial waste
systems in place. In contrast, in lower-income neighborhoods and areas, there is often a
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lack of waste disposal systems, resulting in open burning for fuel. Informal recyclers called
saleng are also vital in the waste collection of plastic in low and high-income areas. These
waste pickers are not enrolled in formal work, but often collect high-valued waste plastic,
selling the material to local junk shops and recycling facilities (Interview 16; Hongsathavij
2017a).

4.6

Plastic Waste Imports
Amidst rising interest in addressing plastic waste on the global scale, the

international community was shocked into reality by a series of events and realizations
facilitated by China’s January 2018 waste import ban, otherwise known as the National
Sword policy (Katz, 2019). In response to its long-standing role as the solid waste ‘dump’
for countries across the world, China’s new regulation prevented waste imports from
reaching its recycling processors, which had processed almost half of the global recyclable
waste over the previous 25 years (Katz, 2019). As a result, this redirected a large amount
of plastic waste to countries such as Thailand. 10 This trend was not altogether new.
According to Thailand’s Commerce Ministry, Thailand imported 906,521 tonnes of plastic
from 81 countries between 2014 and 2018 (Hicks, 2020). The top three exporters included
Japan, Hong Kong, and the U.S. (Roberts-Davis & Saetang, 2019). Immediately following
China’s waste import ban, however, Thailand received a massive new influx in waste
imports from countries in the region that had previously exported to China, with the highest
amounts from Japan, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and China (RobertsDavis & Saetang, 2019). Other major imports of waste came from non-regional countries
including the U.S., the U.K., and Canada (Roberts-Davis & Saetang, 2019). This led to a
surge in Thailand’s plastic scrap imports by 1,370%, putting new pressures on the limited
capacity of Thailand’s current waste management systems (Interview 3; Roberts-Davis &
Saetang 2019). Plastic waste imports jumped from 70,000 tons in 2016 to as many an
estimated range of between 481,000 tons to 553,000 tons in 2018 (Marks, Miller, &
Vassanadumrongdee 2020; Sasaki, 2020).

10 Although Thailand had historically exported more plastic waste than it imported, this policy led to a dramatic shift in

the global waste trade landscape (Sasaki, 2020).
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4.7

Thailand’s Response to the Plastic Pileup
On the governmental level, the primary response to the plastic waste issue was the

creation of a MoNRE Roadmap for Plastic Waste Management (2018-2030) implemented
by the Pollution Control Department, which aims to recycle all plastic waste and to cease
production of non-recyclable plastics. Additionally, in June 2018, Thailand established a
Public Private Partnership (PPP) for Plastic Waste Management, a collaborative effort
including the government sector, private sector, and non-profit organizations (Thailand
PPP Plastic, 2019). The Thai government announced the national goal to ‘reduce Thailand
plastic ocean waste at least 50% by 2027’ (Thailand PPP Plastic, 2019). The explicit
mission of Thailand’s PPP is “to connect the dots and be a center of networks to build
plastic circular economy focusing on infrastructure improvement, innovation, and
education” (Thailand PPP Plastic, 2019). Notably, on August 7, 2018, “the PPP Plastic led
by the Federation of Thai Industries and TBCSD (Thailand Business Council for
Sustainable Development) was officially appointed to be the 3rd working Group of Plastic
Waste Management Sub-Committee” by the Deputy Permanent Secretary of the MoNRE
(Thailand PPP Plastic, 2019). The PPP and Roadmap on Plastic Waste Management (20182030) call for improved waste collection and segregation infrastructure, recycling and
upcycling (transforming waste into new materials of value) business development,
responsible consumers, and responsible plastic industry members and brand owners
(Thailand PPP Plastic, 2019).
2014
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2015 Feb.
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Figure 4.5 Timeline of Events (2020).
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2018 Aug.
Thailand
plans to
completely
ban scrap
plastic
imports
within two
years

2022

2019 Apr.
Thai Cabinet
approves the
Plastic Waste
Management
Road Map
2018-2030

2018 Jul. Thailand
enacts temporary
ban on scrap plastic
imports

2022 Thailand plans to
ban plastic straws foam
containers, plastic bags
<36 microns, single-use
plastic cups

2019 Thailand plans to ban
microbeads, oxo-degradable
plastic bags
2020 Jan. Ban on
<36-micron plastic
bags implemented
two years ahead
of schedule

As new members join the PPP, they are also in conversation with other regional
and supranational efforts. According to interviews with representatives from the MoNRE,
Thailand’s MoNRE and the PPP are enrolled in various forms of international networks
and collaborations with organizations such as the International Union for Conservation of
Nature (IUCN), the European Union (EU),

the World Bank, the United Nations

Environment Programme (UNEP), and the United Nations Centre for Regional
Development (UNCRD), as well as regional collaboration through conferences on ASEAN
marine plastic debris (Interview 1, 2, 4).
Oft critiqued for its lack of political will to address the issue, recent developments
reveal some exceptions, such as the case of plastic bags. Most plastic consumed by the
public comes in the shape of plastic packaging, supplied in fresh markets as well as by
major retail conglomerates such as CP Group and the major department stores including
Central Group and Mall Group. As recent public pressure mounted, however, private sector
groups set up plastic-bag free days in many shopping departments and convenience stores
(Pollution Control Department, 2019).

4.8

Uneven Plasticscapes
Despite the Thai government’s recent push to address plastic waste, the efforts remain

diffuse. One of the primary issues is a lack of centralized waste management and
regulation. Community and household waste improvement schemes are inhibited by a lack
of resources and infrastructure investment, deeming the national push ineffective in many
areas, while BMA monetary investment continues to privilege collection and disposal over
reduction, recycling, and separation of waste (Marks, Miller, & Vassanadumrongdee 2020;
Vassanadumrongdee 2018).
Meanwhile, there are disparities between the government’s response to plastic waste
and activist concerns. For example, the Thai government strongly promotes waste-toenergy as a resolution to plastic waste, although it remains highly contested for its
compatibility with the circular economy (Interview 2, 4, 7, 27). Many activist groups
remain in strong opposition to such waste-to-energy endeavors (Interview 7, 22). However,
the government has yet to create strong regulations to cover emissions of dangerous
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chemicals and carcinogens such as dioxin, and activists suspect that these systems are
further overloaded by plastic waste imports (Interview 7). These lead to tensions
surrounding the DIW’s environmental quality tests and activist and resident’s situated
knowledges and lived experiences with pollution, likewise, examined in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 5. THE ROLE OF EXPERTISE

5.1

Introduction
When the notorious story of a dead pilot whale stuffed with plastic bags on the

southern coast of Thailand spread to international news outlets in 2018, it was soon
followed by articles detailing the plastic-induced deaths of other major megafauna such as
large sea turtles and wild deer in Thailand (Wipatayotin 2018; Wongcha-um 2019). These
articles often prominently cited the Jambeck et al. (2015) ranking and similar rankings
created by organizations such as the Ocean Conservancy (2015). In turn, the deluge of
news coverage appears to have sparked new efforts to address the waste and raise public
consciousness (Pollution Control Department, 2019). Photos, testimonials, articles and opeds flooded environmental news communications, demonstrating the massive plastic waste
issue that Thailand faces, and validating calls for change. However, these discourses on
Thailand’s plastic waste have simultaneously reflected a top-down narrative, largely
shaped by outside media and Western scientific rationales. Additionally, certain forms of
expertise and voices positioned in powerful governing agencies and elites working in the
plastic industry have reconfigured and imposed particular solutions. While the plastic
waste issue continues to shape environmental problems and lived experiences in Thailand,
grassroots voices struggle to influence large-scale responses as particular forms of
expertise are imposed on them.
Amidst growing pressure to stem the tide of plastic waste into khlongs, rivers, and
the Gulf of Thailand, government regulators, plastic industry representatives, recyclers,
and environmental activists are pushing for various solutions including improved waste
management, waste import bans, product upcycling, plastic bag taxes, and more. These
solutions suit particular agendas, and often rely on expert knowledges, which they aim to
infuse at all levels of decision making. Therefore, Thailand’s response to the plastic waste
reflects the voices and concerns of numerous specialists in the plastic industry, scientific
community, government, and other sectors. However, following Harding (1986) and
Haraway’s (1988) theoretical work to locate and position knowledges, this chapter seeks
to interrogate some of the key expert knowledges that inform these responses, examining
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who has the power to define the problems and solutions to the plastic pileup, and the
variegated responses that they make possible.

Figure 5.1 Neon “Say No to Plastic Bags” sign illuminates the streets outside of Central
department store in Pathum Wan District, Bangkok. Photo by author (2019).
First, I situate some of the central experts and intellectuals on plastic waste in
Thailand, who develop authoritative explanations about the causes and solutions to plastic
waste. I draw on feminist political ecology scholars, who skillfully apply Gramsci’s (1949,
1988) concept of hegemony to the study of environmental knowledges and narratives
which travel through asymmetrical power relations and groups of people. In particular,
feminist political ecologists that work to question authoritative knowledges trace the
sources and dissemination processes of expertise (Rocheleau, 2008). In doing so, scholars
such as Sundberg (1998), Truelove (2011), Sen (2017), Li (2007), and Yeh (2013), reveal
the particular ways that environmental improvement and development schemes have a
totalizing and hegemonizing effect on the defining and proposed solutions to
environmental issues. This hegemony is often made possible and constructed through
expertise, while failing to accurately represent or incorporate the many voices of those not
deemed experts.
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As such, feminist political ecology informs my understanding of expertise in
Thailand’s plastic pileup and the ways in which such expert knowledges construct a topdown approach that fails to address and include many grassroots activist concerns and
demands as well as locally produced expertise. In this chapter, I discuss expertise
constructed through media portrayals of Thailand, Thailand’s 6th ranking in contributions
to marine plastic waste, and the domestic experts in Thailand situated in government and
plastic industry sectors. I illuminate the role of these top-down experts and Western
scientific rationales in shaping what is valued in Thailand and how the problem is defined.
I then consider what solutions they privilege, and how particular groups engage with,
counter, and reproduce related discourses and narratives.

5.2

Locating the Expertise: Who Decided Plastic Waste was a Problem?
Major developments on an international scale in the years preceding this study

clearly centered plastic waste in the global consciousness. For example, in February of
2017, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) launched a campaign to end plastic waste,
targeting major microplastic sources that lead to marine waste (UN Environment
Programme, 2017). UNEP is considered “…the leading global environmental authority that
sets the global environmental agenda, promotes the coherent implementation of the
environmental dimension of sustainable development within the United Nations system,
and serves as an authoritative advocate for the global environment” (UN Environment
Programme, 2020). This organizational body, as a self-proclaimed authority represents a
group of experts that create top-down information and guidelines for addressing
environmental problems.
Paralleling this trend, the international community focused on plastic waste,
evidenced in popular media coverage. Before commencing my fieldwork, I read through
an extensive collection of media articles on the plastic waste situation in Thailand.
Discourses on “plastic addiction,” Thailand’s ranking as the 6 th largest contributor to
marine plastic pollution, and the plastic-caused deaths of major megafauna in the country
largely dominated the media coverage both in international and domestic media outlets
including but not limited to Reuters, the Bangkok Post, Khaosod English, Coconuts
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Bangkok, CNN, the Washington Post, The Nation, The Nikkei, The Washington Post, Fox
News, BBC, The Japan Times, The Hindu, and China Daily.

Figure 5.2 Compilation of news headlines and excerpts referring to Thailand’s “plastic
addiction” and key events such as the 2018 death of a pilot whale on Thailand’s coast
(2020).11
It appeared that Southeast Asia, including Thailand, was receiving worldwide
attention for their “addiction” to plastic as well as the many associated environmental
ramifications of prolific plastic use. The combination of international decision-making
bodies, international media, and scientific studies had formed a broad collection of

11 Images derived from: BBC News (2018), Brocchettom & Olarn (2018), Corporal (2010), Crider (2020), Deviller
(2019), Fedschun (2018), Ives (2018), Kamolvattanavith (2019), Katz (2018), Kishimoto (2020), Marks (2018), Praiwan
& Apisniran (2019), Selley (2019), Syllis (2018), Tanakasempipat & Kittisilpa (2018), The Hindu (2019),
Vassanadumrongdee & Marks (2020).
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‘expertise,’ and ‘authority’ shaping what we knew about plastic waste in Thailand, how we
understood the issue, and what the solutions could and should be.

5.3

Western Research: International Knowledges on Thailand’s Ranking
While the explicit purpose of the Jambeck et al. (2015) study was to create a

generalized global estimate of marine plastic pollution, it was extrapolated from countrylevel data, leading to a prominently featured ranking of each country’s contribution to
marine plastic waste. Out of the 192 countries included in the study, the top six ranked
countries were China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. In
particular, Thailand’s ranking was derived from data on its coastal population (26.0
million), waste generated (1.2 kg/ppd), percent plastic waste (12%), percent mismanaged
waste (75%), mismanaged plastic waste (1.03 MMT/year), percent of total mismanaged
plastic waste (3.2%) and its subsequent total plastic marine debris (0.15-0.41 MMT/year). 12
Over all, the Jambeck Research Group posits that population size and the quality of waste
management systems represent two of the most influential factors in determining a
country’s ranking. However, the article explicitly states various lines of uncertainty
including limited measurements on waste generation and disposal outside of urban regions,
a lack of data on informal waste collection and illegal dumping, and an absence of data on
waste imports and exports, leading to various gaps in the dataset.
In examining this particular scientific study, it is worth noting the undeniable power
of Western expertise in determining how we understand Thailand’s plastic waste issue.
Western scientific rationality and expertise is historically positioned as the authority and
definer of solutions to technical and development issues across the world (Harding, 2011).
Due to the construction of this ‘objective,’ and expert scientific research in the form of the
Jambeck et al. (2015) scientific study, a discourse on Thailand’s 6th ranking spread from
the peer-reviewed scientific journal, saturating academic, journalism, and policy spheres
in the plastic waste discussion. International decision-making bodies such as UNEP, as an
“environmental authority that sets the global environmental agenda,” utilize the same data

12 According to Jambeck et al. (2015), ppd refers to person per day, while MMT represents million metric tons.
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from the Jambeck et al. (2015) study, with graphics explaining that Thailand wastes
3,734,630 kg of plastic per day, of which 73% is mismanaged. UNEP then utilized this
Western scientific research as the basis for a $6 million collaborative project, “reducing
marine litter by addressing the management of the plastic value chain in South East Asia,”
announced on September 10, 2018 (UN Environment Programme 2018). This initiative for
reducing marine litter targets Thailand through market-based solutions, strengthening the
scientific basis for decision-making, outreach on marine litter and plastic pollution and
regional networking, with the aim of including participants in Thailand’s national and local
government, private sector, academia, and civil society organizations (UN Environment
Programme, 2019). Scientific Western rationales become the backdrop for initiatives
aiming to infuse decision-making on plastic in Thailand, implying that Thai regulators
should make decisions based on these Western studies.

Figure 5.3 Plastic and other assorted waste overtakes the sidewalk on a busy street in Bang
Sue District, Bangkok. Photo by author (2019).
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Meanwhile, continued international and domestic news coverage on plastic waste
such as Thailand’s plastic-induced megafauna deaths and plastic-related policy
developments consistently rely on this ranking. As one environmental activist explained,
the ranking’s prevalence in international media demonstrates its validity (Interview 10).
The study’s framing of Thailand’s plastic waste is mirrored by NGOs such as the Ocean
Conservancy,13 National Geographic, and Greenpeace. As such, it is worth considering the
power imbued in these discourses on Thailand, and how they formulated new
understandings and solutions to the plastic waste problem.
According to a representative in the Plastic Institute of Thailand, under the Ministry
of Industry, his discussions with Dr. Jambeck suggested that the calculations used for the
2015 publication on global and domestic plastic waste were in part derived from the World
Bank and UNEP (Interview 5). This study’s situatedness within these powerful
international circles of expertise and its reception in the international media helped
proliferate and prioritize the study over other knowledges, as evidenced later in this
chapter. Notably, the Plastic Institute of Thailand respondent told me, the Jambeck
Research Group utilized “assumptions” from UNEP and “not the fact [or] data,” a
distinction that gained further significance in my examination of the politics and power of
knowledge making in Thailand’s plastic waste efforts (Interview 5). While the ranking
serves as a useful scientific estimation based on a broad range of data, my goal is to
illuminate its role in shaping how certain forms of expertise and particular voices are
valued over others in framing the plastic waste issue and its solutions. Examining the power
in discourse helps to explain why this knowledge, as a Western-produced study, gained
such traction on a massive scale.

5.4

How did Global Discourse and Expertise Shape Thailand’s response?
Based on interviews, Thailand’s residents have a diversity of views, interest in, and

commitment to countering the plastic waste issue, however, it is clear that Western
scientific rationales and expertise shaped the response of the Thai government,
13 Various organizations uphold similar rankings, such as the Ocean Conservancy, a U.S. based nonprofit and
environmental advocacy organization arguing that over half of all land-based marine plastic waste originates from five
countries, including Thailand (Ocean Conservancy, 2015).
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environmental NGOs, and the plastic industry. Interview respondents explained how
stories about the negative effects of plastic on Thailand’s marine life caused them or others
to take action to reduce plastic waste. Additionally, the Jambeck et al. (2015) study of
global waste influenced people’s awareness and sparked action. As noted by one
interviewee, it caused people to “wake up and know that it is their responsibility to solve
this thing” (Interview 10). As news of these Western scientific studies, international
agendas, and widespread media coverage gained traction in Thailand, this in effect, put
international pressure on Thailand to center plastic waste in its national agenda.
Jambeck et al. (2015) and international campaigns gained immense traction and
were discussed in my interviews with various plastic waste experts, including officials with
entire teams of researchers and regulators at their disposal. These individuals are incredibly
well-versed in the material aspects of plastic waste, as well as the domestic policies that
govern waste management systems. These actors typically have highly specialized
expertise and are able to articulate the ways in which scientific rankings, international
agendas, and media coverage of megafauna deaths have already reconfigured plastic waste
management systems in Thailand. For example, a government official and pollution
specialist in the MoNRE explained that international pressure reconfigured the waste
management focus in Thailand to center on plastic. Although overall municipal solid waste
poses challenges, this MoNRE respondent noted that because plastic has become a global
issue of concern, this has forced regulatory groups such as the PCD to scope down at times,
centering more particularly on plastic waste (Interview 2).
Interviewees in the government and plastic industry point to collaborations with
regional and supranational groups. These international networks bring together
authoritative and expert organizations including the IUCN, the EU, the World Bank,
UNEP, and UNCRD (Interview 1, 2, 4). These organizations hold authority and credibility
in decision-making spheres, and respondents in the government and plastic industry often
pointed to particular international forums and events in which solutions and policy
suggestions such as the circular economy were introduced. For example, one interviewee
in the plastic industry learned about the circular economy, a strategy that their company
has now adopted, at an Ellen McCarthur presentation at the World Economic Forum
(Interview 28). Meanwhile, a government representative claimed that these forums were
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useful for establishing what counted as an expert knowledge, explaining “we have to set
some scientific forum to prove what is the fact” (Interview 2). These organizations,
networks, and forums represent powerful locations by which authoritative knowledge is
disseminated, plastic waste is placed on the international agenda, and top-down solutions
are developed and spread to local elites in the government an industry sphere. These
organizations both frame the problem and promote particular solutions, thereby reorienting
domestic agendas in Thailand to focus on plastic waste. Scientific expertise utilized by
these organizations has additionally shaped the response to plastic waste. For example, The
Jambeck et al. (2015) ranking and the associated media coverage not only sparked action
by government agencies, but also stimulated a response by the plastic industry. When asked
about the Jambeck et al. (2015) ranking, one representative of PTTGC’s plastic waste
reduction initiatives remarked, “it is the beginning of us,” since the study brought new
attention and pressure on PTTGC to take action (Interview 28).
Global discourse, especially through media coverage also shapes Thailand’s
response to plastic waste. Many independent grassroots activists I interviewed, as well as
those situated in NGOs, explained that it was the news coverage of the dead pilot whale,
of dead sea turtles, and of dying birds that caused them to wake up to the plastic waste
issue, and to prioritize it in their own lives. The socio-political dimensions of global
discourse and expertise as it disseminates among regulatory, industry, and activist groups,
largely influence subsequent action on Thailand’s plastic waste issue. While the underlying
prioritization of Western technical and scientific expertise and agendas underscores the
response, it is further complicated by localized power asymmetries and conflict in
Thailand. As such, I now turn to consider the ways in which global discourses and Western
scientific expertise were reproduced and contested in media, government, activist, and
industry spheres.

5.5

How were Western Scientific Rationales and Global Discourses Willingly or
Unwillingly Received? Scientific and Discursive Critiques of the Expertise
While there is apparent consensus among the Thai Government, activists, and larger

public, that plastic waste is a problem in Thailand, there are varying levels of acceptance
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about the degree of the problem and its framing as a Thai-produced issue. Many of the
environmental regulators and plastic industry representatives I interviewed suggested
feelings of unjust international blame targeted at Thailand. Some argue that global
discourse led to a visceral international reaction and damnation of Thai people who create
plastic waste problem. As one respondent put it, “Thailand is being accused that we are
number six in the world who have the plastic waste in the ocean problem.” With respect to
the Jambeck et al. (2015) ranking, interviewees in the government and plastic industry felt
a level of unfounded international blame based on faulty, insufficient, and incorrect data
(Interview 2, 4, 5, 9, 28). While Dr. Jambeck explains that the intent of the ranking was not
“finger pointing,”14 the use of this particular expert knowledge has led to various discourses
of blame, in which the problem is framed as Thai consumer-produced rather than also
exploring other possible sources of pollution, such as waste imports or industrial waste.
Across interviews with numerous government workers and industry representatives, I
learned that individuals felt that their country was being “accused” by an international and
largely Western community that was placing unjust blame on Thailand. “The people
judge,” one interviewee told me, “the EU just judge Thai people. I think it's not fair”
(Interview 9). However, countering such claims proves difficult. “The Thai government
doesn’t have the real data,” he told me. Conducting such studies takes time and money,
which isn’t a productive endeavor for politicians who rely on elections and maintain short
positions of one or two years. Research on the sources of plastic waste, outside of
explanations on high consumption and “plastic addiction” remain understudied.
Additionally, disunity over how the problem is framed stems from an issue of
power in terms of whose research and expertise is platformed on the international scale. A
representative of the DMCR, explained that his agency collects data on coastal

14 According to a transcript from the AAAS Panel on February 12, 2015, Jenna Jambeck explained, “The purpose of this
work was to create this global estimate. But remember what I said before – behind these numbers are people, people
living in culturally and socially different countries of the world. And we had to use country-level data to build out our
framework – so we do indeed have a list of countries that are top contributors. And this has been getting a lot of attention
so I want to be clear about how we think about this list – it is not about finger pointing, but examining things that strongly
influence a country’s rank in this list: first, the population density in the coastlines – how many people are generating
waste within 50 kilometers of the sea? Next, how MUCH plastic waste is each person generating? And finally the
mismanaged waste percentage plays a role – how much of what all those people throw away accidentally ends up in the
ocean? So what you will find near the top are mostly middle income countries with rapidly growing economies that have
not yet been able to develop waste management systems to handle the increase in waste generation that comes along with
economic growth” (Jambeck, 2015).
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mismanaged waste, calculating a far lower number (50% mismanagement) than that
utilized in Jambeck et al. (2015) (75% mismanagement), discounting domestically
produced data in favor of secondary data extracted from the internet (Interview 4). He
lamented that Dr. Jambeck and her team did not reach out to his agency before publishing
this study, and that multiple efforts to contact the Jambeck Research Group after the
article’s publication proved fruitless. “We use the same principle as her,” he told me, “but
the results [are] very different, very, very different” (Interview 4). Meanwhile, by nature
of participating in international networks and collaborations, one MoNRE representative
explained that he had to be willing to let international experts discount the data that his
agency produced (Interview 2). For example, UNEP’s reliance on Western scientific
research such as Jambeck et al. (2015) implies that their stated goal of increasing the
“scientific basis for decision-making” in Thailand, is reliant on Thai participants accepting
and utilizing these same Western scientific rationales in shaping their anti-plastic waste
initiatives and policies (UN Environment Programme, 2019). The authoritative expertise
deemed accurate in these circles had to be accepted if one was to be considered a participant
in these discussions, regardless of contrasting expertise that a group might have produced
themselves.
Others express doubts over the validity of framing Thailand’s plastic waste in terms
of its 6th ranking due to critical absences of data. An interview with a representative of the
Thailand Institute of Packaging and Recycling Management for Sustainable Environment
(TIPMSE), a nonprofit funded primarily by the Federation of Thai Industries and private
manufacturers and producers of packaging and consumer products, revealed doubt over the
consumption data utilized to produce Thailand’s 6th ranking (Yamamoto & Hosoda, 2016).
According to my interviewee, Thailand collects data on production of plastic and the
recycling rate. However, as there is no packaging tax in Thailand, data on consumption is
not collected. According to these situated knowledges, the Jambeck et al. (2015) study
assumes that all non-recycled plastic waste enters the ocean and lacks consumption data
that accounts for plastic currently in use (Interview 3, 9). Therefore, respondents felt that
the issue was being misrepresented in terms of how much marine plastic waste Thailand
was actually producing. One DIW explained her skepticism that Thai people are creating
the plastic waste. “We know we might not have a very good system in terms of waste
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management in the country, but I don’t think that we do litter that much,” she told me.
Then she said laughing, “it could be some container that fell off the ship” (Interview 3).

Figure 5.4 Waste at Bang Krachao. While the amount of mismanaged coastal waste is
contested, plastic continues to wash up on the shores. Photo by author (2019).

Meanwhile, the acceptance of scientific studies and expert knowledges by
particular respondents appeared intimately tied their network affiliation, organizational
agenda, and relative trust or distrust in the Thai government. The ranking remains
contested, as some government officials have attempted to present Thailand in the top ten
contributors to marine plastic pollution, rather than in the top six, while grassroots activists
insist on using the 6th ranking.15 As one environmental activist told me:
15 According to interviews, when Thailand’s ranking gained public attention, many government representatives
responded by disputing the 6th ranking, claiming that Thailand actually ranked more broadly in the top ten contributors
to marine plastic pollution. Numerous government regulators in interviews referred to Thailand’s status in the “top ten”
contributors as opposed to the 6th ranking in the Jambeck et al. (2015) study. The situation has since evolved, with some
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“I don't have suspicion or did not wonder why Thailand [is] being ranked
number 6 that produces plastic waste in the ocean out of the world because
Thai government has never had no courage to enforce the law.”
To her, Thailand’s plastic waste ranking represented a historic pattern of government
failures to take environmental action and resulting civic distrust. Meanwhile, expert
knowledges that frame Thailand’s plastic waste issue are also put into question and
interrogated in the plastic industry sphere. 16 Respondents question the agendas of those in
different groups across government, industry, and environmental spheres, revealing
localized power asymmetries in terms of whose expert knowledges are valued, trusted, and
validated in different networks. As different expert knowledges are accepted and rejected,
the plastic waste issue is approached in dynamic ways, and the power to frame the issue
remains contested.
Authoritative and expert knowledges used to frame Thailand’s plastic waste issue
must be positioned and situated. Residents with intimate knowledge of the production of
plastic, waste management systems, and environmental monitoring in Thailand often
cannot find a platform for their studies, and their research remains relatively absent in
international media coverage. However, these experts also have situated agendas and
vested interests in framing the plastic waste issue in particular ways, leading grassroots
environmental activists to remain skeptical of domestically produced research by
governmental agencies. Meanwhile the expert knowledges that have gained the most
traction in international media coverage often frame the pileup as Thai-produced. In
particular, the Jambeck et al. (2015) study framed Thailand’s plastic waste issue and

government literature acknowledging the Jambeck et al. (2015) ranking (Information acquired through a pamphlet
provided by a representative of the Pollution Control Department entitled “Thailand’s plastic management initiative to
reduce marine debris,” (n.d), which may not be publicly available). However, this particular form of expertise that frames
Thailand’s plastic waste issue remains contentious.
16 Interviewees in the plastic industry question the authority and accuracy of scientific studies and media portrayals of
Thailand’s plastic waste, sometimes arguing that scientific expertise and media coverage are utilized to make the plastic
waste issue appear more urgent and the environmental degradation more substantial. For example, some argue that the
media is using exaggerated and manipulated studies in order to make people panic (Interview 9, 13). For example, one
TIPMSE interviewee in the Federation of Thai Industries, explained that scrap plastic is different than waste plastic, as
it is a byproduct of manufacturing and can easily be recycled as it is clean. However, he explained, the media includes
scrap plastic data in order to inflate statistics and claim that there is more plastic waste in Thailand (Interview 9).
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informed the debate. As a result, through the discursive work of international and domestic
experts, the knowledge of the ranking was reproduced and proliferated in Thailand.
However, some residents of Thailand felt that international discourse and forms of
scientific expertise such as the ranking imposed unjust blame on Thai people and the
country. Through the pairing of discourse on Thailand’s “plastic addiction” and the
Jambeck et al. (2015) ranking in the media, this reinforces perceptions of the pileup as an
issue of Thai consumption while dissuading exploration of other various alternative sources
of waste such as plastic waste imports. The role of expertise maintains vital importance in
shaping both how groups understand the issue, as well as the national responses to the
plastic problem, as many powerful actors have formed alliances to promote solutions.

5.6

Who Defines the Solutions?
Those primarily deciding what solutions are implemented in Thailand include the Thai

government, the plastic industry, and grassroots environmental organizations. While
various government Ministries are involved in the plastic waste issue, the MoNRE are
primarily shaping the goals and objectives on plastic waste reduction, while other groups
situated in other Ministries such as the Customs Department under the Ministry of Finance
deal with specific waste flows such as waste imports, the Department of Industrial Works
deals with factory regulations and collaborates with the Customs Department, while still
other groups such as the Ministry of Interior, would theoretically have the power to create
future laws on plastic waste.
The most comprehensive waste plans appear to come from the MoNRE’s large-scale
improvement scheme, including the National 3R strategy and National Master Plan for
Waste Management (2016-2021) as well as a Plastic Debris Management Plan (2017-2021)
(Wichai-utcha & Chavalparit, 2019). The primary government output from the joint
venture with the plastic industry thus far has been the Roadmap for Plastic Waste
Management, which outlines a plan to ostensibly draw 100% of plastic product and
packaging waste into recycling systems, as well as to reduce or stop using various plastic
products through bans and eco-friendly replacement materials. Additionally, this
environmental improvement scheme creates several benchmarks and dates by which a
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select number of plastic products will be phased out. In particular, the Roadmap for Plastic
Waste Management involved the phasing out of seven plastic products. In 2019, the
government aimed to ban microbeads, oxo-degradable plastic bags, and cap seals, while
by 2022, they planned to ban plastic straws, foam food containers, single-use plastic cups,
and plastic bags of a thickness <36 microns.
Meanwhile, the relative effectiveness of the Roadmap for Plastic Waste
Management (2018-2030) is controversial due to its non-binding and voluntary nature.
Government regulators and industry representatives involved in policy initiatives lament
the need for a centralized organization to address the waste and other shortcomings
(Interview 25, 28). In an interview with MoNRE Permanent Secretary Dr. Wijarn
Simachaya, he revealed the misleading language of the plastic waste initiatives in
government literature and media coverage. While these literatures point to the
government’s ambitious goal of recycling 100% of plastic waste by 2030, Dr. Simachaya
corrected this language. “Yeah, something like that” he said with a chuckle, “but 100% of
our target is like a certain type of plastic. Not for the whole thing” (Interview 1). Instead,
he suggested that this goal applied to plastics such as PET, which is already far more likely
to be recovered due to its economic value.
In my interview with Dr. Wijarn Simachaya, I asked how these decisions were
made as to what plastic items to ban and the timeline. Dr. Simachaya explained that plastic
industry representatives were intimately involved in deciding which plastic items were
banned and how.
“We work closely with the Thai plastic producer association, yeah what
kind of plastic [to ban] and we also look for the replacement, the substitution
… for example if we ban like the plastic food container we have something
to replace that plastic … we come up with roadmap and we work closely
with the Thai plastic industry or association on the plastic” (Interview with
Dr. Wijarn Simachaya, MoNRE).
The plastic industry’s voice is often central to the regulatory responses of the MoNRE,
often mediated through the Thailand Public-Private Partnership for Plastic and Waste
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Management (PPP), a coalition including many plastic industry representatives, the
government, and various other organizational bodies (Interview 25; Thailand PPP Plastic
2019). For example, as of July 2019, government groups include the MoNRE, Ministry of
Industry, and Ministry of Finance (Interview 25; Thailand PPP Plastic 2019). PPP members
also include the Ministry of Industry’s Plastics Institute of Thailand, the Federation of Thai
Industries; the Thailand Business Council for Sustainable Development, and private and
public companies such as the Dow Thailand Group, Siam Cement Group, Central Group,
PTTGC, CP All, Indorama Global Ventures, and IRPC Public Company Limited.

Figure 5.5 Introductory slide produced by the PPP. Data from 2019. Source: Thailand PPP
Plastic (2019).

With a plethora of members in the government and private sector, the PPP has
struggled to gain civil society and environmental NGO members (Marks, Miller, &
Vassanadumrongdee, 2020). According to one Federation of Thai Industries employee and
founder of the PPP, the organization has spent hours attempting to convince NGOs that
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their intentions are to improve plastic waste management rather than to simply improve
business, with limited success (Interview 25). However, this has not prevented the PPP
from influencing policies and environmental schemes such as the Roadmap for Plastic
Waste Management.
Plastic industry groups and members of the PPP do not shy away from discussing
their intimate role in affecting plastic waste solutions in Thailand. Although it is not widely
covered in the Thai media, industry representatives and plastic industry groups openly
discuss their influence upon the anti-plastic movement in interviews about the PPP, while
openly critiquing the government’s initiatives such as the Roadmap. When asked about the
effectiveness of the Roadmap, a Federation of Thai Industries representative explained that
it was simply a way to save or “make face” rather than sparking substantial change
(Interview 9). Perhaps a more surprising, but related finding, however, was that the plastic
industry perceived itself to be the experts, leading the way in the movement to address
plastic waste.
“We are very humble. Normally we say... that we are a leader in this circular
economy. Have to [be] humble!” (Interview 28, PTTGC Member, Plastic
Industry).
“The fact that the private sector has to take the lead is a bit worrying, but it
doesn't mean that the government can't catch up. I'm sure they could if they
wanted to” (Interview 13, Indorama Ventures, Plastic Industry).

This quickly proved to be the case after various interviews with plastic industry and
government agency representatives. While claiming a level of responsibility to address the
issue, the plastic industry has simultaneously positioned themselves as experts as well as
“role models” for anti-waste action. Plastic industry representatives explained that they
were willing to own their role in the plastic waste issue, and that they felt they had many
answers and solutions for improving the situation. Time and time again in my interviews,
plastic industry groups such as PTTGC, SCG, Dow Thailand Group, and Indorama Global
Ventures were at the forefront of the conversation, their anti-plastic initiatives lauded, and
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their expertise in the PPP centered by the MoNRE and other government groups. The
groups have additionally formed powerful alliances with international NGOs, such as the
PTTGC and National Geographic co-sponsorship of the Circular Living Symposium 2019:
Upcycling our Planet and a public-private partnership with Dow to reduce plastic waste in
Rayong Province (Daugherty, 2020).
However, this over-representation of the plastic industry in the PPP has unique
implications for why some solutions are promoted over others in Thailand. Notably, in an
interview with Dr. Wijarn Simachaya, it became evident that the bans on these plastic items
were largely to be enacted through voluntary measures. According to interviews, this lack
of governmental enforcement was not simply due to a lack of action on the part of the
Ministry of Interior to create a law. The following chapter will outline some of the key
impacts of the plastic industry on Thailand’s plastic waste responses, especially with
respect to their role in preventing outright plastic bans and taxes, favoring voluntary bans.
Additionally, despite these alignments between government and industry, I will outline
some of the distinct divisions and tensions between those in the government who want
stronger regulation, and industry representatives that do not. Additionally, the plastic
industry has a substantial role in promoting the expertise of the circular economy, which
has likewise shifted solutions toward waste management schemes including recycling and
upcycling, rather than reducing plastic production (Thailand PPP Plastic, 2019).
Specifically, they do so through utilization of the circular economy concept, promoted not
only as an environmental solution, but a means of boosting economies and profits
(Thailand Board of Investment, 2019). The circular economy discourse represents an
environmental development strategy and mirrors many of the tenets of global capitalism as
a form of authoritative expertise.
Meanwhile, grassroots activist efforts and NGO environmental advocacy maintain
that the plastic waste issue is dire. They form their own expertise and call for increased
action beyond the MoNRE Roadmap. While some government and industry groups explain
that they want to include environmental groups and NGOs, as seen with the DMCR, they
are often unwilling to center grassroots environmental demands and contrasting expertise.
Instead, large scale solutions are imposed on these grassroots groups, without including
their concerns. In turn, these grassroots environmental activists also question the lauded
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successes of the government and industry to reduce plastic waste, discussed more in
Chapter 8.

Figure 5.6 Stacks of crushed PET bottles sourced from Southern Thailand and transported
to a recycling factory in the Bangkok metropolitan area. Photo by author (2019).

5.7

What is the Circular Economy?
“The ban of plastic is not useful for industry. But okay, it's useful for the
environment. So, the people from industry [do] not accept that. But the
circular economy concept, everyone accepts it” (Interview 5).
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Relying on plastic industry expertise has had clear implications on Thailand’s
policies. For example, the Federation of Thai Industries, a private sector network of
industrial enterprises, is one of the founding members of the PPP and continues to have a
very active role in this partnership. However, the Federation of Thai Industries also has a
history of influencing Thai policy and governance over the years. For example, as industry
interviewees explained, over a decade ago, the Federation of Thai Industries successfully
prevented the Thai government’s attempt to launch a packaging tax in Thailand (Interview
9, 28). The Federation of Thai Industries achieves such political work through maintaining
various forms of expertise as to how such initiatives would affect the country, largely
arguing that packaging taxes and plastic bottle bans would hurt the economy and the poor,
while any tax would be co-opted by political corruption.17 Such successful efforts to thwart
policy enforcement have continued, as industry representatives in the PPP explain that the
Thai government attempted to ban plastic products, but that they lobbied and/or negotiated
to successfully prevent more radical bans in the Roadmap (Interview 5, 27). As a result,
instead of bans and taxes, the solution that has emerged at the forefront of government and
industry endeavors is the institution of the circular economy, lauded as a sustainable
strategy and alternative economic model for addressing plastic waste.
Broadly, the circular economy is a response to a traditional linear economy which
relies on converting natural resources through production into waste (Murray, Skene &
Haynes, 2017). Instead, the circular economy advocates a resource acquisition and
extraction process where no damage results to the environment, and which can instead lead
to environmental restoration (Murray, Skene & Haynes, 2017). Meanwhile, it maintains a
production process and product lifecycle in which little to no waste is generated (Murray,
Skene & Haynes, 2017). Previously unwanted waste outputs of industrial processes are
reconfigured as raw materials, while simultaneously advocating the three Rs: Reduce,
Reuse, and Recycle (Interview 1, 4, 5, 12, 15, 25, 28).

17 Narratives about how poor people rely upon cheap plastic such as take-out bags and plastic water bottles proliferate
in these circles. This disseminates an ideology purporting to speak for the poor, mediated through intellectuals or wealthy
plastic industry representatives in order to support the agenda of continued plastic production. However, while taxes
could prove unpopular among lower income groups, a 2017 poll of 2,000 Thai citizens showed that a majority (60%)
were willing to pay plastic bag fees of one baht (Marks, Miller, & Vassanadumrongdee, 2020).
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Interestingly, the concept of linear economy was largely developed in tandem with
the circular economy as a means of promoting the latter. This concept’s theoretical
underpinnings are derived from the fields of ecological and environmental economics,
concerned with limits to growth and resources, as well as notions of a sustainability
contingent on material reuse and recycling (Murray, Skene & Haynes 2017; Gregson et al.
2015). Although there is relative agreement about what the circular economy hopes to
achieve, there are contested and ambiguous understandings of the origin of the term and
how to define it (Korhonen et al. 2018; Murray, Skene & Haynes 2017; Gregson et al.
2015). Ultimately, the circular economy attempts to decouple economic growth from
primary resource consumption (Gregson et al., 2015). While energy production and many
other patterns of production and consumption continue to follow a linear model, plastic is
emerging as the frontline product for a circular economy approach in Thailand.

5.8

Locating the Discourse: The Roots of Thailand’s Circular Economy
The dissemination of the circular economy concept in Thailand can be traced back

to large international organizations and forums. Paralleling other analyses of the circular
economy, the Ellen MacArthur Foundation and European Commission are seen as the
primary advocacy bodies of this concept that have widely shaped its contemporary uses
and understandings (Korhonen et al., 2018). Similar to the global spread of water
privatization and green neoliberalism, the expansion of the circular economy concept
occurs through the work of a transnational professional class (Goldman, 2007). Meanwhile,
my interviewees trace the roots back to large international governing bodies and forums.
While its introduction for different groups in Thailand might vary, interviewees
particularly noted its introduction at the World Economic Forum three years previous to
my fieldwork, through the conceptual work of Ellen MacArthur (Interview 4, 28). Now,
the circular economy is promoted by Thai environmental organizations, technocrats, and
most prominently, the Thai plastic industry.
My research suggests that the government and plastic industry in Thailand have in
part, created a positive association and partnership through a shared vision of a circular
economy, as seen through the PPP’s membership and shared agenda. Three of the industry
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groups considered leaders in this circular economy transition include groups interviewed
for this research: Siam Cement Group (SCG), PTT Global Chemical (PTTGC) and
Indorama Ventures (IVL) (Thailand Board of Investment, 2019). Other notable groups
pushing toward circular economy concepts are the Federation of Thai Industries and the
Plastic Institute of Thailand, also deeply entwined in the PPP network, with representatives
interviewed for this research. Meanwhile, these groups have garnered international
attention and accolades, as current business investment literature calls foreign investors to
insert themselves in the bourgeoning vision of Thailand as a plastic and bioplastic hub of
Southeast Asia, with a circular economy vision at the center of such calls (Thailand Board
of Investment 2019; Chong 2019). The circular economy is seen as a business-friendly
opportunity for increased profits while transitioning to a more sustainable future for plastic
producers. Therefore, by merging ideals of a growing packaging industry with the
discourse of the circular economy, increasing plastic consumption can be reconfigured as
‘sustainable consumption.’
The circular economy as it is understood by my interviewees in Thailand aligns
with popular conceptions, with particular emphasis on reconfiguring plastic waste as a
resource and utilizing this waste as a form of accumulation and consumption for the benefit
of a growing economy. As seen in Figure 5.7 by the Ellen MacArthur Foundation and
Figure 5.8 by PTT Global Chemical, products and materials are meant to be kept in use
rather than used up, a mission emphasized through product redesign and downstream
solutions such as recycling and upcycling. With relatively little research on the circular
economy despite its rapid and proliferate global attention, the ways in which Thailand’s
governance has operationalized and adapted the concept has yet to be studied, nor are there
comparative studies of its implementation and practice in other countries. As such, I
examine the discursive work that the plastic industry is doing to shape Thailand’s response
to the plastic waste through the concept of the circular economy, drawing on interviews
across activist, government, and industry circles.
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Figure 5.7 The Butterfly Diagram for Circular Economy created by Ellen
MacArthur Foundation.18

Figure 5.8 Circular Living Diagram created by PTTGC.19

18 Source: Ellen MacArthur Foundation, Circular economy systems diagram (February 2019).
www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org. Drawing based on Braungart & McDonough, Cradle to Cradle (C2C)
19 Source: PTTGC (2019) Circular Economy: management approach.
https://www.pttgcgroup.com/en/sustainability/circular-economy
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Another common use of the circular economy as described in Thailand, is its
pairing with the 3Rs (reduce, reuse, recycle). The circular economy is presented as
reflecting these three values as a taken-for-granted assumption, and the 3Rs were
constantly alluded to in interviews that turned to the circular economy. Interestingly,
however, “reduce” rarely seemed to be interpreted as a reduction of production rates of
plastic. Instead, reduction seemed to refer to increased energy efficiency, reductions of byproduct waste, and the use of alternative fuel sources (see Figure 5.7). In general, despite
the inclusion of “reduction” in the 3Rs, the reduction of plastic production and
consumption remains inadequately addressed, with those narrating and defining the plastic
waste issue often leaving it out of the story. As one plastic industry representative explained
in reference to the plastic chain, “Better to attack the beginning part, which is the
collection” (Interview 13). This reticence to address plastic production as a means of
implementing the circular economy is clear in interviews with the plastic industry
representatives and industry representatives in the government. Moving forward with
measures to de-incentivize production through measures such as bans or taxes, is seen as
being in direct opposition with the plastic industry’s interests. For example, a
representative of the Plastic Institute of Thailand under the Ministry of Industry explained:
“The problem is some politician think that they have to ban plastic, the use
of plastic, especially for single-use. But some people in industry or Ministry
of Industry they don't agree like this because reduce, reuse means reduce
the economic… people from industry don't like that. But people from
industry think we should have the concept of circular economy to solve this
problem. We have to have good management of the plastic waste because
we don't agree with the ban on use of plastics” (Interview 5).

While plastic industry groups such as PTTGC and others laud the circular economy, it is
clear that they have no intention of reducing production of plastic, especially through bans.
Interestingly, despite consistent references to the 3Rs in interviews about the circular
economy, in this quote, the circular economy is identified as an alternative to the 3Rs rather
than indicative of it. Instead of reducing and reusing plastic, the circular economy is
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something that supports industry interests; The circular economy as it is understood by the
plastic industry in Thailand is a means of addressing solely waste management. In other
words, the plastic industry supports a circular economy that doesn’t reduce consumption
of plastic but maximizes the length of time that we use (and profit from) materials. In an
interview with Dr. Varoon Varanyanond, a CU Zero Waste organizer and professor in
Bangkok,20 he asked me if I knew why the circular economy was so popular amongst
government and industry circles. “It’s because they want to keep plastic in the system,” he
told me. “There’s no such thing as circular as they describe it.” Consumption rates are
maintained or even increased, supporting capitalist profit through plastic production, while
circular economy strategies are centered on downstream measures such as recycling and
upcycling.
This account paralleled my findings through interviews and participant observation,
suggesting that the circular economy promoted by Thailand’s government and plastic
industry was of a very particular focus. For example, while in attendance at the Circular
Living Symposium 2019: Upcycling our Planet held in Bangkok in 2019, it became clear
through the speakers, sessions, and events, that reducing plastic production was not a
priority, let alone a topic of debate. This massive event was co-sponsored by PTT Global
Chemical Public Company Limited (PTTGC) in collaboration with National Geographic
and included attendance free of charge. It highlighted international, regional, and domestic
efforts surrounding issues of waste management and upcycling. Interviewees in the plastic
industry continually centered waste management as if production were not part of the
plastic lifecycle; insufficient waste collection and separation is discussed as the primary
barrier to a circular economy (Interview 13). The belief that a circular economy ideal is
made possible through improved waste collection, separation, and recycling initiatives
such as upcycling as opposed to reduced production and consumption rates has formed a
hegemonic interpretation of the circular economy in industry spheres. As such, efforts that
replicated this interpretation appeared more likely to be provided a platform and voice at
this national and international forum.

20 Real name and affiliation included as requested by interviewee. CU Zero Waste is a campus waste reduction
initiative by Chulalongkorn University’s Environmental Research Institute, the Physical Resource Management Office,
and a network of Chulalongkorn faculty and students.
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5.9

How the Circular Economy Became Hegemonic in Thailand
This chapter argues that those with the power to define interpretations of the

circular economy in and its associated solutions in Thailand utilize it as a tool to decenter
a focus on production of plastic, instead directing efforts toward downstream efforts. The
challenge with the pro-business, pro-industry interpretation of the circular economy lies
with the plastic industry’s power to hegemonize interpretations and acceptance of the
circular economy in Thailand’s anti-plastic initiatives. The implementation of a circular
economy in Thailand perhaps ironically, perhaps not, relies on the expertise of those
invested in increasing plastic production. This inevitably factors into what solutions are
proposed. For example, as noted in the previous chapter, plastic industry members in the
PPP are identified as experts who are consulted in the drafting of government agendas such
as the Roadmap for Plastic Waste Management (2018-2030) and other initiatives that aim
to embrace the logic of the circular economy. Meanwhile, these proposed solutions involve
an inseparable and underlying reliance on ideas of economic growth, de-regulation, and
capitalistic profit, seen as compatible with building a circular economy in Thailand.
Meanwhile, as the Federation of Thai Industries and other industry groups offer
expertise and advice to the government in setting up national policies, they also benefit
from a relationship with the government of another sort. As one source noted:
“One of the weakness of the Thai politics, each governor doesn't stay long
because they have some fighting. That is our benefit that because then they
want to pass some law, some regulation, some legislation, take a long time
to do that.”
While industry groups actively lobby for their interests, they also passively benefit from
instability in the Thai government, creating a major roadblock to strong anti-plastic waste
policies such as taxes and bans. The quote demonstrates how in effect, a weak government
is seen as more business friendly, since business-as-usual operations can operate without
government interference.
Interviews with industry representatives in the government as well as in the plastic
industry, articulate a recognition of the need for regulation, juxtaposed with its perceived
70

anti-business and anti-plastic industry effects. A ban on single-use plastic is seen as hurting
business interests and economic profit. Therefore, the primary mechanism for promoting
this worldview appears to be through inserting their expertise in the form of a hegemonic
meaning of the circular economy. This hegemonic reading of the circular economy frames
it as an alternative to plastic reduction (primarily through bans and taxes), redirecting focus
on strategies such as upcycling. Recent investigations by international and Western news
agencies point to similar conclusions about the global plastic industry’s role, suggesting
that the industry in effect is highly aware of the limits to recycling, and that their strong
promotion of waste management and recycling schemes is an intentional effort to counter
enforced and regulated plastic reduction initiatives, thereby maintaining plastic production
and consumption (Lerner 2019; Sullivan 2020). Power asymmetries emerge, as those
wielding the expert position to define the problem and solution find their agendas enacted
through policy.
Environmental improvement and development schemes, such as the circular
economy, work to educate the ambitions of multiple publics, transforming what solutions
they in turn promote and execute (Li, 2007). Generally, the circular economy is considered
an appropriate solution by respondents in all sectors and the circular economy discourse is
prevalent in grassroots organizing circles. 21 As one industry representative once told me
“the circular economy concept, everyone accepts it” (Interview 5). However, questioning
and disagreement about the circular economy is necessary in the making of hegemony
(Williams, 1977). While the plastic industry promotes technical solutions such as improved
waste management systems and upcycling projects, grassroots environmentalists continue
to see plastic waste not solely as a technical issue, but a political issue.
Grassroots groups simultaneously explain their support for circular economy
measures, while critiquing a lack of bans and taxes, seeing their cleanup and upcycling
initiatives as a way of raising awareness and education, not as a means to an end (Interview

21 Various activists and those working for prominent environmental NGOs such as Precious Plastic, Environman, and
Trash Hero reproduce and rely upon the circular economy discourse in Thailand, explaining that the circular economy is
the end goal (Interview 12, 21). UNEP’s initiative “The Southeast Asia Circular- solving plastic pollution at the source”
has connected with grassroots environmental groups such as Trash Hero in Thailand to promote “circular economic
strategies” and “market-based conservation solutions” (Finlay, 2019). Groups such as Trash Hero Bangkok and Precious
Plastic, that focus on recycling and upcycling, were platformed at Circular Living Symposium 2019: Upcycling our
Planet.

71

12). For them, the concept of the circular economy is not the issue, it is the measures being
taken to achieve its vision. Grassroots environmental activists say they want a circular
economy with “laws,” “regulations,” “bans,” and corporate accountability, expressing that
the Roadmap’s voluntary bans are insufficient (Interview 11, 19, 22). “We want to ask the
government to have a concrete regulation” one respondent explained (Interview 10). “I
want a law that either subsidizes the use of recycled material in the production of recycled
products or the taxation of using virgin plastic in products” said another (Interview 12).
Bans and taxes are specifically a priority for these groups. “Yes, I think [the ban on plastic
straws will be] in a few years like two years. I wish they could ban it faster” one respondent
explained (Interview 20). “We want to collect tax on plastic bag” said another (Interview
21). However, individuals explain distrust in Thailand’s regulatory measures. As one
environmental activist put it: “Yeah, this year in the roadmap they said they will ban oxo
plastic right? The thing that happen is, they still sell everywhere ... but I don't think they
will punish those who use it” (Interview 22).
As environmental activists call for stronger regulatory measures, close relationships
between petrochemical and plastic packaging groups, corporate interests, and the
government, create blurred lines of responsibility and questions as to how to influence and
adjust the solutions to the plastic waste. For example, the Ministry of Industry is charged
with both the promotion and regulation of industry, situated in a realm where regulation is
framed through disourse as anti-industry. Meanwhile, corporate organizations such as
Charoen Pokphand Group (CP) hold vast amounts of political power in influencing the role
of plastic packaging in Thailand. CP Group a Thai conglomerate and global empire worth
tens of billions USD that maintains prominent influence over Thailand, operating
thousands of 7-Eleven stores across the country. Geoff Baker, an environmental activist
and teacher, explained his struggles in shaping a targeted campaign for his student-led
organization, Grin Green International. “Nowadays, the line between corporations and
government is so hazy that the corporations have so much sway,” he told me. Describing
his attempt to pitch a collaboration between CP and Grin Green to CP’s CEO, he explained,
“This guy is no question richer and more powerful than Prayut [Thailand’s Prime
Minister].” “Who is more important here in this meeting? Like who if I had a meeting with
this guy from CP or Prayut the Prime Minister, who would we have more impact pitching
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to?” The ability of plastic industry and retail groups to shape Thailand’s environmental
improvement schemes as well as the blurred lines between government and industry has
created new challenges for grassroots environmental groups who wish to introduce plastic
bans and taxes.
While the circular economy discourse is widely accepted, I demonstrate how those
with the power to define interpretations of the circular economy and its associated solutions
utilize it as a tool to decenter a focus on production of plastic, instead directing efforts
toward downstream efforts. Industry expertise and resulting strategies have become
synonymous with a particular vision of the circular economy, positioning the circular
economy as an alternative to enforced regulation, becoming hegemonic. I reveal that
industry and government solutions proposed in support of the circular economy discourse
in Thailand fall short of grassroots environmental activist demands. Activists likewise
negotiate struggles around how to make these demands due to blurred roles and
responsibilities in shaping the response to the plastic waste. Nonetheless, the circular
economy does not need to be altogether rejected, as grassroots activists do not see it as
incompatible with their calls for plastic bans and taxes. Circular economy initiatives would
be strengthened by incorporating a greater diversity of voices who recognize the necessity
of reducing production of single-use plastic, and who seek creative solutions to address the
“reduction” component of the 3Rs. Likewise, prioritizing these relationships has the
potential for empowering grassroots waste sorters through an influx of resources.
Encouraged by the preexisting collaborations between the plastic industry and grassroots
organizers, saleng, and small-scale, grassroots recycling initiatives to promote the circular
economy, there is much room for strengthened connections. Finally, including a greater
diversity of voices with the power to say what the circular economy means and what
solutions it proposes has the potential to create a more effective circular economy reality
that reduces plastic waste.

5.10 Conclusion
It is evident that Thailand is facing a colossal plastic waste problem. High
consumption rates, waste imports, management issues, privileging of plastic industry
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interests, and other challenges have led to large inputs of plastic waste into the ocean
originating in Thailand. Following relevant feminist political ecology scholarship, I draw
from Harding (1986) and Haraway’s (1988) theoretical work to locate and position
knowledges. Ideas and their producers are put into context with positionality, social
context, and the results they enable. Following Haraway (1988) and Harding (1986), I work
to locate and situate the knowledges discussed, recognizing their embodied production and
relational dissemination in these networks. Therefore, this chapter examines situated
environmental knowledges, the positionality of those who produce the knowledge, and the
power dimensions underlying whose voice counts in shaping large-scale environmental
improvement plans.
Drawing on Gramsci’s (1949, 1988) notion of the intellectuals and hegemony, as
well as feminist political ecology, I explore how expertise greatly shapes how the problem
is framed, the solutions created, and the power within this process. Those primarily framing
the plastic waste issue appear to be situated in Western and international academic and
institutional organizations, producing expertise based on Western scientific rationales and
promoted by international platforms in the media. These expert knowledges such as
Thailand’s ranking, media discourse, and other forms of scientific expertise inform our
understanding and the anti-plastic initiatives that they facilitate. In particular, the Jambeck
et al. (2015) ranking reveals power imbalances in which domestic-produced Thai research
is discounted on the international scale, while local elites often maintain the power to define
which solutions are imposed.
I work to situate this broad spectrum of perceptions and power relations within the
context of Thailand’s complex political terrain, while recognizing the limits of situating
these knowledges. In particular, I point to the vested interests of particular groups, as well
as the contradictions and limits to a passive acceptance of ideas and values provided by
authoritative academic, government, and industry institutions. Those shaping domestic
regulatory responses are often local elites situated in the government and plastic industry,
who have formed powerful alliances through the PPP and large international organizations
such as National Geographic. The current framing of Thailand’s plastic waste issue, as well
as the solutions proposed, continue to promote a top-down narrative, drawing on elite
intellectuals and experts, while failing to incorporate grassroots environmental actors in
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the PPP and other areas of decision-making. In critiquing this relationship, I hope to reveal
how the current initiatives are not necessarily solving the plastic waste issue. However,
greater incorporation of grassroots voices has the potential to improve how the plastic
waste is defined and what solutions are deemed appropriate, creating a robust and more
equitable anti-plastic waste movement.
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CHAPTER 6. THE GRASSROOTS RESPONSE

Figure 6.1 Trash Hero activists and Buddhist monks participate in a waste cleanup on the
shore of the Chao Phraya River in Bang Krachao, south of Bangkok. Photo by author
(2019).

6.1

Unpacking the “Grassroots” Response
Those taking action to address plastic waste include the Thai government,

international and Thai NGOs, independent grassroots activists, plastic industry groups,
plastic recyclers, and those living and working near plastic waste sites. Grassroots
organizations and independent activists seeking to counter plastic waste are situated in this
broad network of actors. Organizations and individuals contacted for this research include
but are not limited to Grin Green International, RecycleNow.Asia, Refill Station, CHULA
Zero Waste, EARTH-Thailand, Trash Hero Bangkok, Greenpeace Thailand, Precious
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Plastic, @3WheelsUncle, Environman @Environman.th, GEPP Waste Collectors
@GEPPThailand, ReReef @Re4Reef, Won @WonTogether, Ralyn Satidtanasarn (Lilly)
dubbed "Thailand's Greta Thunberg," and many more. While some occupy visible spaces
in Bangkok’s social landscape, with NGO-affiliations, a large social media presence, and
participants in international and high-income circles, others work outside of the spotlight
on individual actions or social justice issues outside of the city of Bangkok. I spoke with
those situated in leadership positions in activist organizations as well as individuals who
considered themselves ordinary citizens taking action. These grassroots actors enact a
multiplicity of actions and diverse forms of environmental engagement, often tied to their
differential social and geographic positions. Those occupying positions in international
NGOs likewise had strong networks and a voice in the media, their expertise often
centering on the negative environmental, social, and health-related effects of plastic waste
on the megafauna and communities across Thailand. Notably, I soon found that
Westerners, specifically from the UK and the U.S., often held leadership positions in
grassroots environmental and plastic industry spheres, necessitating incorporation in this
research. Likewise, some interviewees were born, raised and/or educated in international
contexts, born to both Western and Thai parents, and inhabited a broad range of
positionalities that complicate Thainess as an identity marker. Interviewees were
positioned in various roles with differing positions of power and types of expertise.
Most interviews with grassroots actors occurred in person, often involving more
interactive engagement at educational events and waste cleanups. I conducted a two-hour
walking interview that was particularly fruitful, as walking interviews often illuminate
interviewee’s attitudes and knowledges about the space (James and Jones, 2011). The
movement through a particularly polluted neighborhood facilitated a flowing conversation,
and objects or places of significance sparked new topics for the interviewee as he recalled
past waste cleanups in the area and the previous king, Rama 9’s efforts to revitalize
Bangkok’s water systems. Through interviews and participant observation, I learned about
a diverse range of direct actions, education efforts, and creative projects that make up
Thailand’s grassroots response to plastic waste. Activist efforts range from collective
action and public demonstrations, to subtler forms of engagement such as zero-waste
lifestyles, reusable product design, and refill stations that reduce production and
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consumption of plastic. 22 Some are confrontational, while others work quietly in the
background of the anti-plastic movement.

6.2

Grassroots Action: Alignments, Frictions, and Tensions
Networks of collaboration and strategic coalitions with particular NGOs, industry,

and government organizations affect Thailand’s grassroots environmental efforts. One of
the first tensions that emerged in my research was that of international environmental
NGOs in Thailand which reconfigure local grassroots activisms. Throughout the interview
process, many large international decision-making bodies and NGOs were cited for their
expert knowledges, while grassroots organizers often worked to form coalitions.
Meanwhile, although these international connections can broaden the scales at which
activists can influence decision-making and propose solutions, it can also lead to
prioritization of particular campaigns and reconfiguring activisms on the local scale at the
expense of addressing local polluters or environmental offenders. One environmental
organizer expressed frustration that the group Greenpeace Thailand, originally targeted
Coca-Cola as one of the largest plastic waste producers in Thailand as opposed to the Thai
conglomerate Charoen Pokphand (CP Group), the owner of 7-Eleven:
“And [Greenpeace Thailand] invited me to the press conference on the
brand audit that they did in Thailand, you know? And I went, and I was like
furious because they only did one cleanup in Thailand. [And I don’t think
the staff] demonstrate who is like the real bad polluter […] Yeah it became
like a generic thing and then they say like they have so many lawsuits with
everyone already and they’re not trying to take one more with 7-Eleven and
I guess that there was still a focus on Coca-Cola, like international
campaign, and they weren’t doing anything local yet.”23

22 As noted by scholars such as Lora-Wainwright (2016), Chatterton (2006), and Berglund (2016), subtle and everyday
acts of public engagement should be included in studies of activism and social movements, as many activist–public roles
are blurred.
23 Greenpeace is an international NGO that works to facilitate global environmental campaigns while simultaneously
coordinating national and regional campaigns carried out by independent subgroups (Greenpeace International, 2019).
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CP Group is a Thai conglomerate and private company worth billions of dollars. As a major
business presence with a history of influence in Thailand, 24 CP Group operates almost
11,000 7-Eleven stores across the country of Thailand and is a proliferate provider of
plastic packaging.25 For this particular activist, the centering of Coca-Cola as opposed to
CP Group as the target of Greenpeace Thailand’s anti-plastic campaign was a major
oversight that failed to consider local context in Thailand. In part, this conflict seems
structural, since national and regional organizations (NROs) such as Greenpeace Thailand
must carry out campaigns that are “…consistent and contribute to the global campaign
programme” (Greenpeace International, 2019). Based on this language as well as interview
data, Greenpeace Thailand, based in Bangkok, is likely encouraged to orient its campaign
efforts (e.g., brand audits and plastic waste beach surveys) to support the global
Greenpeace campaigns. Following political ecologists such as Sundberg (1998), this
example follows a trend of global-level NGOs and institutions shaping environmental
agendas.26 However, although tensions may remain, Greenpeace Thailand’s most recent
report released in October of 2019 names CP as the largest local plastic waste producer
(Greenpeace Southeast Asia, 2019). Given the large influence of NGOs in Thailand’s
response to the plastic waste issue, it is highly likely that international agendas continue to
be privileged over local agendas, while activist pushback has the ability to refocus
initiatives on concerns situated and focused in Thailand.
Coalitional tensions appear to be emerging, in which groups strategically choose
other organizations and networks with which to align themselves. These coalitions are
24 Over the course of about a hundred years, CP became Thailand’s largest business empire, involved in foreign imports
and pioneering retail development, with a history of receiving contracts (e.g., laying telephone lines and launching
satellites) from Thailand’s military junta (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005).
25 Domestically, in 2018 CP owned and operated 10,988 7-Eleven stores across Thailand and employed 202,869
employees (CP Group, 2018). CP’s sustainability initiatives include a goal of 100% plastic packaging be ‘reusable,
recyclable, and/or biodegradable. Their 2018 performance included 66,765 tons of plastic packaging used (CP Group,
2018).
26 This phenomenon is not new in Thailand and is not exclusively covered in political ecology scholarship. For example,
“In the mid-1980s, several activists in [the] fledgling NGO movement began to argue that the top-down development
policy adopted since the 1960s had failed to improve the lives of the majority of people; rather, it had brought great social
and emotional disruption. Top-down development demanded that villagers change to a more modern, scientific, and
market-rational way of operation. By contrast, the activists argued that development should be rooted in villagers’ own
knowledge, and should try to strengthen local culture and preserve village-style social relationships, since these were
inherently more humane and more in line with Buddhist values than those of urban capitalist society” (Baker &
Phongpaichit, 2005: 216). Events such as the proposed Nam Choan dam in 1982 led to increasing efforts for NGOs to
incorporate local villagers and activists, and “This experience founded several new NGOs, which provided a bridge
between local protests, middle-class sympathizers, and the international environmental movement” (Baker &
Phongpaichit, 2005: 217).
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diverse, as they represent heterogeneous issues (Taylor 2018). Some organizations focus
on plastic waste imports and environmental justice, while others are more interested in
targeting individual consumer behavior and littering. Drawing on Taylor (2018) and
Lugoness (2003), some groups evidently share particular goals, such as the promotion of
plastic waste education in primary schools, while others more independently support the
efforts of another organization while taking issue with the particular strategies or critiquing
what they see as greenwashing. Also, while some grassroots environmental organizations
rely heavily on partnerships and coalitions with governmental entities and plastic industry
groups, still others maintain strategic distances or directly counter government and industry
entities. Coalitions tend to be easier to facilitate among groups that do not challenge plastic
production or call for strong regulations, while those that have a more radical stance tend
to be less visible in these networks. Through analysis of the silences that manifest in
interviews, it is evident that a ‘green’ agenda of environmental preservation rather than a
‘brown’ agenda of pollution and industry proliferates, despite plastic waste’s dramatic
reconfiguring of Bangkok’s urban environmental problems. 27 For example, health and
safety of saleng were often omitted from discussion on waste management. This parallels
trends in other countries in which many environmentalists tend to focus on
“environmental” concerns while failing to consider the lives and risks of those working at
recycling centers (Pellow, 2002). Although activists highlight numerous issues of
environmental injustice, a critical discussion of underlying inequalities in shaping the
plastic issue are often omitted from the discourses of the anti-plastic movement in some
environmental networks.
Additional coalitional tensions can be framed around narratives of blame, in terms
of who is seen as the creator of the plastic waste issue and who is seen as leading the way
to solutions. In plastic waste discourse, consumers, foreign tourists, retailers, plastic
producers, migrant workers, and more are targeted as the guilty party in generating the
waste. These narratives explain what stories are told, and how people view their own

27 This category is often utilized to explain differences between ecological or justice centered environmentalism.
According to Forsyth (2001), classification of environmental social movements include "...three broad categories of
‘green’ environmental concerns (wildlife, forestry, wilderness, etc.); ‘brown’ issues (industrial and urban pollution); and
the growing discourse of ‘red-green’ environmental concern, which emphasizes poverty-reduction and social
development as environmental priorities" (36).
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position in relation to the waste, often aligning with one’s affiliation or network. For
example, the plastic industry often points to consumer behavior. As one plastic industry
representative told me:
“In Thailand, the problem mainly comes from the consumers, actually. I
often get upset why people blame plastic bag companies and I said, well, if
you think about it, and it's probably the same in America. I've never seen a
billboard advertising plastic bags. I've never seen a newspaper advertising
plastic bags” (Interview 13).
Through this interviewee’s perspective, without marketing through direct advertisements,
the plastic industry is simply filling a demand. However, it disregards the manufactured
demand created through the omnipresence of plastic. Additionally, this focus on consumer
behavior, while shared with many grassroots environmental organizations, is juxtaposed
with narratives of blame centered on plastic producers, manufacturers and retailers. Geoff
Baker of Grin Green described his effort to target a prominent corporate retailer as part of
the anti-plastic campaign. After participating in a government-hosted environmental event,
he and his students decided to approach a representative of Tesco Lotus, a supermarket
chain started by CP Group. After flagging the representative down in the hallway, they
asked her for her opinion on Tesco’s plastic reductions measures and its effectiveness. He
details her response and his own analysis as follows:
“What she said, I'll explain with the analogy of the tobacco companies. Back
in the … 90s and late 80s, the tobacco company was increasingly under a
lot of pressure for, you know, advertising to children and everybody was
smoking and it was a big thing. So then, the anti-smoking movement came
out, so the tobacco companies’ response to ‘why do you allow this to
happen’ is this, and this is essentially what her answer was with waste. She
said look, we don't force anyone to take a plastic bag. If they don't take a
plastic bag, we can say ‘okay.’ So, and again, that's what the tobacco
company used to say, they used to say ‘we don't force anyone to smoke,
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they come in, they buy the cigarettes, we don't tell them to.’ But it's like,
yeah, you're spending billions on marketing campaigns to appeal to certain
age groups and certain people knowing that the science shows
psychologically that people will buy into the idea, through social pressure,
same thing, when every single thing comes in a bag and you create a demand
where it's like a luxury necessity. So that was her response. And I was just
like damn, that's cold-blooded you know? She actually did the mental
gymnastics to justify her like giving out plastic bags because it's, we don't
force them okay? Alright! It was an educational answer for me.”

Geoff describes frustration with the presumed innocence of the plastic industry, and their
supposed passive role in fulfilling a pre-existing demand for plastic. While some grassroots
environmental organizations have embraced partnerships with the plastic industry, many
others are disenchanted with the imagery and reality of plastic industry groups as perceived
“role models” for anti-plastic waste action.
These sentiments inform the clear divides among organizations and who they
choose to partner or work with. For example, some grassroots organizations and actors
make strategic alignments with major industry players such as SCG, Dow Chemical,
Indorama Ventures and PTTGC. 28 Meanwhile, other groups such as EARTH raise concerns
about these industry players, sometimes including critical stances on their anti-plastic
initiatives. For example, without proper governance and regulation, upcycling initiatives
by PPP members such as SCG, continue to raise concerns for activist organizations. In
Chonburi, joint efforts by Dow Chemical, AMATA Corporation and SCG to create a
manufacturing facility for converting recycled plastic into pavement spark concerns from
activists about the ecological ramifications (Lee Roberts and Saetang: 2019). Following
Forsyth (2019b), public-private partnerships in Asian waste management often privilege
empowerment of specific actors and groups over the actual reduction of the waste issue. In
this case, my research reveals that privileging the voice of the plastic industry leads to
reductive understandings of solutions to the plastic issue. While the plastic industry’s

28 Groups such as Trash Hero Bangkok and Precious Plastic were platformed at PTTGC Circular Living Symposium,
Dow Chemical has partnered with grassroots activists and Trash Hero organizers (Daugherty, 2020), etc.
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expertise may provide useful for various policies and metrics, its logics likewise seep into
the initiatives it proposes, reproduced by the Thai government as seen with the Chonburi
project. With the plastic industry taking lead, waste reduction is continually sidelined in
favor of recycling, upcycling, and other forms of waste management, while lacking a
holistic consideration of ecological ramifications and benefits.
Meanwhile, across affiliations and networks, individuals maintain that the
government is not delivering the level of action that the situation necessitates. Waiting for
consumers to change their behavior is futile, yet, waiting for the slow pace of government
change, despite the need for state responsibility, is also insufficient (Interview 23, 24). The
Roadmap for Plastic Waste Management (2018-2030) largely lacks any form of enforced
regulation, maintaining a voluntary-based stance. “Situated knowledges” of activists living
in Thailand also emphasize the ineffectiveness of the bans that the Roadmap espouses. For
example, environmental activists question the successes of the Roadmap in banning plastic
cap seals, which the government claims have been phased out (Interview 22). Instead, they
claim that seals are still seen across the country. Likewise, an independent government
initiative to stop using Styrofoam krathongs29 has proven ineffective, as activists continue
to find these Styrofoam vessels during waste cleanups. As one activist explained, this
supposed government achievement proved hollow without enforcement: “you can still buy
the Styrofoam ones out on the street” (Interview 19). Discourses pervade suggesting that
Thai people prefer voluntary measures, however, behind closed doors, numerous
government and plastic industry respondents admitted that increased regulation is likely
necessary.
As another environmental activist explained, narratives of blame, while pointing to
the many causes and sources of plastic waste, prove fruitless without pointing to the lack
of government accountability. “And what to be blame, it's not people in the local, not only
tourists, but we also have to blame the government that you not doing anything to ban…”

29 Loy Krathong is an annual Thai festival on the full-moon day of the 12th lunar month, where Thai residents float
krathangs (lotus blossom-shaped vessels with candles, flowers, and incense) down rivers and ponds to pay respect to the
Buddha and Ganga, the goddess of water. While the intent is to apologize for having used the river for anything negative,
many individuals have ironically begun to use Styrofoam to construct these vessels, which has caused pollution. The
Prime minister and government officials have created a voluntary-based ban, calling instead for the use of
environmentally friendly materials such as banana leaves, flowers, vegetables and other biodegradable materials
(Interview 19).
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he tells me, detailing the lack of infrastructure such as trash cans (Interview 21). One
Western environmental organizer nonchalantly explained:
“I'll bet you the Thai people would blame the government because they're
pretty disenfranchised with the Thai government now … they think it's a
one-party state, which it is, corrupt, which it is, self-serving, which it is.”

In an interview with two Thai grassroots environmental activists, this sentiment was
reiterated. “[The Thai government], they don’t want to have conflicts with corporates
because of power,” one of the activists explained. Her friend and fellow activist nodded in
agreement. “I think no one trust[s the] government” she responded. Their words represent
what is oft said in interviews with hushed voices or with off the record disclaimers,
demonstrating a daily form of disobedience and rebellion against the omnipresent
discipline of the Thai government. Theories swirl around why the government’s actions
are weak, with explanations such as politicians’ fear of losing popularity, and resulting
concerted efforts to steer clear of environmental regulation that would reduce convenience
for consumers (Interview 23). Government workers and plastic industry likewise point to
government corruption as a means of supporting their particular agendas, claiming that a
packaging tax or more regulated permit system for waste imports would only get coopted
by corrupt government entities (Interview 3, 9).
As environmental narratives and forms of expertise shape both how the plastic issue
is defined and how Thailand responds, it is clear that the voices centered in the anti-plastic
efforts influence lived experience and reality of the plastic waste issue. Representatives of
the plastic industry and government regulators feel unjustly blamed, while activists are
more concerned with holding these groups accountable. Organizational structures and
coalitions tend to reconfigure activisms and targeted campaigns, while grassroots
organizations and actors negotiate which ‘expertise,’ situated knowledges, and
environmental narratives to accept or reject. Meanwhile, groups are fighting back through
producing their own expert and “situated knowledges,” highlighting transparency issues
that uphold hegemonic ‘expertise,’ overall dissatisfaction with the steps taken, and calls
for stricter regulation as seen in the following section.
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6.3

Contested Knowledges: Transparency Issues and Citizen Science
Thailand’s residents are becoming increasingly aware of the plastic waste issue but

are also waking up to the realization that the government’s initiatives fall short of what
they purport to achieve. Power is obscured through intentional barriers to transparency at
each level of the plastic lifecycle, and at all points of decision making. However, grassroots
activists are working to bring corrupt exchanges, insufficient regulations, or unaccountable
systems into the public view. They utilize creative forms of performance, 30 direct action
displays, 31 policy demands, and other diverse forms of collective organizing and action to
demand more of the Thai government and public. As they form critiques and alternative
systems and visions for managing plastic waste, this often relies on pushing back against
the plastic industry and Thai government’s expert knowledges, as activists form their own
expertise or highlight “situated knowledges” and lived experiences.
At the forefront of transparency issues, is the matter of waste management. Waste
management in Thailand is shaped not simply by the materiality of waste separation,
recycling, and landfill systems, but the discourses of expertise and “situated knowledges”
of Thai residents. For example, public perception of waste management continues to shape
both recycling behaviors and is central to the discussion on plastic waste, with most energy
focused on this particular part of the plastic lifecycle. While regulators inveigh against the
lack of public discipline in separating waste, many in the general public, as well as activists,
express frustration around the lack of clarity and transparency on such waste separation
and management systems.
According to numerous interviewees, participant observation, and relevant
literature, there is a lack of transparency surrounding waste collection, as well as waste
transfer and disposal sites, with many barriers for those wishing to access both the physical
sites as well as information about the structure and ownership of these systems

30 For example, Grin Green demonstrates publicly in Bangkok with a plastic bag monster costume and signage to raise
awareness about high plastic consumption. Tuohy, L. (2018, June 5). “Plastic Bag Monster” Invades Bangkok’s Biggest
Mall For World Environment Day. Retrieved from https://coconuts.co/bangkok/news/plastic-bag-monster-invadesbangkoks-biggest-mall-world-environment-day-video/.
31 About 50 Bangkok protesters dump plastic waste outside of a government building on June 20, 2019, where member
states plan to meet for the 34th ASEAN summit. These Thai activists call for a ban on waste imports from first world
countries. Source: Rujivanrom, P. Trash plastic waste Trade. The Nation Thailand. Retrieved from
https://www.nationthailand.com/news/30371490.
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(Hongsathavij, 2017a). Many Thai residents believe that waste separation does not occur
and that collection trucks will simply throw all pre-separated waste together, while
interviewee opinions of this vary (Interview 15, 17, 21, 26). Currently, efforts to prove that
waste is separated when collected is enacted through documentaries that follow garbage
trucks and other public education efforts, however, they appear not to have saturated Thai
society. Meanwhile, most waste separation is outsourced to saleng, who gain access to
waste dumps at time through bribes (Hongsathavij, 2017a). This lack of transparency
transcends to the workers as well, as work permits for informal workers do not specify
particularities of the work (Hongsathavij, 2017a). Likewise, enclosure and restricted access
to sites such as Bangkok’s four main waste transfer stations and regional landfills
represents extension over control of physical materials and the framing of these waste
materials as valuable resources (Samson 2015; Hongsathavij 2017a). Transparency issues
pervade, leading to broader questions of ownership, control, and money. For example,
private and public waste management systems are muddled and, as one interviewee
explained:
“They don’t want anyone to disrupt their business, their quiet money, which
is legal and no monitoring. So, yes it’s not that transparent because the
amount is huge and no one wants to talk about it” (Interview 15).

According to activists and plastic waste recyclers, decisions about waste
management are largely based on corrupt exchanges and private-public
relationships (Interview 6, 15). 32 Meanwhile, waste collection, separation, and
management represents a space of profit and accumulation. As academic
scholarship and grassroots efforts struggle to penetrate the veil surrounding waste
sites, public understanding of waste separation poses challenges.

32 Activists believe that government decisions on recycling are largely related to private business interests. For example,
unlike many countries, in Thailand, it is illegal to recycle PET into food-grade material (Interview 6, 12, 13). Plastic
industry groups such as Indorama Ventures, are lobbying to change this, in order to increase their recycling capacity
(Interview 13). However, as one activist and recycler speculates “PTT is the biggest player of the polymer market… I
think personally that the government waits for PTT to finish the recycle plant and then approve the, pass the rule”
(Interview 6). According to the “situated knowledge” of this recycler, the government is waiting for the wealthy and
powerful petrochemical group PTTGC to build a factory for this type of recycling initiative before changing the law, as
a means of facilitating PTTGC cornering the market on recycled food-grade plastic material.
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Figure 6.2 BMA trash trucks transport waste to the On Nut Waste Transfer Station in
Bangkok. Photo by author (2019).

Perceived failed and corrupt waste separation systems de-incentivizes waste action
in the country (Vassanadumrongdee & Kittipongvises, 2018). Specifically, distrust in these
systems such as the collection trucks de-incentivizes waste separation. Likewise, systemic
barriers such as insufficient waste collection leads to prolific littering. Therefore,
promoting trust in the waste separation systems is vital, while tangible improvements to
the systems in place is necessary to affirm such trust. Public engagement in the act of waste
separation is contingent upon the power of particular expert knowledges that explains these
relations and changes, where struggles over truth are already taking place.

6.4

Conclusion
Efforts by activists have led to some major successes in reducing plastic

consumption, especially their targeted campaigns to reduce plastic bags disseminated by
major retailers. By January 1, 2020, 75 participating retailers including those in Central
Group and the Mall Group Retail stores that once supplied prolific numbers of plastic bags,
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agreed to cease distribution of free single-use plastic bags (The Nation, 2019). Following
this development, the government unexpectedly responded to public pressure, moving up
the date of a plastic bag ban in a number of major retail spaces including Central
Department Store. The ban went into effect on January 1st, 2020, despite its intended date
of 2022 (Wipatayotin & Kongrut, 2020). The newly implemented timeline means that the
ban is meant to go into full effect at all shops by 2021 (Wipatayotin & Kongrut, 2020).
However, the challenges of both forming coalitions with and viewing corporate entities
and plastic producers as the “leaders” in the anti-plastic movement is evidenced in
discourse that has emerged since the ban. There is already a strong backlash, as a
representative of the Thai Plastic Industries Association claims that 47 of the 86 plasticbag producing factories are affected by the ban (Wipatayotin & Kongrut, 2020). The
association calculates that the ban is harming workers as well as the economy, costing the
industry 24.3 billion baht and threatening layoffs for 6,030 workers (Wipatayotin &
Kongrut, 2020). However, innumerable department stores, food stands, and other venues
remain stocked with various forms of plastic packaging. This tension between
environmental regulation, the power of the plastic industry, and the role of expertise is
central to the story of plastic waste in Thailand.
Meanwhile, many if not most grassroots groups call for more radical action and
regulations than are currently put forth by the plastic industry and Thai government. They
work on a diversity issues, from trash cleanups, to corporate accountability campaigns, to
creative upcycling efforts, to anti-pollution and recycling emission petitions, often based
on differential relations to plastic waste (e.g., urban vs. rural, family business, living in a
wealthier neighborhood, etc.). In particular, this chapter discusses some of the tensions
arising from networks, coalitions, and organizational structures in the grassroots
movement. Grassroots environmental groups are divided through their opposition and
alignment with various anti-plastic waste initiatives spearheaded by the government and
plastic industry. Likewise, activists’ understandings of the plastic issue are nuanced,
complex, varied, and multi-layered. In the next chapter, I turn to examine the “plastic
addiction” discourse and interrogate the notion of ‘plastic addicted subjects.’ Then, in the
concluding chapter of this thesis, I summarize some of the counter-hegemonic work of
activists and specialists in generating more radical visions surrounding the plastic waste
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issue. Drawing on situated knowledges and ‘expertise,’ they work to push back on some
of the efforts of the plastic industry and government. While this chapter outlines their main
concerns, demands, and efforts, the conclusion chapter will explore the solutions they
propose.
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CHAPTER 7. ‘PLASTIC ADDICTED SUBJECTS’ AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
ESSENTIALIZED THAINESSS

7.1

Introduction
As attention centers on plastic waste in Thailand, a commonplace discourse has

emerged about Thai people as being “addicted to plastic.” This discourse of “plastic
addiction” emerges as a supposed ‘pathological’ condition, in which prolific plastic
consumption is framed as an attribute of Thai culture. Therefore, in this chapter, I shift the
analytical focus to examine how actors (re)produce negative environmental tropes about
Thainess and “plastic addiction.” In doing so, I demonstrate how hegemonic and discursive
forms of expertise on “plastic addiction,” vis à vis Thainess, play a powerful role in shaping
how Thai actors make sense of the plastic waste causes as well as their own subjectivities.
Drawing on feminist political ecology scholarship on anti-essentialism and
environmental subjects as well as critical Thai studies, I establish the relationship between
negative environmental tropes on Thainess and the plastic waste issue first by outlining the
historical development of Thainess. I trace its formation through Thai political and
nationalist projects as well as Western and international powers that position themselves
as superior through allusions to ‘development’ and ‘progress.’ I then locate tropes as they
emerge in particular forms of Thainess and contextualize this discursive construction with
its contemporary uses in the plastic waste issue. These discourses hegemonize Thai
experiences and subjects, often facilitating negative tropes and stereotypes about Thai
people in terms of their environmental behavior, plastic consumption patterns, and
activisms.
Notably, I found that across all groups interviewed for this research, participants
reproduced supposed ‘cultural pathologies’ of Thai “plastic addiction.” I demonstrate how
my respondents reproduce, reconfigure, and reinforce these tropes through their variegated
responses to the plastic waste issue, exposing how discourses and narratives on plastic
waste and Thainess produce new environmental subjects. Consequently, I argue that
through the coupling of “addicted to plastic” discourses and present-day manifestations of
Thai tropes, Thai people are construed as new ‘plastic addicted subjects,’ thereby silencing
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a diversity of voices. In doing so, this chapter challenges us to critically examine how
‘plastic addicted’ tropes limit understanding of the causes of the plastic waste issue,
focusing on consumer behavior while disregarding other sources of waste such as plastic
waste imports and industrial pollution. Similarly, I reveal how these discourses reinforce a
Western-Thai binary in terms of activisms and identity, performing a similar function by
obscuring the role of Western plastic waste imports and Western influence in the Thai
government and the history of the state. Through this analysis, we can see the power of
discourse, deployed for various agendas, in constructing environmental Thai subjects, in
which particular blind spots are shared by individuals in the government, plastic industry,
recycling, and grassroots activism spheres. As such, this chapter challenges readers to
consider the limitations of framing both Thai residents as well as the plastic waste issue as
one construed by “plastic addiction,” and how solutions might be improved by moving
beyond this framework.

7.2

Bounding Thainess: The Social Construction of Thai Identity
Throughout my experiences in Thailand, I have heard innumerable references to a

specific vision of what citizens perceive their culture and nation to be. Although
contemporary Thainess is treated as a culturally hegemonic object, in actuality, Thainess
is a highly contested and learned process. Tropes evoked in interviews are therefore
predicated on the notion of a homogenized category of Thai, in which individuals are seen
as sharing a coherent essence, quality, or way of being. Conceptions of Thainess have
evolved largely through the work of hegemonic intellectuals enrolled in various political
projects and power asymmetries. Drawing on critical Thai studies scholars, I provide a
brief historical account of the construction of Thailand and associated projects that shape
Thainess, then, discuss its contemporary understandings.
Thainess is foregrounded in current discourse due to a long history of nationalist
state projects, colonialism and hegemonic Western discourses and an expanding global
capitalism. To understand the country of Thailand and associations of Thainess as an
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“imagined political community”33 it is vital to first consider the histories and processes by
which these categories were brought into being, as it is imbued with meanings as to the
nation-state, race, ethnicity, borders, and culture. Thainess evolved in tandem with a
Cartesian model of Thailand, each reinforcing the other through structural and discursive
processes.
Thailand, formally known as Siam, has undergone various changes through the
construction of the nation, nation-state, and national identity. Meanwhile, colonial legacies
largely shaped the construction of Thailand’s borders and influenced beliefs about
Thainess. For example, despite a rich history in which Siam did not maintain borders, the
idea of bounding Siam was largely derived from European systems and colonial pressures
(Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005). The kingdom’s previous lack of established borders put
Siam at risk, initiating their adoption as a defense against colonization, and as a response
to ineffective political and social control (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005). Meanwhile, in the
absence of such boundaries, modern and indigenous conceptions of borders in Siam led to
misunderstandings and clashes with European powers (Winichakul, 1994). This led British
and French powers to impose and enforce trade treaties, maintaining influence in reworking
the bounds of the country (Chakrabarty, 2010). This formed a bounded ‘geo-body’ of
classified and enforced territory and borders (Winichakul, 1994). 34 Likewise, internally,
there were decided efforts to implement Western systems resulting from the gravitational
pull of expert knowledges on ‘progress,’ ‘modernity,’ and ‘development.’ 35
This sparked a new era, in which Siam worked to incorporate new groups of people
within its borders. As the state struggled to assimilate new regions into its ‘geo-body’ and
rework individuals as state citizens, it depended on centralized state authority and control,
demonstrated by Bangkok’s growing prominence and sovereignty (Baker & Phongpaichit,
2005). Despite fears of invoking colonial backlash, Siam formed an army, which likewise

33 Drawing on anthropological frameworks, Benedict Anderson (1983) defines the nation as “…an imagined political
community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (p. 49).
34 Drawing Siam’s borders through mapping was seen as the “‘the encoding of desire” (Winichakul, 1994: 59).
35 For example, in the early to mid 1800s, King Rama IV (1804-1868), also known as Mongkut, placed various
Westerners in governmental positions in an effort to bring ‘progress’ to Siam and signed the Bowring Treaty in 1855,
solidifying links with Britain (Harrison 2010; Baker & Phongpaichit 2005). This treaty prevented Thai control over
foreign trade while privileging Western colonials (Harrison 2010).
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served to impose authority over new citizens. 36 These developments placed individuals in
a shared relationship with the state, while at the same time, reinventing those from diverse
locations and histories into members of a shared race (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005).
Meanwhile, racial groupings were likewise enacted to serve the interests of the
state, often through the work of intellectuals. Looming threats of European colonial
conquest led to a reconsideration of the exclusion of mixed-race Thai citizens. 37 Those
wielding power at the time, such as the Siamese court, shaped new racial discourses to
counteract this discursive threat of racial differentiation, instituting educational reforms in
school textbooks that demanded a national identity based on shared history, language,
religion, and nationalistic loyalty (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005). The Nationality Act of
1913 meant that anyone living within the Thai kingdom was entitled to Thai nationality.
However, “While this unified Thainess was presented to foreigners, internally the court
retained some subtle differentiation” (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005: 65). For example,
“School textbooks distinguished between those who spoke ‘proper’ cultivated Thai and
others who were encouraged to improve themselves in order to qualify fully as members
of the nation” (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005: 65). Meanwhile, categorical Thai citizens
were now bounded through borders, race, language, religion, and history.
Between the 1850s to 1910s, intellectuals continued to shape knowledge of and
consent to a particular form of Thainess, representing a taken for granted knowledge. While
differentially positioned intellectuals had varying agendas, many elite intellectuals were
particularly concerned with Western discourses of ‘progress’ and efforts to push back
against hegemonic expert knowledges of Thai ‘inferiority’ and various negative tropes. 38
36 King Rama V (1853-1910), named Chulalongkorn, resisted criticisms that creation of an army could instigate colonial
backlash, however, he was adamant that the military endeavor was a necessary quality of a modern nation state. This
standing army was also effective, as “…the real need was not external, against the colonialists, but internal – imposing
Bangkok authority on the area inside the new borders, and bringing all people under the king” (Baker & Phongpaichit,
2005: 61). King Chulalongkorn’s actions were likely related to his travels to colonial states in South and Southeast Asia,
with the goal of transforming Siam into a “miniature European colony, without the Europeans, making it a modernized,
‘civilized’ Asian state” (Wyatt, 1994: 279).
37 Discourses differentiating Thais and non-Thais by previous metrics would have framed French colonization as a move
toward liberating the majority of people or non-Thais (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005). Therefore, broader inclusions into
Thainess were strategic.
38 While commoner intellectuals were largely concerned with deconstructing and abolishing the hierarchical exclusions
that prevented average citizens from contributing to the nation’s progress, elite intellectuals were preoccupied with
Western conceptions of the nation, their ideals on an absolute kingship, and pathways to ‘progress’ (Baker &
Phongpaichit, 2005). For example, these elite intellectuals enacted educational projects to excavate the rich history of the
people and land, in an effort to push back against hegemonic Western discourses on Thai people as ‘uncivilized’ (Baker
& Phongpaichit, 2005).
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Many believed that Siam had to reconfigure itself to the Western ideal of a ‘civilized’
nation, which meant bowing to the pressures of free trade as well as European values of
justice and popular consensus (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005). Therefore, despite consistent
historical and contemporary discourses on Thailand evading colonization, Siam was
simultaneously enrolled in colonial economies and subjected to colonial logics that shaped
its very constitution.
Dramatic shifts in power from the early to mid 1900s such as the dissolvement of
the absolute monarchy led to distinct adjustments to discourses on Thainess.39 In 1939, in
an effort to distance itself from its royalist legacies, the name Siam changed to Thailand,
to better reflect the Thai race (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005).40 Nationalistic projects were
rolled out to define Thai culture in terms of “…beauty, orderliness, progress and
uniformity, and the morality of the nation,” with documents designating Thai people’s
qualities as “…Buddhist, industrious, peace-loving, self-reliant, aspiring for progress, and
loyal to their leader” (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005: 135). As hegemonic intellectuals
translated and disseminated these expert knowledges, theorization of Thai citizens was
often constructed based on class divisions with paternalist, urban elite juxtaposed with a
‘regressive’ or ‘passive’ peasantry, largely benefiting those in higher-income intellectual
spheres (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005). From the 1940s to 1960s, Western influence on
Thailand’s ‘development’ was augmented by Cold War tensions, where the U.S. played a
central role in promoting capitalist expansion and economic growth in the country (Baker
& Phongpaichit, 2005). During this time, Western hegemonic intellectuals shaped
discourses on Thainess, as “American academics portrayed a society where passivity and
paternalism were traditional” (p. 163). Various forms of Western intervention and domestic
class tensions revealed struggles over meaning and knowledge claims about Thai identity,

39 During the 1910s to 1940s, many pushed back against the previous ideas of the nation, state, and ‘progress,’ in
particular, challenging “the definition of the nation as those loyal to the king,” and demanding that citizens more equitably
share in the benefits of ‘progress’ and recasting “…the purpose of the nation-state as the well-being of the nation’s
members,” leading to the 1932 revolutions that dissolved the absolute monarchy (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005: 105).
40 According to Herzfeld (2002) as cited in Jackson (2010), the ethnonym “Thai” is often used to mean “free” and
“independent” as cited in Thai nationalist literature and dictionaries, which is often placed in opposition to the word
“…“that” (from Pali/Sanskrit dasa) [which] means “slave” or “servant” (211). This verbiage implies a resistance to
domination, yet as Siam resisted this Western domination, it likewise became complicit to Western logics, and, in which
elite Thais were made “free” through the “enslavement” of the Thai populace (Jackson, 2010: 53).
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related voting rights, and other forms of political integration based on one’s first, second,
or third generation status in Thailand.
As incomes raised and governmental expectations and demands evolved, the 21 st
century vision of a bounded, Thai subject and nation-state also transformed (Baker &
Phongpaichit, 2005). Intellectuals communicating narratives of Thainess revealed a more
relaxed and interpretive understanding with respect to the culture and nation, disseminated
through popular media and entertainment outlets. 41 However, this historic and processual
construction of the Thai nation-state and Thai subjects has led to prevailing legacies of
conflict. While Lao, Mon, Khmer, Northern Thai, Malays, tribal peoples, and other groups
that were once considered autonomous have since been incorporated in part, into the
modern conception of Thai, they maintain varying degrees of belonging (Keyes, 1989).42
Groups that do not assimilate to a homogenized depiction of the ‘modern’ Thai citizen
often risk having their citizenship or Thainess brought into question while efforts for
autonomy are repressed.43 Although groups maintain different identities and subjectivities,
Thainess is often not awarded the flexibility to incorporate such multiplicities, reflecting a
central Thai hegemony.
While critical Thai studies scholars recognize national identities as fluid and
constructed discursively, authoritative narratives disregard forms of difference and
permeate Thai historical accounts (Winichakul, 1994). After various new iterations in
reworking what it means to be Thai, this discursive form of expertise works to homogenize
and define Thai identities and subjectivities daily. These processes of contestation have
since continued, with pushback enacted by newly annexed communities and ethnic groups
that fail to identify with a singular vision of a Buddhist, Thai-speaking, and nationalistic

41 Hegemonic and counter-hegemonic intellectuals communicated Thainess through advertisements, art, sports, and
writing (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005).
42 Incorporation of these groups have differential histories and effects. For example, some argue that the South has
maintained distinctions due to its ethnically Malay population and Muslim religion, juxtaposed with a more easily
assimilated Lao and Khmer populations of the North and Northeast who are largely Buddhist (Loos, 2010). While
Bangkok deployed ‘civilizing’ and colonial discourses to refer to these groups, these were likewise met with various
forms of resistance.
43 Contemporary examples include the struggle for Mon recognition as an indigenous group, the exclusion of hill tribes
from state protections and services, southern independence movements, class-based and hierarchical distinctions in the
Thai language that paint the northeastern region as ‘antiquated’ or less educated, and various other forms of conflict.
Likewise, the distinction between Chinese and Thai have fluctuated over the centuries, often tied to the political economy
and international political ideologies.
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Thainess (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005).44 The state has played a strong role in repressing
cultural, religious, and lingual diversity, while incorporating a broad range of previously
autonomous peoples into the “imagined community” of Thailand. How diversity should be
incorporated, defined, and structured within the boundaries of Thainess has remained a
space of contest, as hegemonic intellectuals, or the Thai elite, work to enforce and
standardize Bangkok’s sovereignty and central Thai language in defining Thai national
culture (Keyes, 1989). In particular, it is clear that an understanding of Thainess as a
homogenous group in which certain qualities are attributed, forms an essentialized
knowledge that has discursive and lived power in Thailand. Similarly, as respondents in
this research evoke Thainess as a taken-for granted and essentialized concept, this
knowledge serves as a form of expertise that hegemonizes subjectivities.

7.3

Constructing ‘Plastic Subjects’ through Thai Essentialisms
While Thai culture is often awarded an ontological status, critical geographers 45 and

Thai studies scholars examine the continual processes of (re)production and varied
iterations of identity, as outlined in the section above.46 Drawing on a poststructuralist
anti-essentialism in political ecology (Escobar, 2010) and critical Thai studies, it is evident
that the discourses of Thainess are both a social construction, and a form of hegemonic
essentialism, in which those belonging to the category of Thai are assigned particular
characteristics and traits. These largely manifest as negative environmental tropes, in which

44 Particular tensions are concentrated in regions such as Isaan, due to religious, language, and political diversity. The
state worked to stifle such difference, stationing Buddhist monks in communities in order to convert them to Buddhism
(Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005). Meanwhile, repression of Islam and socialism in this region was theorized as a means of
securing national security as it was meant to convert these hill tribes into assimilated citizens loyal to the Bangkok
sovereignty. Communities across Thailand demonstrated their agency through independence and resistance movements.
45 Geographer Don Mitchell argues that culture does not ontologically exist, instead, advocating an examination of its
material development as a form of ideology. In doing so, this allows for further theoretical development in understanding
systems and processes of social reproduction (Mitchell, 1995).
46 Notably, scholars across many disciplines recognize that “all cultures are involved in one another; none is single and
pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated an unmonolithic” (Said, 1993: xxix). Although there is
disagreement among Thai studies scholars as to the relative importance of ‘internal’ or ‘external’ factors in shaping
Siam/Thailand history and culture, many critical Thai studies scholars align with critical geography, arguing for hybridity
and border-crossing (Kitiarsa, 2010). Thongchai Winichakul (1994) specifically study such grouping and bounding in
Thailand, interrogating its processual effects in identity and geography. Thailand’s borders and subsequently Thainess
were constructed for particular vested interests, while this geographic bounding in defining Thainess as it appears in
much popular and academic discourse, ignores the transculturated (see Mary Louise Pratt 1992 analysis on
transculturation as form of agency within asymmetrical powers of colonialism) nature of Thai identity (Winichakul 1994;
Harrison & Jackson 2010).
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Thainess is associated with negative attributes and behavior. In particular, this section
interrogates how Thainess is invoked to construct ‘plastic addicted subjects,’ tracing the
coupling of these discourses, environmental narratives, and subsequent responses and
activisms. I argue that the merging of notions of Thainess with particular forms of
environmental behavior, consumption patterns, and activisms, constructs an expert
knowledge, imposing the agendas of hegemonic intellectuals, thereby hegemonizing
environmental subjects.

Figure 7.1 Shoppers carry plastic-wrapped traditional khanoms (desserts) and fresh
produce out of the market in plastic bags. Plastic bags and street food are consistently
discussed as a major source of plastic waste in Thailand. Photo by author (2016).

“We actually are a plastic society. We are addicted to plastic. If you live
here a while, you will actually see” (Interview 15).
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One of the primary discourses on plastic waste reproduced time and time again in
the media,47 in conversation, and in other forms of communication, was that of Thai people
being “addicted to plastic.” This particular discourse presumes a level of personal
accountability as well as blame placed on consumer behavior. However, this discourse was
one of many in which Thai people were described as ascribing to non-environmental
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. Although there is immense diversity in perspectives, the
painting of Thai citizens as ‘plastic addicted subjects’ became a departure point for
analyzing the varied and common tropes about Thai values, environmentalism, and
behavior. In my analysis, I center the ways in which Thainess, and related issues of identity
emerge through environmental narratives, shaping the thoughts and actions of these
supposed ‘plastic addicted subjects.’
Arguably, the ‘plastic addicted subjects’ discourse provides useful for a cursory
representation of the high plastic consumption rates in Thailand. Nevertheless, it does little
to explain some of the more nuanced, pernicious, and structural issues and power
asymmetries that shape environmental subjects and the plastic waste problem. While these
actors largely control their everyday interaction with plastic in terms of their consumption
rates and efforts to properly dispose of the plastic, they are simultaneously subjected to
various forms of expertise which complicate this environmental discourse of blame.
Additionally, they face various structural barriers around accessibility to education, waste
management systems, and proper governance. However, as environmental subjects
internalize and reproduce the value of experts and authorities, this reconfigures how they
act and perceive their own subjectivities. Thainess becomes synonymous with “plastic
addiction,” thereby homogenizing Thai people and experiences. I now turn to explore the
broader social context within which “plastic addiction” is situated and accepted,
considering tropes about Thai behavior and activism, and how this relates to their
relationship with plastic waste.

47 This discourse appears in articles platformed by Reuters (2018), The Bangkok Post (2018), Coconuts Bangkok (2019)
and various other media outlets.
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Figure 7.2 Environmental activists in Bang Kachao collect and sort plastic waste by hand.
Photo by author (2019).

“The nature of Thai, people are like super chill. We are usually like the
model Thailand, Land of the Smiles. It’s like, show how chill we are, and
we sometimes take things for granted. For example, this issue, this plastic
issue” (Interview 20).
Various historical and contemporary discourses paint Thailand as “the Land of the
Smiles”48 in which citizens are affable, courteous, and easy-going. However, this is
likewise paired with a discourse of compliance, submissiveness, and obedience. Both
interpretations are hegemonic and serve the interests of a Thai state that depends on a docile
Thai public. These processes of discipline are enacted by various institutions such as

48 This discourse pervades popular media, and is especially prevalent in the tourism sector, which utilizes this concept
to entice travel to the country. The discourse of “Land of the Smiles” fits in easily with the varied hegemonic notions
about what Thai people should be and how they should act. Paralleling nationalism in various other countries such as the
U.S., anti-nationalist arguments or various opposing ideas that counter such hegemony are relegated as ‘un-Thai’ (Baker
& Phongpaichit, 2005: 284).
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schools and government offices in order to facilitate easier governance (Foucault, 1977). 49
For example, the Thai state has relied on hegemonic expert knowledges of Thai
‘subservience’ and ‘inferiority’ to prevent the granting of rights to Thai citizens.
Accordingly, in the 1970s and 80s, the newly formed National Cultural Commission and
National Identity Office conducted research, ‘discovering’ that the majority of the Thai
population was apolitical and required the guidance and protection of “paternal officials”
(Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005: 236). This led the Interior Ministry to conclude that “Thai
people were not ready for democracy because of poor upbringing, an innate lack of ethics
or seriousness, or simply a ‘disposition to be under the command of others’” (Baker &
Phongpaichit, 2005: 236). Rather than conceptualizing ‘progress’ as a move toward fair
and democratic representation, they created an educational program, indoctrinating
ideologies about ‘good people’ and what it means to be a ‘good citizen’ and their
associations with ‘progress.’ Through the work of intellectuals situated in disciplinary
institutions, these discourses continue to permeate beliefs about Thai subjects and
governance to this day. One of my interviewees noted her frustration in this framework,
placing the supposed ‘goodness’ of an individual over demands for political representation
and action.
“I think … some people in Thai culture, some people have the mindset [that]
those who look to be [a] good person, those who [are] kind, are trustworthy.
But it's not true, you don't need to be a good person, but you have to develop
the country, you know what I mean? But people sometimes have this kind
of mindset like: Oh, he is kind, so he is a good person and I will listen to
everything he says” (Interview 23).

Her quote reveals a pointed dissatisfaction with the failures of the Thai government to take
action on environmental issues and to respond to her and many other Thai citizen’s
democratic efforts through petitioning and other forms of activism. It also addresses one of

49 Foucault’s (1997) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison explains the ways in which disciplinary institutions
such as schools, military institutions, and prisons work to control bodies through the internalization and naturalization of
disciplinary discourses.
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the ways in which this discourse has penetrated visions of what it means to be a ‘good
citizen’ in Thailand. This discourse also shaped what was seen as uniquely Thai in defining
how people should behave.
The characterization of Thai people as ‘chill,’ ‘easy going,’ and ‘good citizens’ has
configured how people understand their own actions to address plastic waste. For example,
respondents’ accounts of themselves and others suggest that these identity essentialisms
become internalized. As noted by the interviewee quote about being “chill,” there is
pressure to demonstrate one’s conformity to this idealized vision and interpretation of
Thainess. Interviewees suggest that these beliefs about Thai behavior in part, explain why
so many retail workers distribute plastic. For some, this is reflected in notions of Thai
people relating differentially to the material of plastic. One interviewee explained that
“…for Thai people, they often associate plastic as a luxury,” creating pressure to
disseminate plastic packaging and products such as plastic bags and straws (Interview 12).
Another explained that retail workers feel like it is their duty as a good and generous worker
to provide these bags. “Yeah and they also feel happy to give plastic bags, [it’s] generosity”
(Interview 24). According to their situated knowledges, this likewise makes plastic taxes,
initiated in smaller localities, challenging. Activists critique the lack of enforcement of
such measures, noting the behavior of sellers: “They say they will charge but I think you
know in Thai culture sometimes they will say "It's okay, you don't need to pay!" (Interview
23). Despite comparative similarities in other countries that likely prevail, interviewees
frame Thais as having a distinct and unique perception of plastic as luxurious, stylish,
clean, and professional (Interview 12, 14, 17, 31)50 while being a ‘good citizen’ means
making this plastic readily available for consumers. Respondents suggest that Thai people
are performing ‘good citizens’ by performing an ideal embodiment of Thainess. Aligning
with the findings of Agrawal (2005) and Robbins (2012), these environmental subjects
internalized expert and authoritative discourses. Conforming to the status quo of
distribution and consumption patterns in many ways aligns with judgements about what it

50 One interviewee notes “When you go into a restaurant and order water you automatically get a plastic bottle of water
because it's seen as clean and professional versus getting clean water in a jar. Like it will be perceived very very
differently [by Thais]. And a lot of restaurants and hotels are sort of forced to use plastic bottles for that reason I guess
because it is perceived as more clean and professional” (Interview 14). Another activist comments on the obsession with
products sold in plastic cups such as bubble tea and Starbucks. “Thai people are so obsessed with Starbucks as it makes
them look fab and expensive” she laughs (Interview 31).
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means to be a ‘good’ Thai citizen, while reproducing the trope of an unengaged Thai public
likewise upholds a specific vision of Thailand. 51
Replications of negative environmental Thai tropes are consistently evoked by
those in the plastic industry, government, recycling, and activist networks. This shapes how
people understand their own actions and behaviors, consistently attributing behavior as a
reflection of culture, leading to statements like: “Waste separation is not in the culture of
Thais” (Interview 15). Thai respondents often reproduce and counter these hegemonic
ideas about governance and leadership in relation to the plastic waste issue. For example,
one Thai environmental activist revealed that they found Thai people to be less likely to
address plastic waste and adopt environmental behavior, asserting:
“Thai people think they should have a leader do it first. Thai people always
wait to do it. It’s not like abroad where they do it and everyone do it, but
Thai people are waiting. I think it’s the culture or something. We don’t want
to” (Interview 6).

Meanwhile, one Western environmental activist noted his frustration in efforts to organize
environmental protests:
“I mean it's just a different, I mean again this is not assuming anything about
the way people are in any negative context, cause even my [Thai] students
will admit. Cause I'm like guys, why don't we, why don't you get more
passionate like these extinction rebellion kids on the TV and why don't you
get more passionate? And they're like, it's just a very different culture, like
it's very disrespectful. It's very culturally different to be that rebellious
towards authority. It's weird. I don't know” (Interview 17).

51 Respondents describe how Thai people attempt to keep anything unpleasant hidden, in order to conform to the idea
of Thailand as beautiful, explaining that “Thai people always keep the problem under the table…. Right, and everything
on top it should be beautiful. But the problem is inside. Yes. It is the nature of Thai people” (Quote anonymized). Such
conformity likewise bolsters government efforts to inject doubt about Thailand’s ranking, to present Thailand as a
beautiful country of smiling and docile Thai citizens, and explains the privileging of international research and media
over domestic narratives (described in the previous chapter). Meanwhile, this common discourse of “Thai people don’t
like to express their feelings” invokes “…Buddhist precepts of self-effacement,” a “stereotypical assumption [that] is
reproduced internally as well” (Herzfeld, 2010: 184).
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This quote reflects a derogatory, essentializing, and historically inaccurate view of
Thainess. Meanwhile, the trope of Thainess as ‘passive’ suits the interests of a paternalistic
ruling class, as it both justifies its ruling and, as represented in this quote, causes
environmental subjects to internalize problematic ideas about the agency of Thai citizens
to take action, and their responsibility in doing so. Passivity is paralleled with a ruling class
and Thai oligarchy that utilizes discourses on “giving” protections and development
(Anderson, 2011). Following political ecologists critical of discourses on improvement,
development, and leadership, it seems fitting to likewise maintain healthy skepticism of
what is relinquished in exchange. For example, through hegemonic state discourse, Yeh
(2013) demonstrates how Tibetans are told to be grateful for Han migration, the ‘gift’ of
development, and its “…purported educative effects on their own subjectivities” (Yeh,
2013: 7). Drawing on the works of Mauss, 52 and other philosophers, Yeh (2013) critically
examines gifts being something that warrants reciprocation and that actually makes the
state appear coherent and absolute (something that can bestow a gift), while countering the
assumption of states as ontologically real. Environmental improvement schemes, calls for
‘development’ and related forms of governance, framed as “given” to the people, rather
than demanded through public pressure, bolsters and perpetuates the hegemonic and
omnipresent rule of power in Thailand, while disempowering Thai publics.
Additionally, in the above quote (Interview 6), the Thai activist reveals how Thai
environmental actions and systems are compared to those of international and Western
countries. Such comparisons continually emerged through interview data, which
necessitates situating Thainess within the continued legacies of colonialism and discourses
on development, discussed in the following section. Through this making of ‘plastic
subjects,’ Thai citizens are subjected to the hegemony of being ‘plastic addicted,’
discourses on what it means to be a ‘good citizen,’ and ‘cultural’ reasons for environmental
inaction. The homogenized Thainess discourse then renders actors as engaging in imitative
self-fulfilling actions that adhere to these essentializing tropes. Even as actors demand and
enact action on plastic waste, many reproduce discourse on Thainess that disregard this
agency.

52 Mauss, M. (1966). The gift: Forms and functions of exchange in archaic societies. London: Cohen & West.
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Figure 7.3 While some cleanup efforts accumulate large portions of non-recyclable plastic
waste such as straws, activists separate the waste in order to reveal the need to reduce
consumption of particular plastic items. Photo by author (2019).

7.4

Western Discourses and Legacies of Colonialism on Thai ‘Plastic Addicted
Subjects’
Drawing parallels between the historical construction of Thainess and respondents’

comparisons of Thailand’s plastic waste issue to Western logics reveals insights into the
(re)production of Thai tropes in the anti-plastic movement. Broadly, portrayals of Thainess
that emerged in my interviews painted Thailand as ‘underdeveloped’ and Thai people as
‘lazy,’ ‘submissive,’ and ‘uncaring’ about environmental issues. Through these tropes,
international and largely Western countries and entities are positioned as role models for
environmental behavior, while simultaneously pathologizing Thai people as ‘inferior’ in
their environmental behavior, consumption, and activism. These Western-Thai binaries in
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turn lead to blind spots that, while not shared by all individuals, further obscure how we
understand the causes of the plastic waste issue, placing blame on Thai people’s
consumption. As respondents chronicle their understanding of plastic management
schemes, environmental activisms, and social relations, these legacies continue to shape
the narratives and the subjectivities of supposed ‘plastic addicted subjects.’ In order to
analyze this phenomenon, I reckon with the legacies of colonialism and Western influence
in Thailand, while considering how these discourses configure power relations, structures,
and environmental subjects in Thailand. I aim to tease out the implications of prominent
scholarly debates on Thainess and the multiplicity of popular conceptions surrounding
Thainess through its appropriations and resistances in the plastic waste issue.
Critical Thai studies scholarship helps to contextualize and inform the WesternThai binaries reinforced by my interviewees. Although vast amounts of scholarship on
Thailand once examined Thai nationalist ideologies within the country’s borders, critical
Subaltern Studies and postcolonial scholars have since grappled with the influence of
Western imperial powers and globalization in Thailand (Chakrabarty, 2010). 53 While
Thailand was never formally colonized, 54 legacies of colonial and Western intervention
prevail in influencing how Thai people imagine the country and themselves. Western (a
discursive construction itself) hegemonic discourses on the East as ‘uncivilized,’ ‘archaic,’
‘irrational,’ and ‘monolithic’ continue to affect the region (Said, 1978). However, as
discussed in Chapter 2, these negative tropes which appear to be reproduced by Thai
respondents in this research do not simply reflect an imitative relationship with the West,
but also a reflection of Thailand’s historic construction, incorporation in colonial
economies, and cultural configurations. For example, Thai studies scholars point to the
ways in which elite Thais adopt Western ideals on progress in order to sustain their local
hierarchies:

53 Thai studies have produced various understandings of how to apply postcolonial theory to Thailand, utilizing
“semicolonial” (Peter Jackson and Rachel Harrison), “crypto-colonial” (Michael Herzfeld), “hybrid” (Thongchai
Winichakul, Peter Jackson, Homi Bhabha, Néstor García Canclini), and “autocolonial” categorizations. (Chakrabarty,
2010).
54 Some Thai studies scholars argue “That claims to freedom actually signify hegemony and domination, even in the
English language sense of those claims … should not come as a great surprise. An ideological proclamation of benign
intentions does not guarantee their translation into practice (see especially Kapferer 1988). National freedom, too, can
become the expression of a subjugated condition…” (Herzfeld, 2010: 184).
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“A rhetoric of adaptability and tolerance ensures that the mutual
engagement of local practices with Western-derived and increasingly
globalized markers of power and dispossession should operate smoothly
and in the interests of both the local elites and the international structures
that sustain it. In that context, it is merely prejudicial to say that Thais are
“imitating” the West. They are, rather, engaging in a subtle deployment of
cultural markers in which they invest meanings of preponderantly local
relevance" (Herzfeld, 2010: 181).

Notably, in contrast to describing a direct case of Western domination, Winichakul (2010)
argues that “…Thai scholarship is overwhelmed by local (as opposed to global) discourses
and ideologies such as “Thainess”” (p. 145). 55 Although intellectual domination discussed
here does not equate to political, economic, or social domination, these scholars grapple
with the role of the West in reinforcing local hierarchies. Thailand’s “master narratives” 56
of Thai history demonstrates a resistance to be compared to other countries, as seen through
narratives of Thai exceptionalism57 and mythologies of Thai uniqueness, and yet, “…since
the mid-nineteenth century the West as represented a privileged Other in Thai imagination
(see, for example, Thongchai, Pattana, Herzfeld and Loose)” (Harrison, 2010: 10). For
some in Thailand, the West represents an aspirational ideal of progress and equality. 58

55 Winichakul (2010) continues, “Broader level epistemological domination by the West does not preclude the possible
domination of some domains of scholarship by local nationalisms influenced by non-Western or even anti-Western
ideologies. Intellectual domination by the West is complicated by the politics of different local academies. The relative
power relations between an often remote and indirect West and the immediate and direct local conditions in non-Western
societies need to be taken into account when considering the forms of intellectual domination in any given place. In some
cases, local forms of power over local academic conditions can be stronger despite being under the overall global
domination of the West (see also Jackson in this volume)” (Winichakul, 2010: 146).
56 As described by Halverson et al., a “master narrative” is a "coherent system of interrelated and sequentially
organized stories that share a common rhetorical desire to resolve a conflict by establishing audience expectations
according to the known trajectories of its literary and rhetorical form.” See: Halverson J.R., Goodall H.L., Corman
S.R. (2011) What is a Master Narrative?. In: Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism. Palgrave Macmillan, New
York.
57 Thai exceptionalism is often demonstrated with respect to narratives about its evasion of colonization and subsequent
unique culture. As noted by Thai studies scholars, many of these narratives invite tacit agreement in the “…representation
of Thailand as forever struggling to emulate an ultimately unattainable Western modernity but also forever free to manage
the fate to which it has been consigned. They do not constitute an invitation to critical analysis” (Herzfeld, 2010). Such
complicity in narratives and discourses of Thai exceptionalism make comparative studies involving Thailand incredibly
challenging. This research likewise works to tease out the ways in which Thailand is framed through empirics as both
exceptional as well as striving for an ‘unattainable’ Western standard with respect to waste.
58 Loos (2006) examines how, at the end of the nineteenth century, Siam’s ruling elite mirroring of Western ideals
reflected not a sense of inferiority, “… but one of spirited aspirations to equality” (Harrison, 2010: 13).
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These understandings of Westernization and progress in Thailand are reflected in
respondent’s discussions of the plastic waste issue, and beliefs about Western or
international environmentalism.
This thesis works to incorporate the messy and complex ways in which Western
discourses and nationalist discourses both rework the waste issue, yet these categorizations
do not necessarily capture the nuanced ways in which the discourses evolved, represent,
and configure understandings of Thailand’s waste issue. Some scholars argue that Western
discourses become Thai-ized in the context of Thailand (Winichakul, 2010).60 Following
this line of thought, as a Western researcher, it seems that assuming particular discourses
are Western, would thereby re-center the West and its sphere of domination, which would
be both incomplete and misleading. Such centering would demonstrate “the subtle,
epistemological devices that fix Euro-American experiences as the standard, the typical,
the universal, and the centre…” (Winichakul, 2010: 151). Therefore, rather than working
to locate and trace the histories of these discourses in my own research or determining
which practices or habits evoked in my empirics are “Thai” or “Western,” I instead focus
my analysis on the ways in which these Western-Thai binary discourses are deployed, often
as forms of expertise about the causes of the plastic waste issue, reinforced through tropes
on Thainess.61 These discourses have varied and complex effects on Thai subjectivities,
often differentiated through Thailand’s hierarchical and class-based differentiations. As
such, this research addresses “…the relational construction of political subjectivities” and
“spatial identities (places, nations) [which] can equally be reconceptualized in relational
terms” (Massey, 2005: 10). For example, I now consider some of the ways in which
transnational connections and awareness about systems abroad have reshaped how people
view themselves.

60 According to Winichakul (2010), “Logically speaking, a Western, or any other foreign, element stops being purely
Western (if it ever was) and becomes a localized Western element the moment that it is translated into a Thai context. To
put it the other way round, that element becomes Thai-ized and is no longer Western in the sense that it comes to exist
and operate in a Thai context. In Thailand “The West” is in fact always the Thai-ized West” (p. 148).
61 In doing so, I follow Herzfeld (2010), who argues that “… the question of whether certain habits of thought
are “Thai Buddhist” or “Western”, while grounded in the historical processes that have indeed led to
contemporary understandings, must today be read as an argument about contested idioms of legitimation. What
people say about origins is one part, and only one, of what they do with them. Origins are perhaps less important
than the ways and contexts in which both the discourse and its attributed origins are deployed” (p. 178).
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Many of my respondents situated in large international organizing bodies and
NGOs draw on tropes by which Thai people are seen as ‘subordinate’ and ‘passive’ and
align with colonial legacies that paint Thailand as ‘less developed,’ likely disseminated
through these transnational networks and organizations.63 Feminist scholars have examined
tensions that arise from transnational feminist organizing and how these have led to the
reproduction of imperialism and feminist orientalism that painted the West as progressive
and the East as less developed or inferior (Rupp, 1991). However, interviews also suggest
a parallel relationship of Thai ‘local’ discourses that consistently hegemonize ideas of
Thailand as less ‘developed’ and less ‘civilized’ with respect to consuming, managing, and
countering plastic waste. These are contrasted with Western entities, seen as progressive
and environmental. Interview quotes comparing Thainess and the Western ‘Other’ 64
established recurrent tensions, while evoking references to tropes about relative
‘civilization’ and ‘development,’ as well as ideas about how Thailand could use these
Western depictions as a model for improvement. As respondents walked me through their
environmental narratives on the cause of the plastic pileup, I paid particular attention to the
role of these hegemonic Western discourses and Thai-ized forms of tropes. These often
centered on government inaction. For instance, when describing why the Thai government
had yet to take strong action on reducing plastic waste, one interviewee explained:
“I don't really think they care about [the] environment yet. Okay, in
Thailand … it's still developing country, it[’s] not that developed … we still
63 As discussed in the previous chapter, Thai activists and others working to address plastic waste are highly integrated
in international circles and networks. While this thesis does not locate and examine the discourses and narratives that
arise in these particular circles, it is likely that individuals interact with Western discourses and narratives that shape how
they view themselves. As Thai subjects grow increasingly integrated into global commodity markets such as the buying
and selling of plastic products and the waste trade, and join large-scale international forums, institutions, and NGOs, this
causes actors to negotiate global discourses and international perspectives in terms of their own identities, leading to new
subjectivities.
64 In defining the Western ‘Other,’ Thai studies scholars draw from the commonly used term “farang.” This term refers
to “…Western people without any specification of nationality, culture, ethnicity, language, or whatever” (Winichakul,
2004: 5). Kitiarsa (2010) broadens this definition, outlining a geneology of the term, while exploring the various
meanings and contexts of its verbiage. According to Kitiarsa (2010), the Western ‘Other’ is situated in a “…historically
and culturally rooted system of epistemological tactics employed by Siam’s rulers and intellectual elites to turn the
Otherness of farang into ambiguous objects of those elite’s desires to be modern and civilized” (58). Kitiarsa (2010)
additionally outlines the various constructions of farang and its role in remaking Thai identities through contemporary
consumerism and mass media, arguing that “…the modern makeup of Thainess can only be understood as an outcome
of the cultural project of the Siamese Occidentalization of farang” (59). He highlights how this discourse emerged
through local agency rather than as a Western imposition and has reconfigured and “…constituted cultural practice in the
service of local projects of power,” arguing that it is impossible to disentangle Thainess and farang (60).
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have kind of corruption problem many other economic issues [which] they
want to focus on [rather than the] environment issue. Yeah, so I guess now
we can only rely on … the normal people like us, to be more aware and try
to do something by ourselves first” (Interview 26).

Another interviewee expressed frustration in that the Thai laws prohibit the recycling of
PET into food-grade level packaging. She told me:
“you know all of those countries that are obviously more civilized than us,
and I’m sure have higher standards for hygiene than us, so if it works in
those countries then I would raise the question as to why it’s not good
enough for us. It's not because we are underdogs, but also you know those
countries have been using those materials for a long time and we recognize
them as high developed countries right, they are in the G-20 whatever, so I
think we could learn from them and … asking relevant questions as to; this
is what we want, how can we get there? And it's not like rocket science,
there are proven cases” (Interview 30).

These quotes provide insights into the environmental narratives that respondents tell in
explaining Thailand’s plastic pileup. Discourses on development are evoked in interviews
for various reasons, often to lament the lack of development in the waste management
sector. It was common to refer to the sensitivity of politicians and the military government
to critiques, and their subsequent resistance to governmental action that might limit plastic
availability and therefore, presumed convenience. 65 However, these discourses also reveal
an ambiguous and amorphous sense of lagging behind, of ‘inferiority,’ and of associated
issues related to waste. Activists deploy Thai tropes that both inscribe Thainess with

65 For example, another interviewee explained: “If you want to do something better for the environment you have to
sacrifice something, you have to cut some convenience and then the government see that if I cut that, I make people
inconvenient and they will be judged. So, this government is very sensitive to people's voice now. Military government
right like this situation they've sensitive they don't want to be blamed by people so they wait people too. And every people
in Thailand you know my country is [not a developed country]. They want to make money first, so environment is better.
I have to make money I have to make my life better. I think it's the same in undeveloped countries, they have to focus on
their life first” (Interview 6).

109

negative environmental tropes, but also that do the work of critiquing government inaction.
This is also done through further Western-Thai comparisons. For example, Thailand’s
actions on waste management are continually placed in relation to Western logics and
systems. As one Western respondent working in the plastic industry explained:
“It’s difficult to persuade Thais to just take what America has done and
emulate it. They keep saying that we’re not the same as America” (Interview
13).

It is evident through these quotes, that the desire to emulate an ambiguous Westernized
ideal is both upheld and resisted in Thailand. 66 It is worth noting here, that the structural
influence of Western powers in bolstering the authoritarian dimensions of the Thai
government, increasing materialism and consumption,67 as well as in the recent influx in
toxic plastic waste, remain under discussed in conventional media and scholarly coverage,
yet play a significant role in reconfiguring environmental subjectivities. Rather, critiques
of the Thai government are often articulated through comparisons with the West and
framed as an issue of a broad understanding of development rather than solely a lack of
political will or action. Specifically challenges around plastic waste management and
reduction are often framed as cultural issues, while engaging with, reproducing (as seen by
the image of a progressive Western ideal) or pushing back against a hegemonizing Western
‘Other’68 in this complex political landscape. Grappling with these complex legacies of
nationalist and colonial projects, I argue that it is vital to engage with the effects of Thaiized Western discourse and colonial histories in understanding the plastic waste issue in

66 Winichakul (2010) writes on the tension in which the West represents something to be followed and emulated yet
simultaneously abhorred and avoided. In this depiction of Thai consciousness, “…the farang has been a temptation as
well as a threat in the Thai imagination, a seductive but dangerous Other” (135).
67 Intellectual critiques of the Americanization of Thailand point to increased materialism and cultural destruction as
consumption patterns began to reflect Western and Japanese influence (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005).
68 According to Kitiarsa (2010), the Western ‘Other’ is situated in a “…historically and culturally rooted system of
epistemological tactics employed by Siam’s rulers and intellectual elites to turn the Otherness of farang into ambiguous
objects of those elite’s desires to be modern and civilized” (58). Kitiarsa (2010) additionally outlines the various
constructions of farang and its role in remaking Thai identities through contemporary consumerism and mass media,
arguing that “…the modern makeup of Thainess can only be understood as an outcome of the cultural project of the
Siamese Occidentalization of farang” (59). Through a genealogy of farang, he highlights how this discourse emerged
through local agency rather than as a Western imposition, and has reconfigured and “…constituted cultural practice in
the service of local projects of power,” arguing that it is impossible to disentangle Thainess and farang (60).
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Thailand, and how these contribute to the shaping of environmental subjects through
tropes. Through disentangling these Western-Thai binaries, I argue that these discourses
often obscure the role of the West in shaping Thailand’s plastic waste issue.

7.5

Reproducing Thai Tropes in the Grassroots Response
Social constructions of Thainess dramatically shape grassroots anti-plastic efforts in

Thailand, while ‘Western’ solutions and leadership are simultaneously resisted and
revered. In this section, I examine the ways in which activists and environmentalists
construct environmental tropes of Thainess through varied efforts. I consider the ways in
which Thai individuals push back against these constructed Thai norms, while at the same
time, reproducing supposed ‘cultural pathologies’ themselves. I first outline some of the
tensions around Western and Thai leadership, then examine various solutions such as waste
cleanups and the integration of reusable products. I demonstrate how Thai tropes legitimize
and de-legitimize particular responses to the plastic waste issue.

Figure 7.4 Art instillation on display at an educational event in Pathum Wan District,
Bangkok. The display raises awareness about the impacts of plastic waste on marine
megafauna. Photo by author (2019).
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My time in Bangkok revealed a highly visible international and Western presence
in the leadership and targeting of the environmental grassroots movement. On my first day
of fieldwork, while attending an environmental awareness event centered on plastic waste,
I noted a strong international presence and Western-centered outreach efforts. These
nascent observations were confirmed soon after this event, when I conducted an interview
with an independent environmental activist working on waste cleanups in and around
Bangkok. As we walked along a highly polluted canal, he lamented some of his frustrations
with the leadership on anti-waste activism and his hope to increase Thai participation.
“They don’t even have a Thai person running Trash Hero Bangkok,”69 he told me. “There’s
so many people doing stuff already,” he explained, “but there’s minimum collaboration
even between Thai local and international… between like Thai agencies so I figure, I can
be the guy … trying to get the Thai, the Bangkok people [involved]” (Interview 11). His
words reveal beliefs about the importance of Thai representation and reveal tensions
surrounding the structuring and participation in anti-plastic waste efforts in Thailand.
While many Thai citizens are passionately leading the way in addressing plastic
waste and have garnered noticeable platforms, 70 there are still tensions around leadership,
visibility, and representation. It is likewise evident that, despite the diversity of genders,
ages, and nationalities represented in Bangkok’s grassroots efforts to address plastic waste,
those in leadership positions as well as a high number of participants in grassroots actions
tend represent wealthier brackets of society, internationally educated individuals, and
Western actors. The phenomenon of Western leadership in various organizations is not
new, represented in a large body of feminist scholarship, pointing to hegemonic discourses
touting Western ‘superiority’ as well as the barriers of professionalization whereby a select
group of educated, wealthy, and English-speaking candidates are prioritized for grassroots
organizational positions, thereby reconfiguring the efforts of said organization. 71 In the
69 A highly visible nonprofit organization, Trash Hero, was founded in Thailand in 2013 by two Westerners. Now
spanning 12 countries, Trash Hero largely focuses on trash cleanups and educational efforts. Trash Hero subgroups in
Thailand have garnered large numbers of participants in cleanups. For more information, see: Trash Hero World. (2018).
About us: How we are governed. [online] Available at: https://trashhero.org/how-we-are-governed/. [Accessed 25
November 2019].
70 Popular anti-waste activists and educators include ลุงซาเล้งกับขยะที่หายไป @3WheelsUncle, Environman @Environman.th,
GEPP Waste Collectors @GEPPThailand, ReReef @Re4Reef, Won @WonTogether, Ralyn Satidtanasarn (Lilly) dubbed
"Thailand's Greta Thunberg," the On Nut Refill Station, and many more.
71 For example, Liddle and Rai (1998) examine ‘first wave’ and ‘second wave’ feminist writings by North American
women, revealing how Western leadership was (re)produced through painting Western countries as more civilized and
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case of Thailand’s anti-plastic grassroots organizing, prioritizing Western and international
actors, leadership, education, and solutions are connected to three main tropes about Thai
people and the plastic waste issue: Thai people as ‘uninvolved’ and ‘inactive’; Thai culture
as incompatible with particular solutions; and Thai people as ‘unaware’ and ‘uneducated.’
The first tension that emerged was that of participation in anti-plastic and related
waste reduction activisms and behavior. Given the visibility of Western and international
actors in the movement, this demographic poses challenges in terms of galvanizing others
to action, since, according to some respondents’ situated knowledges, Thai individuals may
be less likely to participate when they do not see themselves reflected in the organization
(Interview 11, 17). For example, this phenomenon affects groups that work to pick up waste
including plastic in the Bangkok metropolitan area. Expanding on his earlier critique of
leadership in Trash Hero, the activist explained that due to Western actors leading
cleanups, these participants were spatially privileged in the choosing of waste cleanup
locations, while language barriers further inhibited local Thais from joining in (Interview
11). Later, a Western activist involved in a separate organization conducting waste
cleanups detailed a story about a failure to galvanize Thais to join in during a student-led
beach cleanup, detailing how Thai people said that there were too few participants for them
to feel comfortable enough to join in. 72 His quote reflects presumed cultural barriers to
taking visible leadership or action, as well as the potential need for visibility of Thai
activists in disrupting apprehension and reticence to participate in waste cleanups, since,
according to various respondents, grassroots-led waste cleanups are seen as a distinctly
Western practice.73 Although Thai visibility is vital, Western action and environmental
superior in tandem with producing Western women as the rightful leaders of the feminist movement. On the other hand,
there are also a large number of structural forces that facilitate Western leadership where, for example, professionalization
of activist organizations produces barriers to involvement in these positions, further leading to spaces of exclusion
(Markowitz & Tice, 2002).
72 Full Quote: “We had like maybe 40 people lead this cleanup and it's a huge beach, so we had a section of the beach
where we just sorted the garbage and Thais were all around just lounging around on the beach whatever. None of them
joined in to help us. And I mean wouldn't you think if you had like 40 kids picking up your garbage on the beach some
of the Thais would be like "yeah, I'll help," but not one Thai did. And then after we did the cleanup, I had some of my
kids go around and interview some of the locals like what do you think is going on here. And a bunch of Thais were like
"Oh if there were more people in the cleanup like 100," the number they gave us is 100, "then maybe we would have felt
more incentivized to join. But we figure it's a small cleanup, it wasn't enough people for us to get involved." Really? So,
100 is the magic number, but when you see literally 40 kids in one area just going back and forth, um. Point is, most
people don't really care” (Interview 17).
73 The act of picking up waste is associated with saleng. This job is seen as a lower class position and is largely looked
down upon, often described as an essential cultural perception in Thailand. This creates stigmas around the act of waste
picking, which activists regularly disrupt through their environmental efforts.
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activism is not always detrimental to their cause. One Thai environmental activist
expresses:
“I saw foreigners picking up others’ trash on the beach and I was like oh,
I’ve never done that before. And they don’t look Thai. Surely, they have no
business to be doing this; I could be doing this. The next day I go to join
them” (Interview 11).

The visibility of Westerners disrupting what was expected in terms of who should or should
not be responsible in addressing Thailand’s waste is framed largely around nationality in
this quote. One Western activist narrates how Thai students felt encouraged and inspired
seeing other Thais caring about similar environmental issues, noting “it does matter for
them… And that’s important,” he continued, “it’s got to be from Thais, for Thais, by Thais”
(Interview 17). These quotes point to a fundamental concern with local leadership that is
not necessarily being met by the current grassroots efforts surrounding plastic waste in
Thailand education and outreach efforts. Clearly, tropes that relegate Thai people as
‘inactive’ on the plastic waste issue erase the efforts by innumerable Thai citizens that are
enacted daily and obscure structural barriers to participation. Meanwhile, the various
prominent hegemonic discourses articulating stereotypes of Thai people as ‘unengaged’
and ‘indifferent’ are both “self-serving and self-fulfilling” and “misleading” (Herzfeld,
2010: 184).74 This aligns with the continuous categorization of activisms as Western rather
than Thai, in which Western associations take prevalence in defining activisms over the
involvement of Thai people.

74 For example, discourses on the Thai middle class as indifferent to issues of poverty disregard when “college students
engage in the care of slum communities; their social activism resists easy typification as “Thai” or “Western”, but, while
still enmeshed in the positivistic rhetoric of “data” collection, nevertheless also belies any definition of political life in
purely institutional terms. Analyses that miss this key point are effectively complicit in the self-constitution of official
authority” (Herzfeld, 2010: 184-5).
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Figure 7.5 Refill Station stocked with reusable products located in Watthana District,
Bangkok. Photo by Author (2019).

The quotes in this thesis demonstrate the continual process of distinguishing
Thainess from the West or an international ‘Other.’ As evidenced in these interviews, it
additionally relies on essential allusions to nationality, culture, and a sense of responsibility
or belonging. According to respondents, solutions that are deemed ‘Western’ face
particular stigmas in their adoption in Thailand, from these waste cleanups to the use of
refillable and reusable products (Interview 11, 14, 20, 24). One owner of a refill station,
where customers can purchase reusable containers and straws, and refill essential body care
and food products explained that she and her team “…found this idea from other country
like in Europe or Canada” since they looked for a refill “…shop like this in Thai[land] but
there were none, none at all” (Interview 24). While some reusable products, such as a
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reusable water bottles, have caught on in many Western countries, these have yet to be seen
on a large scale in Thailand. 75 After interviews with those designing, promoting, and
distributing various refillable and reusable products from straws to shampoo bottles, I
learned that many of these items and practices are perceived as distinctly Western. This is
challenging for activists, as reusable products and refill stations are one of the only
solutions that currently challenge production of plastic. Other sellers of these products
explain that they historically serve a foreign clientele rather than Thai people, although
they are hopeful that this is changing due to increasing interest (Interview 14).76 However,
these stigmas prevail in many ways:
“In locations where there's a lot more foreigners, they do not have any
negative feedback but in locations with more Thai population, some Thais
are not ready for this idea yet. Like they're not used to the idea of using
metal straws again and again in a cafe. Like they feel that it could be dirty
or it's just not like normal. Yeah and some of them just like plastic straws”
(Interview 14).
“… Everyone said, are you crazy? Why you have to carry your own bottles?
It’s very weird in Thai” (Interview 24).
Actors adopting these solutions feel that they are countering stigmas about ‘Western’
solutions through their own adoption and use of these strategies. While these quotes
describe barriers to adopting these environmental solutions, the “situated knowledges”
presented in this research likewise demonstrate the processes by which respondents

75 Due to distrust in the water pipes in Bangkok, many citizens opt in favor of plastic water bottles. One activist has
worked to facilitate the use of reusable bottles by creating awareness about filtered water refill stations in Bangkok and
Thailand more generally. More information here: https://www.facebook.com/waterstationthailand/.
76 Full Quote: “We talk to communities … and introduce our products to the consumer. Especially the Thai population
because when we started out it was a lot of foreigners. More than half was foreigners. But then as we grew, we tried to
have some Thai content and all of that. We started to have more and more Thai people interested which was a really big
thing for us because we wanted to change the behavior and way Thai people understand this issue and it's starting to get
more and more engagement” (Interview 14). “I would say that more and more Thai people are starting to have an open
mind about this because it used to be sort of a foreign idea and behavior to save [and reuse products] or try to be eco. So
that has changed quite a lot” (Interview 14).
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reinforce Thai tropes in their efforts to address plastic waste, forming new environmental
subjects.
Cultural stigmas are not the sole barrier to garnering participation in environmental
behaviors and activisms, as respondents continually encounter and reproduce tropes of
Thai people as ‘unaware’ and ‘uneducated.’ These self-critical discourses exemplify
pernicious impacts on how people perceive themselves and their relation to plastic and the
environment. When questioned about the challenges of promoting and transitioning to the
use of reusable products as opposed to single-use plastics and other environmental
behavior, my respondents revealed various negative tropes and perceptions of Thai people:
“People here are just lazy. By our nature, Thai people tend to be more lazy.
So, we are lazy to wash [reusable products such as straws] every day …
yeah challenge and maybe they just don't want to carry many thing that
much … but in Thailand, since the past, we have kind of word, sentence
that say that Thai people love to smile and be lazy, just is our nature because
our country already have like good food, we don't have any disaster to
struggle at all so people try to be more laid back, easy, just like yeah yeah
you know. So that's in our genes a little bit, we don't have to struggle we
don't have to [have] that much discipline. So, I think that might affect a little
bit about this… If you compare to Japanese people, that may be easier to
educate them to like okay one of your disciplines is to wash this straw that
may be easier if compare to Thai people” (Interview 26).
“Thai people, Bangkok people we’re so lazy” (Interview 11).
‘Laziness’ is not inherently negative, as it can be interpreted as a rejection of the neoliberal
myth of personal responsibility. However, many of these tropes of Thai ‘laziness’ are
paralleled with discussions of Thailand as a developing country marked by a lower rate of
environmental education and awareness (Interview 26). An essentialized Thai people are
positioned as ‘inferior’ to Western countries and the larger global community. One activist
told me “Especially like Europe and the U.S. … people are actually more aware of this
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problem compared to Thai people. I think Thai people's awareness is a little low compared
to the world's entire population” (Interview 24). This framing of international foreigners as
more educated and environmentally conscious is mirrored within Thailand’s borders and
grassroots efforts. For example, international schools in Thailand are considered privileged
in their funding, educational standards, and their predisposition to environmental ethics
(Interview 12, 13, 17, 24). “I would say that the international schools have a more
progressive open-minded worldview of the [plastic] problem” one Western activist
explained (Interview 17). As another plastic industry representative noted, “The Thai
schools is key. The only real educational reform [on waste management] is happening at
international schools here” (Interview 13). Interestingly, this forms a self-fulfilling issue in
which activist efforts are directed toward a better resourced and wealthy international
community in Thailand. While grassroots activists and environmentalist continually
explain the importance of increased education in Thai communities and schools, alluding
to increasing awareness on plastic waste in the Thai public, interviews about their own
outreach efforts revealed distinct contradictions. For example, describing her outreach
promoting reusable products in international schools, one interviewee (Interview 14)
explained:
Respondent: “I think it's also because it is an international school and the
topic and awareness of this issue is already there. Quite deeply. It's very
different from the majority of the Thai community where they're not so
much aware of this. So, going into [international] schools and all that is
easier, and we feel a lot more supported because they know about this
problem it's not just from scratch.

Interviewer: So, do you go to more international schools than Thai schools
for that reason?

Respondent: Yes, we actually haven't been to any Thai schools. Yes, just
international schools and international universities.
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While various grassroots actors explained an explicit desire to change Thai people’s
awareness of the plastic waste issue, they maintained focused efforts on international
forums and schools. Access to environmental education is often concentrated in wealthier
and international schools (Interview 8, 12, 13, 30). This contradiction is not solely a result
of negative environmental tropes as it also reflects structural issues such as increased
funding availability at international schools, as well as power asymmetries in which
students at wealthier and international schools are perceived as existing in pipelines to
positions of decision-making in Thai governance and industry. Activists also uphold this
focus of educational endeavors in international schools, as they are likely to enable access
to funding for the environmental organization or, they perceive international communities
as being more environmentally aware and receptive (Interview 30). Although the stated
end goal is to create environmental education programs in Thai schools, this appears to be
endlessly deferred.
As noted throughout this chapter, Thai environmental subjects are framed as being
less aware of the plastic waste issue, predicated on hackneyed stereotypes and tropes about
Thai dispositions. While activists struggle to increase participation and awareness on the
plastic waste issue, these actors likewise rely on tropes, sometimes skillfully using them as
a way of critiquing government inaction on plastic waste. Meanwhile, as they counter
stereotypes and tropes of Thainess through their own activisms, they also reinforce ideas
about what Thainess means. What counts as Thai and whose voice counts produce barriers
to participation and stigmas around waste cleanups and reusable products being seen as
Western and ‘un-Thai.’ The concept of Thainess continues to create tensions with activist
endeavors as environmental action on plastic is entwined with social constructions of Thai
culture. Through internalizing tropes on Thai environmentalism, activists’ own
relationship with environmental action is altered, revealing the formation of new
subjectivities.

7.6

Weaponizing Thainess: The Plastic Industry’s Agenda
As discussed in Chapter 5, the state and industry-led plastic management schemes

reveal specific environmental interventions that draw on the plastic industry’s expertise.
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Such initiatives shape environmental subjects as they configure specific discourses about
plastic dependency and about the relative appropriateness of particular initiatives that then
get platformed over other solutions. This is worth scrutiny, as the plastic industry and large
retail groups have various blurred roles with respect to plastic governance, as discussed
throughout this thesis. This is complicated further through historical and contemporary
merges between corporate and political powers.77 In this section, I outline some of the ways
in which the plastic industry and its proponents reproduce, accommodate, and harness
essentializing discourses on Thainess, while considering the various political and economic
agendas that these discourses empower.
The construction of a Thai ‘plastic addicted subject’ is utilized to bolster a sense of
inherent dependency on plastic. In various iterations, industry proponents told me of the
exceptional reliance of Thai people on plastic packaging. This need was predicated on any
range of cultural and economic explanations, including narratives about poor people
greatly relying on cheap and available plastic, Thailand’s hot climate necessitating plastic
to prevent food waste, and the uses of plastic in supporting Thailand’s low-cost, on-the-go
street food. As various industry representatives and PPP members explained:
“Thailand is different from other countries. We have curry and noodle
which need plastic … This is our culture. It’s different from other countries”
(Interview 27).
“If we concern only environment sometimes it's like panic of the people …
society how they can survive it if the price go up? And if we ban some
plastic bag or plastic if you are familiar with Thai people, when they buy
the food, it's in plastic right? If we didn't have the plastic, how the people
sell? Because our weather is very hot, very warm, the food … bacteria will

77 Lines between corporate groups and preexisting hierarchies of power have become blurred. Intermarriages between
prominent business families consolidated power in the 1960s and onward, becoming even more common in the 1990s.
For example, Central Group or Central Holding represents a holding company with billions in assets and a major retail
player in the contemporary plastic issue, is centered in these histories. During the 1990s, a Thai royal relative married a
member of the Chirathiwat retailing family, owners of Central (Baker & Phongpaichit, 2005). Such intermarriages formed
informal oligarchies. Furthermore, according to Benedict Anderson, Siam is largely controlled by “…clusters of
interlocking families, whose children go to the same schools, whose businesses are interconnected, who marry among
themselves, and share a common set of values and interests” (2011).
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grow up very fast, it’s not like in Europe. … If they want to launch some
campaign or regulation, they should understand the behavior or the culture,
sometimes they learn from Europe or Japan but it's not here” (Interview 9).
The quotes suggest a continued push for Thai exceptionalism, while maintaining that “Thai
culture” is misunderstood. Likewise, the assumption of the ‘plastic addicted subject’ is
predicated on tropes yet ignores the centuries of cultural development and constructions of
Thainess preceding the introduction of plastic. I discuss these narratives not to contradict
and dismiss them, as these “situated knowledges” in themselves reveal truths. However,
they also represent a clear move toward power in their effort to protect a continued
production of plastic and to avoid structural and regulatory changes such as plastic bans or
taxes. As such, solutions proposed in these networks of decision-making likewise upheld
conceptions of negative environmental tropes, deeply embedded with ideas about
consumption behavior. In an interview with a member of the Plastic Institute of Thailand
under the Ministry of Industry, it quickly became evident that the policy was to avoid
substantial bans on plastic while privileging solutions that did not challenge plastic
production. In part, this was achieved through narratives of Thai exceptionalism and
uniqueness:
“We do a lot of thing, but some things we do in the wrong way, so we study
and have some crystalized idea that this is the perfect idea for Thailand, not
for another country, because we have our own culture and Thai people think
in the Thai way. It's not like another country, I think American people and
Thai people think in a different way. So, we have to have the system that's
suitable for Thai people, Thai system, Thai culture” (Interview 5).

Affirming Thai exceptionalism, this quote demonstrates an effort to communicate that
‘outsiders’ may not understand the uniqueness of Thainess and the proposed solutions.
Through numerous interviews with government workers and industry affiliates, it became
clear that Thai tropes have permeated discourse in spaces of environmental governance,
especially through the tight network of plastic industry and government workers in the
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PPP. Waste management solutions initiated by the MoNRE were clearly predicated on the
assumption of Thai-specific needs, while upholding previous discussions about the fear of
regulation on the part of government workers.
“Thai people, we love to be volunteer. If you say we have a law or regulation
… maybe people don't like you to control them like that. If we ask for help
or voluntary program it's very good for Thailand.” “We try to … improve
or develop the technique that [is] suitable with our country… because
sometimes when we copy this kind of technology maybe it doesn't match
with our country” (Interview 2).

This respondent in particular, suggested that volunteer-based measures were more popular
and compatible with Thai culture. Despite the innumerable calls for regulation by my
respondents, this quote homogenizes Thai demands and experiences through suggesting a
voluntary approach is necessary. As such, cultural exceptionalism is utilized to explain the
relative compatibility or incompatibility of certain solutions through notions of
pathologizing Thainess. These work to counter forms of regulation such as bans, in favor
of voluntary measures, while suggesting that even technical solutions might be
incompatible with Thai culture.
Although individuals across recycling, plastic industry, government, and activist
groups contribute to various interpretations of Thainess, this section demonstrates some
of the ways in which such tropes are utilized to suit particular agendas. In defining
environmental subjects, their needs, qualities, and desired solutions, these experts
maintain the right to outline the solutions to plastic waste. Tropes include a plastic
dependency and the message is clear: Thai people are not only ‘addicted,’ they need
plastic. In doing so, discourses on Thainess are deployed and weaponized in particular
ways to suit certain interests.
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7.7

Conclusion

Figure 7.6 Thai volunteers collect plastic and assorted waste in Bang Kachao. Photo by
author (2019).

“You can’t separate a group of people by nation” (Interview 24).

Even as interviewees reproduce tropes that equate Thainess with un-environmental
behavior, they simultaneously work to counter this notion, as evidenced in the above quote
(Interview 24). Respondents point to the diversity of opinions, attitudes, and responses held
by Thai citizens, and they take concerted efforts to increase Thai participation and action
on the plastic waste issue. However, in countering what they see as mainstream Thainess,
tropes are still often reproduced and reinforced as ontologically real. Through their
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variegated responses to the plastic waste issue, these tropes become normalized and
internalized.
In particular, as respondents produce environmental narratives to explain the plastic
waste issue, they simultaneously reproduce the discourse of Thai people as ‘plastic
addicted subjects.’ Across government, recycling, industry, and activist circles,
environmental problems are narrated and structured through reproducing Thai tropes.
Some individuals in these groups share distinct blind spots, evoking Thainess as a form of
presumed knowledge, personifying a homogenized Thai character, which has differential
and pervasive effects on their own environmental subjectivities as well as their conceptions
of other Thai citizens. This process obscures a diversity of complex attitudes and a vibrant
and thriving anti-plastic movement that directly counters stereotypes of a homogenized
group of un-environmental Thai actors. In turn, plastic addiction as supposed ‘cultural
pathologies’ positions plastic consumption as the singular causal explanation for the waste
issue, decentering sources of waste such as plastic waste imports. These tropes are often
constructed through a Western-Thai binary that deems particular activisms and identities
appropriate in Thailand. Meanwhile, these binaries tend to conceal the role of the West in
shaping the construction of the Thai state, Thai governmental actions, and contemporary
influence through plastic waste imports.
By attending to the “situated knowledges” of my respondents, I interlink
environmental narratives and discourse to better understand environmental subjects. In
particular, through interrogating Thai tropes, this research challenges us to recognize the
historical development of Thainess and its contemporary situatedness. As such, this chapter
outlines the ways in which the discursive power of Thainess is experienced and configured
through social relations, political and economic structures, and governmental
environmental schemes. This thesis requires that the reader reconsider Thainess and its
associated tropes of “plastic addiction” as a politicized form of discourse, a process of
control, and even perhaps, an expert knowledge that shapes Thailand’s plastic pileup.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION

8.1

Call to Action: Interventions, Enforcement, and Inclusion
Impressive and sweeping efforts to address plastic waste have shaped Thailand in

recent years. Due to the hard work of environmental activists, concerned citizens,
politicians, environmental regulators, celebrities, and technical specialists in the plastic
industry, we are seeing an unprecedented shift and focus of energy centered on Thailand’s
plastic waste issue. Environmentalists are holding the plastic industry accountable, while
some industry representatives point to the Jambeck et al. (2015) study as the stimulus for
their new commitment to reducing plastic waste. We are seeing large-scale international
events and forums, creative public displays and performance, new artistic and technical
initiatives, reusable product focus groups, emerging public-private partnerships, and
thriving coalitions between the plastic industry and grassroots actors who are working to
navigate and solve the plastic waste issue. For example, PTTGC has partnered with
grassroots environmental groups and Buddhist monks at Wat Chak Daeng in Samut Prakan
to collect and upcycle plastic waste bottles (PTTGC, 2019). We are already seeing smallscale campaigns, markets, and stores, that are refusing a plastic dependent lifestyle,
creating the future they want in their own communities.78 There are endless ways in which
Thailand’s residents are taking action, and surprising new partnerships that have yielded
positive outcomes. However, as both environmental activists and this thesis demonstrate,
there is still much room for improvement.
“We were invited to [the] World Ocean … day event last year at Paragon 79
actually … it was quite an embarrassing PR nice suit baby kissing ceremony
that was, they gave out all these awards to Exxon Mobil and Tesco like we
want to bring on the whoever for Exxon Mobil ‘for the change.’ They bring
on this clown from Exxon Mobil, to receive an award for ocean conservancy

78 Seen at the upcycling “Model Market” in Thonglor, the CU Zero-Waste composable packaging and bag taxes, the
implementation of cassava-based packaging by Kasetsart University’s “KU Green,” and the refill stations and reusable
packaging groups.
79 Siam Paragon is a major shopping mall in Bangkok, Thailand.
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and everything … And you're like, that's an insult, because then after they
gave all the executives their awards, they invited actual fishermen and stuff,
and you could see that they're weathered old Thai men who work in the
field, like they should have gotten their award first, [instead of] these
executives who just read off a paper that … "we at Exxon Mobil have
committed to eco waste" (Interview 17).

As groups across industry, government, recycling, and activist spheres conduct variegated
efforts to address plastic waste, the above quote reflects frustration about who is credited
with action and change on plastic waste, and who is seen as creating the waste issue.
Exemplified by the PTTGC representative who described the company’s role as “leaders”
in the anti-plastic waste movement, industry respondents seem to occupy varied and
multiple positions. These individuals advocate for change yet are simultaneously situated
in an industry that produces plastic that later becomes waste, and at times, constrain the
solutions deemed appropriate for Thailand through discourse. While some industry
representatives deviate from their institutions’ public agenda of waste management
initiatives, acknowledging the need for regulation, there is still a noticeable lack of
inclusion of dissenting voices in improvement schemes enacted by the industry and
government. Power is reflected in top-down and often plastic industry-led initiatives that
seem to take center stage. Meanwhile, across the board, respondents share a desire for a
more comprehensive decision-making body than the PPP, with the ability to make
enforceable laws, while plastic bag and bottle producers voice their frustration with the
current recycling rates and their desire for improvements. Plastic industry representatives,
government regulators, activists, and recyclers want change, but there are many barriers to
achieving it, and questions as to who has the power to do so.
In this concluding chapter, I both embrace the current efforts of industry and
government groups, while advocating increased incorporation of grassroots demands,
concerns, and voices in shaping Thailand’s plastic waste improvement schemes. This
inclusion is necessary for facilitating just decision-making that addresses grassroots
concerns and empowers those otherwise marginalized by current environmental solutions.
I explore some of the solutions already proposed by these groups and individuals, and the
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underlying conditions that must be addressed in order to reduce plastic waste, including
issues of transparency and trust, separation of duties, social justice, and the inclusion and
greater integration of a more diverse set of voices.81 In particular, many respondents in the
grassroots environmental movement want to reduce plastic waste through empowering
communities. Thailand’s residents, as with others engaging with sustainability and waste
reduction initiatives, are not “passive recipients” of environmental improvement schemes
but have their own “justice imaginaries” in which “documenting and strengthening these
collective efforts would remedy the lack of attention to social issues…” (Sen, 2017: 18).
Therefore, I advocate inclusion of these voices in order to diversify and strengthen
strategies enacted in a growing and robust anti-plastic waste movement in Thailand. In
doing so, I ask: how is the plastic waste issue currently being framed, and whose efforts
are recognized; what solutions are imposed, and which are demanded en masse; what
solutions would improve Thai resident’s lives and protect the most vulnerable; what are
the underlying conditions of our reliance on plastic as opposed to essentializing tropes;
who is empowered and disempowered to take action. The anti-plastic waste movement is
imperfect, but it also brings a message of hope in terms of what has been achieved and
what can be achieved in the future. As such, this chapter now turns to articulate some of
the key demands by Thai residents and environmental organizers for instituting change.

8.2

The Plastic Waste Trade and the Separation of Duties
The plastic waste trade remains a controversial issue in Thailand. As discussed in

this thesis, China’s National Sword Policy redirected plastic waste imports to Thailand. As
a result, Chinese venture companies quickly relocated to Thailand and poured investment
into Thailand’s recycling systems (Roberts-Davis & Saetang, 2019). In a matter of months,
Thailand’s waste imports had radically transformed the landscape of many villages, still

81 For some, the solutions proposed in this chapter may seem asynchronous with the wide array of technical and
mechanical waste reduction initiatives proposed elsewhere. Issues of power and justice may seem indirectly related to
plastic waste. For example, as noted by critical and feminist political ecology scholars, sustainability regimes sometimes
overlook and silence issues of social sustainability, which takes into account power structures, vulnerability, and
inequality (Sen, 2011). The process of overlooking social-oriented research is often made possible through the privileging
of “measurable outcomes” (Pilgeram, 2011: 375). However, data about waste management performance and material
flows of plastic waste are not the only metrics that determine the success of a solution or progress of the anti-plastic waste
movement.

127

bearing the brunt of this waste today. Grappling with this newly accumulated waste,
Thailand enacted its own import ban, expected to go into full effect in 2021 (Reed, 2018).
This ban aimed to prevent incoming waste, as well as plastic scrap that can be used in
recycling. Accordingly, the government intended to stop the import of plastic scraps82 in
order to promote the use of domestic plastic scraps in creating recycled material (Pollution
Control Department, 2019). However, despite these initial efforts to reduce waste imports,
an inspection of recycling factories in 2018 uncovered illegal imports of non-recyclable
plastic waste from at least 35 countries (Roberts-Davis & Saetang 2019; “Fears Grow over
Waste Imports” 2018).83 Imports remain contentious with respect to the externalized waste
of wealthier nations, the toxins associated with these plastic imports, and the negative
health effects of the waste recycling facilities and open dumps where this waste is
processed and stored. Further controversies about the ban’s value, loopholes, and
regulation remain.
Additionally, transparency issues pervade, obscuring plastic waste import
information and related decision-making. In one environmental activist’s words: “The big
problem is Thailand has the problem of transparency and the public participation in making
decision about the waste trade. We cannot access information related to this problem”
(Interview 7). With only particular voices reflected in the government’s agenda and the
simultaneous exclusion of others, activists raise concerns about the effectiveness, stability,
and material effects of what measures have already been taken on waste imports. While
Thailand’s temporary waste import ban is on track, through an interview with two DIW
representatives, I learned about the internal disagreement within the department about the
nature of this ban. In particular, my interviewee proposed several times that the ban should
be lifted due to its detrimental economic effects on recycling and related waste businesses
in Thailand. However, others situated in regulatory government positions wished to
increase the strength of the ban, in line with activist demands. These contestations expose
the potential for loosened regulations and the tensions arising from blurred responsibilities
(Interview 3). In the meantime, activist point to what they see as a loophole in the waste
82 According to Sasaki (2020), all existing import permits expired in 2019.
83 Activist and recycling groups critique this investigation for its effectiveness as well as the government’s motivations.
According to some, the 2018 police investigations and exposure of illegal imports was simply a means of creating or
saving face, rather than any real environmental or justice concerns over plastic waste (Interview 6).
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import ban, in which toxic plastics are imported without being identified or declared
(Interview 7). Although the ban specifies a halt on import of dirty and contaminated plastic
waste, police inspections reveal that many of these plastic shipments are contaminated as
a result of recent international trade developments; Inspections of shipping containers by
the Customs Department reduced in previous years due to free trade agreements and World
Trade Organization regulations that favor accelerating the speed of transferring ‘goods’
such as waste materials, and including toxic, hazardous waste (Interview 3). 84
Additionally, the DIW is responsible for regulating plastic recycling facilities and
factories. However, this leads to a conflict of interest, arising as the “Department of
Industrial Works (DIW) personnel are simultaneously tasked with the promotion of
industrial development and ensuring businesses’ compliance with applicable laws, thus
responsible for optimizing the investment environment, while also protecting the interests
of the public” (Roberts-Davis & Saetang, 2019: 19). This has already led to ramifications
with what activists see as loose regulations, as seen by the displacement of responsibility
onto local municipalities.
Unfortunately, this decentralized regulatory work leads to environmental and health
threats for communities where plastic waste imports are piling up. Industrial pollution and
waste, particularly from plastic recycling industries are affecting communities across
Thailand. This leads to concerns such as the spread of chemicals and toxins leaching from
the waste itself as well as the waste recycling facilities, and its subsequent effects on the
soil, water, and local communities (Roberts-Davis & Saetang, 2019). During an interview
with Penchom Saetang, Director of EARTH, I learned about the efforts of the organization
to assist these communities in organizing campaigns on the impacts of these facilities on
the environment, livelihoods, and health. Unfortunately, publics living near waste landfill,
recycling, and waste-to-energy sites are often unable to access information related to waste
import permits as well as environmental quality tests and other forms of expertise produced
by government agencies such as the DIW. Meanwhile, speaking up involves politically
sensitive claims about governmental failings to address toxic emissions from plastic
recycling facilities. While mainstream plastic activism in Bangkok centers on waste

84 This trend in which countries reduce environmental regulations in order to attract foreign direct investment is referred
to as the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (Moore, 2011).
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collection and separation, EARTH specifically works on these less visible spaces of
activism on plastic waste.
Displacing regulation onto municipalities is a trend that goes beyond waste
collection, to issues such as regulation of recycling facilities by government groups such
as the DIW (Interview 3, 7). For example, as noted by EARTH, factories charged with
recycling fall under the jurisdiction of the DIW. However, the DIW recently created a
regulation that places factory investigations as the responsibility of local governments. One
DIW representative explained that this new Factory Act would put far more responsibility
onto the local authorities, joking that by no longer categorizing smaller factories under the
jurisdiction of the Factory Act “We can cut our job in half. Yeah, that’s very smart”
(Interview 3). Local municipal governments, therefore, are charged with curating the
expertise, funding, and staffing to hold local recycling factories accountable, while
navigating uneven power relationships with larger and wealthier recycling and waste
companies (Interview 3). These waste management issues have led to new spaces of
conflict around transparency, public distrust, and challenges around roles and
responsibilities.
The DIW inspects most recycling factories every five years, although, with the help
of local municipal inspections, these probes can range between one and five years
(Interview 3). As the DIW decentralizes its power through the new Factory Act, local
municipalities shouldering the weight of increased responsibilities face struggles in
producing their own environmental quality tests and pressing charges against large
factories with their own legal departments (Interview 3). Likewise, official inspections are
imperfect. As one DIW representative admitted, “Usually when we go out and inspect the
factory, the factory often not produce 100% their capacity. They will lower their production
to that level that it will create no emission” (Interview 3). These challenges suggest that
factories need regular monitoring, auditing, and emission reduction, however the official
government stance maintains that their environmental quality tests are reliable enough to
reduce the number of factories under the control of the DIW. Meanwhile, Thai
communities and local residents living near waste dump and recycling sites cite numerous
environmental issues that suggest failures of such systems. According to Penchom Saetang
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of EARTH, there is no legal instrument or regulation for the Thai public to access the
results of these studies and tests enacted by the DIW:
“Yeah … officers from Department of Industrial Works often said that
[there was] no pollution found or no guilty found in many factories, because
the department [is] often monitoring and inspecting from time to time. But
we cannot believe, or we cannot accept such kind of report since Thai
people cannot access this kind of information. So, we don't know if what
you said to public is true or not. But we will raise our experiences in case
[there is a] problem of industrial pollution” (Penchom Saetang).

Activists are adapting and developing a Pollutant Release and Transfer Register 85 as a
mechanism for understanding what type of pollution particular plastic recycling factories
are emitting. Penchom Saetang explains that EARTH is conducting and supporting citizen
science efforts to conduct environmental monitoring. In valuing of the “situated
knowledges” of local residents that remain discounted by the DIW, these organizers are
producing their own politically useful expert knowledges. These efforts include collecting
samples of industrial pollution and testing in laboratories, formulating local petitions and
developing campaigns that target responsible agencies and companies, policy demands and
recommendations to improve existing laws, and producing scholarship and public outreach
literature. The issues surrounding plastic waste imports and management highlight the
ways in which local residents are pushing back against authoritative expertise that denies
the effects and emissions of pollutants. In turn, it demonstrates the need to address and
incorporate grassroots demands and “situated knowledges” more broadly in the anti-plastic
movement.

8.3

Waste Management Systems and Informal Waste Collection
Waste management and cleanup systems function in highly uneven ways in Thailand.

This includes a noticeable lack of trash cans and waste management in poorer areas that
85 PRTR is a publicly accessible database or list that documents the emission of pollutants and toxic chemicals.
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incentivizes littering as well as the increased number of cleanups in wealthier areas.
Activists note that within Bangkok, low-income people are affected as children play in and
with contaminated plastic waste, and others burn toxic plastic as a source of cooking fuel
(Interview 11, 29). Activists claim that likewise, plastic waste in wealthy neighborhoods
and highly trafficked tourist beaches and streets remain the focus of waste cleanups, while
local canals and beaches are largely ignored (Interview 10, 12). This aligns with
environmental narratives told by activists about how their venturing into lower income
neighborhoods and streets exposed them to plastic waste that awakened them to the issue,
sparking action (Interview 11, 29).
Urban waste management remains of central importance for addressing the plastic
waste issue. One of the measures taken to address plastic waste is through floating garbage
booms, meant to block debris from traveling through canals to the Chao Phraya River. 86
These serve as a useful collection point for quantifying types of larger waste; however,
they do not capture the abundance of microplastics in the water. Samples derived from the
Chao Phraya River revealed large differences in the amount of microplastics upstream and
downstream, suggesting a large input of plastic entering the river in the city of Bangkok
(Ericsson & Johansson, 2018). Therefore, in the absence of an effective waste collection
and separation system, small-scale and independent waste collection efforts such as Won87
and GEPP88 are working to recycle plastic waste in the Bangkok metropolitan area, with
the aim of expanding to other parts of Thailand. Recycling also occurs through small-scale
grassroots efforts, such as a Thai Buddhist temple just south of Bangkok mentioned earlier
in this chapter, that recycles PET bottles into monk robes.89 While downstream solutions
such as recycling and upcycling are imperfect, sometimes de-incentivizing limits on plastic
production, they also represent creative ways to inspire action and foster education.

86 Information acquired through a PowerPoint provided by a representative of the Marine and Coastal Resources entitled
“The Study of Type and Quantity of Floating Marine Debris from Tha Chin and Chao Phraya River Mouths by Garbage
Boom,” (n.d), which may not be publicly available.
87 Won is a small-scale plastic recycling endeavor run by TPBI Public Company Limited that offers pickup. See more
here: https://www.facebook.com/wontogether/
88 GEPP is a small-scale recycling company that offers pickup and trains individuals on how to separate waste. See more
here: https://gepp.me/about-us/
89 I visited Wat Chak Daeng temple through participant observation during a waste cleanup. This upcycling initiative is
done in partnership with PTT Global Chemical. Further media coverage can be found on media outlets such as Bangkok
Post and Khaosod English.
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Variegated relationships with managing waste also reinforce class-based disparities.
One activist who runs various waste cleanups explained, “This is the worst job anyone can
have, right? Is picking up trash. It’s like the most looked down upon. Even those cleaning
up, picking up, recycling, they feel like, yeah, people look down upon them” (Interview
11). These various and highly differential spatial and interactive relations with waste
expose numerous lines of inquiry as to environmental justice and health justice. In
Thailand, many waste workers, such as those working at the waste transfer sites in
Bangkok, are migrant workers from countries such as Myanmar, who are often hand sorting
through the city’s waste without any protective gear (Hongsathavij, 2017a).
Waste workers or saleng provide an essential service in Thailand. In particular,
informal waste pickers are especially efficient with capturing particular items on the
ground level, such as glass, while less-economically viable materials such as plastic bags
tend to be seen as more efficiently collected or addressed by the government (Hongsathavij
2017a). According to an interview with a saleng worker in Bangkok, the price she receives
for particular kinds of plastic bottles has risen in recent years. As the plastic is
“everywhere,” this aspect of the job is not challenging, although she has to hand sort waste
daily to determine if it is recyclable or non-recyclable, then clean the waste before selling
it to the recycling center. This is a major contributor in the high collection rate of PET
bottles as opposed to single-use plastic bags, which are not considered valuable. Notably,
most relevant actors acknowledge the informal waste sector as a vital part of Bangkok’s
general waste management systems (Hongsathavij 2017a; Hongsathavij 2017b).
Overall, accessing saleng directly in this line of work as well as junk shop owners in
order to explore perceptions of informal waste sector solutions was very difficult. This
results from language barriers since many waste recyclers are non-Thai speaking from
neighboring countries, issues of access to waste collection and transfer sites that maintain
heavily restrictive visitation rules and prevent employees from speaking to non-authorized
individuals, ethical considerations of speaking with waste pickers who might fear
repercussions from local recyclers while working in precarious positions, and more. Most
interviewees spoke to the issues faced by saleng but were far removed from these
communities, without knowing gatekeepers who could facilitate an interview, further
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demonstrating the disconnect between upper-level regulators and waste management
administrators and the informal waste sector.

Figure 8.1 Wrapped roti sai mai (โรตีสายไหม), a sweet Southeast Asian khanom packaged by
hand in plastic bags. Photo by author (2016).

On the whole, while waste collection profit is privatized, the losses and safety risks are
socialized, and placed onto saleng. Some actors propose a greater integration of informal
workers into the formal waste sector, as it increases recycling rates and improves state
municipal waste management systems while increasing profits for lower-income
communities in urban areas (Hongsathavij 2017b). However, such integration has various
dimensions, and may involve negative trade-offs. For example, Hongsathavij (2017b)
argues that waste intermediaries may face increased precarity due to increased price
fluctuations and state regulations that come with greater integration in the urban economy.
Although there are various forms and possibilities of increased integration of the
informal waste sector, justice-oriented initiatives could be focused on improving working
conditions, health care access, and sanitation improvements (Hongsathavij 2017b). As
noted by Hongsathavij (2017a), if alternative models for integration are indeed possible in
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Bangkok’s urban wasteland, it will likely have to start at the level of the street and landfill
waste-pickers, who, while often used interchangeably with the “informal sector” or
“informal waste workers,” are also the most vulnerable in the recycling value chain, and
who are often denied recognition as relevant stakeholders in policy discourses, both in
Bangkok and elsewhere” (p. 69). The informal waste sector remains a potential avenue for
addressing plastic waste and, importantly, leveraging waste solutions can be used as a
platform for social change.

8.4

Toward Solutions in the Anti-Plastic Waste Movement
A wide range of suggestions emerged through interviews for how to address plastic

waste. The PPP, in tandem with environmental improvement schemes such as the Roadmap
for Plastic Waste Management (2018-2030) and circular economy strategies have inspired
many new actions and initiatives that form a departure point and resource base for new
solutions. Meanwhile, vital changes could improve these solutions. Various PPP members
suggest that the partnership lacks regulative and lawmaking capabilities, advocating for a
governmental taskforce that explicitly creates environmental laws around reducing plastic
waste. With more definitive changes around the budget of waste management systems and
increased regulation, this could improve the plastic waste issue dramatically. Meanwhile,
the demands of grassroots environmental activists are underrepresented in Thailand’s
environmental improvement schemes. Therefore, I conclude by advocating increased
incorporation of grassroots voices and their proposed solutions to Thailand’s plastic waste.
With government regulators, a powerful plastic industry, diverse groups of waste
collectors and recyclers, and numerous NGOs and independent activists all vying to push
particular agendas, some interests emerge over others, demonstrated through prominent
discourses that circulate between and within these networks. Activists raise concerns about
plastic waste imports, the contested role and responsibility of particular sectors and
regulatory groups, the social and environmental justice components of waste management,
and the role of expertise in marginalizing particular voices. Through attending to grassroots
voices, it is clear that we need to attend to who the government represents, the role and
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responsibility of industry, and whose voices are included and whose are obscured in plastic
waste solutions.
Ground-level efforts spark new potential waste solutions. In the absence of more
systematic and immediate change, grassroots activists have created alternative systems for
reducing plastic waste and ecological damage, from mapping water refill stations 90 to
tracking waste imports. Calls for separation of duties (e.g., regulation vs. promotion of
industry) of governmental groups such as the DIW and the PPP maintains a primary
concern for many grassroots environmental activists. Additionally, increased transparency
about waste management systems and the international waste trade is vital. These can be
addressed through tangible solutions such as publicly accessible databases that track waste
and environmental toxins. Residents neighboring waste recycling, landfill, and dump sites
should have access to environmental quality tests as called for by the organization EARTH.
Meanwhile, activists continue to push for a more substantial ban on plastic waste imports.
Social, environmental, and economic justice are key to sustaining the anti-plastic
waste movement. Putting social values into practice, such as improved working conditions
and health protections for saleng, are necessary for improved waste management. Another
consideration is the jobs of those enrolled in plastic production, including lower-level paid
factory workers. In these cases, the reduction of plastic production should include the
simultaneous creation of new jobs and efforts to support these individuals and families. As
such, the anti-plastic waste movement brings the potential for forging stronger networks
among individuals across regulatory, industry, recycling, and activist groups.

8.5

Conclusion
This thesis examines discourse that relegates Thai people as ‘plastic addicted

subjects’ and the plastic waste issue as explicitly Thai-produced. However, this framing
fails to capture the nuanced causes of the pileup, and limits potential solutions. Through

90 Activist efforts to track Thailand’s water refill stations such as “Water Station ตูเ้ ติมน้า” in Bangkok demonstrate the
need for structural change in tandem with increased transparency. For example, pervasive distrust in Bangkok’s water
infrastructure and pipes as well as poor water systems lead to prolific plastic water bottle consumption, enforcing a
dependency on plastic. Increased water filtration and refill stations, improved infrastructure, and rebuilding civic trust in
state systems could transition Thailand away from this plastic consumption. Activists are trying to build this future now
and would benefit from the backing and financial support of government and industry investment in these water systems.
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attending to the voices of Thailand’s residents, it is clear that particular blind spots pervade
plastic waste discourse. Often, the issue is framed through tropes in which Thai
consumption is painted as an “addiction” to plastic, and the diverse array of activisms are
disregarded. However, these framings limit both how we understand the sources of the
waste, and how we propose plastic waste solutions. This thesis aims to illuminate
overlooked sources of waste such as plastic waste imports that contribute to the
plasticscape, while also advocating attention to the creative, industrious, and passionate
efforts of Thai residents to reduce plastic waste in their communities. Through broad
networks of collaboration and support, and the constant push for creative problem-solving,
respondents demonstrate a flourishing anti-plastic waste movement and concerted
demands for change. By moving beyond the current framing of the plastic waste issue to
incorporate more voices and concerns, as well as through the current initiatives taken
already by a broad range of people, the anti-plastic movement in Thailand brings a message
of hope for the future.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: Terms and Abbreviations

BMA

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration

CP

Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group

EU

European Union

DIW

Department of Industrial Works

DMCR

Department of Marine and Coastal Resources

EARTH

Ecological Alert and Recovery – Thailand

EPA

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

IUCN

International Union for Conservation of Nature

MoNRE

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment

PCD

Pollution Control Department

PPP

Thailand Public-Private Partnership for Plastic and Waste Management

PTTGC

PTT Global Chemical

SCG

Siam Cement Group Thailand

TIPMSE

Thailand Institute of Packaging and Recycling Management for Sustainable
Environment

UNCRD

United Nations Centre for Regional Development

UNEP

United Nations Environment Programme

Thai names have multiple spellings in the English language. This thesis uses commonly
used spellings (often based on phonetic pronunciation) for locations, public figures, and
other words.

Khlong

canal

farang Western foreigner
Thainess (khwam-pben-thai)
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1 USD= ~32 Baht

As this thesis is made publicly available via the University of Kentucky and is distributed
to the National Research Council of Thailand, I made every effort to ensure the anonymity
of informants. In this thesis, I removed much of the identifying information of informants
such as specific job affiliations and titles, relying instead on general descriptions.
Occasionally, I utilize real names and affiliations upon request, which are identifiable due
to the inclusion of first and last names, and specific organization details. In special
circumstances, I anonymize names of individuals that gave permission to use their real
names or, as a further layer of anonymization, I give no mention of the interview number.
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APPENDIX B: Research Participants Table
Research Participants
# Interview

Role* and number of individuals
interviewed

Interview Type

Recorded

1

Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment

In-Person

Yes

2

Pollution Control Expert, Ministry of
Natural Resources and Environment

In-Person

Yes

3

Department of Industrial Works (2)

In-Person

Yes

4

Department of Marine and Coastal
Resources

In-Person

Yes

5

Plastic Institute of Thailand: Ministry of
Industry

In-Person

Yes

6

Independent Activist, Recycler

In-Person

Yes

7

Environmental NGO

In-Person

Yes

8

Plastic Producer and Grassroots
Recycler (2)

In-Person

Yes

9

Recycling Nonprofit, Federation of Thai
Industries (2)

In-Person

Yes

10

Environmental NGO

In-Person

Yes

11

Independent Activist

In-Person

Yes

12

Independent Activist

Phone

Yes

13

Plastic Industry

In-Person

Yes

14

Independent Activist, Environmental
Company

In-Person

Yes

15

Environmental Organization

In-Person

Yes

16

Independent Recycler (saleng)

In-Person

No

17

Environmental NGO

In-Person

Yes

18

Plastic Recycler (2)

In-Person

Yes
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19

Individual Activist, Environmental
NGO affiliated

In-Person

Yes

20

Independent Activist, Environmental
Company

Phone

Yes

21

Independent Activist, Environmental
NGO affiliated

In-Person

Yes

22

Individual Activist, Environmental
NGO affiliated (2)

In-Person

Yes

23

Individual Activist, Environmental
NGO affiliated (2)

In-Person

No

24

Environmental Company

Phone

Yes

25

Industry, PPP Representative (3)

In-Person

Yes

26

Individual Activist

In-Person

Yes

27

Industry, PPP Member

In-Person

No

28

Plastic Industry, PPP Member (6)

In-Person

Yes

29

Environmental NGO

Phone

Yes

30

Individual Activist, Recycler

Phone

Yes

31

Individual Activist

Written
Response

No

*The categories listed are a simplified taxonomy and do not fully address the multiple and
varied roles people inhabit.
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APPENDIX C: Interview Protocol
Once I had contacted an individual and coordinated a meeting or phone conversation, I
conducted the semi-structured interview. My interview questions were based on broad
themes about the sources of the plastic waste, the environmental effects, production of
plastic, government policies that govern waste management, where plastic is deposited
and potential solutions for reducing plastic waste. However, these questions were
adjusted based on the interviewee’s expertise and interests and remained fluid and
conversational, leading to highly personal accounts of day-to-day experiences and
interactions related to waste.
Interview Questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

What are the major sources of plastic waste in Thailand?
What are the environmental effects of plastic waste in Thailand?
Where does the plastic waste in Thailand come from?
Is plastic produced in Thailand? If so, does this contribute to the plastic waste
issue?
5. What policies govern plastic waste management in Thailand?
6. Does Thailand import plastic waste? Why?
7. Where is plastic waste deposited? Why?
8. What waste management systems are in place to deal with the plastic waste issue?
9. Are there any initiatives to address the plastic waste issue in Thailand? Who is
included in these and at what scale are they implemented?
10. How can plastic waste be reduced?
11. How does plastic waste affect your day-to-day life?
Is there anything else you would like to discuss or that you think would be important
for me to know?
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